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This dissertation addresses the relationship between history, culture, technology, and urban 
governance in South Korea. It focuses on the technologies and techniques of making and 
governing a smart city and argues that they have been shaped by the long-term concerns for 
security, future, development, and globalization. This is not only evident in national economic 
policies and public discussions of the smart city and the new media technologies, but also in the 
spatial-material arrangement of urban environment and individual daily practices interacting with 
the digital environment.  
 My examination of the New Songdo City in South Korea, one of the first smart cities in 
the world that is technically run by codes and data, provides a historically informed and locally 
specific account of what sociopolitical concerns, such as national security, public safety, climate 
change, and economic development, have guided the digitalization of urban governance. For 
instance, Songdo has deployed numerous sensors and cameras to monitor the urban 
infrastructures and public space. Contrary to the common public response to surveillance in the 
West, Koreans have rapidly adapted to the digital media environment and even perceived the 
monitoring technologies to be safely ‘watching over’ them. This dissertation explores how 
Korea’s unique cultural sensibilities to security, privacy, and development have driven the 
country’s status as one of the most cutting-edge, high-tech nations in the world. At the same 
time, the ongoing proposals for the ‘K-Smart City’ extend the tradition of the export-oriented 
industrial model formulated during the 1960s. This dissertation serves as a counterpoint to the 




and cultural account of the technology and the developmental mentality that characterize Korea’s 
unique path toward digitalization and globalization.  
 The field of communication and media studies is approached in two differing ways 
throughout the dissertation. First, I take a socio-material and contextual approach to the smart 
city and offer a ‘pluralized’ way of thinking about the relationship between media and space. 
Based on participatory observations, I offer an expanded account of mediation that include 
urbanization, multiply affected by the governmental rationality and ideal norms of citizenship in 
South Korea. Second, I take a genealogical approach to the media, cutting across multiple 
temporalities and scales, and provide a critique in a form of history of the present, by accounting 
for the problem of power and its relation to the knowledge production and subject formation. 
Through this genealogy, I trace the history of developmentalism and militarism in South Korean 
modernization and post-war formation of urban science and technology, by bringing together 
history of technologies, mentalities, militarism, and developmental government.  
 Following chapters in the dissertation highlight different but interrelated dimensions of 
the smart city. After briefly reviewing the South Korea’s history of urban planning and its 
relation to the military government in Chapter 1, I address different dimensions of the smart city 
in separate chapters – Mobility (Chapter 2), Security (Chapter 3), Environment (Chapter 4), and 
Futurity (Chapter 5) – and connect them to specific genealogies. I analyze the significance of the 
smart city with respect to the earlier models of national and urban governance in South Korea 
and discuss how the complex history embodied and congealed in today’s smart city, as a 
discourse and a material reality, guides how a desirable future is envisioned and imagined in 
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In 1980, Korean mainstream media, public administrators, businessmen, and general public 
were fascinated by a book just came out from the US. Even if one had not read the book, it was 
hard to miss the book title, “The Third Wave,” cited at least several times by the newspapers and 
broadcast news. New terms such as ‘prosumer’, ‘telecommunity’, and ‘intelligent environment’ 
often entered public discussions about the future of the nation and of the world. The idea of 
future society organized around the electronic industry and information and the seemingly 
inevitable transition of mass society into a more decentralized one instigated hopes about more 
open and democratic society.  
 It was in the same year that Korea experienced a second military coup in the nation’s 
history by Jeon Doo-Hwan, who succeeded late Park Chung-Hee’s authoritarian regime and 
became the president of South Korea. Extending late Park’s presidential legacy, Jeon’s regime 
established the economic growth and anticommunist national security policy as the prior policy 
agenda. In 1983, Jeon’s regime expanded the previous Supporting Committee for Semi-
conductor and launched the Supporting Committee for Information Industry, to take the lead in 
building the nation-wide electronic and computer networks. Jeon continued the support for 
scientific research and development activities at the universities and companies like Samsung, a 
company that had started its electronics production business in the 1960s. Samsung, like many 
other chaebols (family-owned large corporations), maintained a close relationship with the 
government to jumpstart and scale its business in a highly rapid fashion. In 1986, Samsung 
demonstrated its first Home Automation technology design called the ‘HA101’. In an article 
published in the Donga Science magazine in 1987, Choi Suk-Gyu, a researcher from Samsung 
Electronics introduced the notion of 3A, which consisted of FA (Factory Automation), OA 
(Office Automation), and HA (Home Automation), which was again divided into Home Security 
System, Home Control System, and Home Information System. Different systems were going to 
be connected by magnetic contacts, infrared, or microwaves. The automation of home, if realized 
by 2000 and reach the consumer market, it was said, was going to revolutionize our life.  
 
It is often said that smart city is going to alter our lives in the future urban world. Technically, a 
smart city is defined as a city that collects and utilizes data gathered from distributed sensors and 
video cameras that connect everything from trash bins to streetlights. Smart city is the ultimate 
dream of urban scientists who want to do away with the ‘human factor’ in urban management, in 
order to maximize efficiency and functionality, pass the drudgery on to the machines, and even 
to create new revenue streams for the private businesses. Many corporate and professional 
narratives, produced and reproduced by technology corporations, consultancy firms, bureaucrats, 




smart city as an intriguing new urban imaginary and an ongoing frontier of technological 
innovation.  
 Yet, we hear very few stories that tell how any particular smart city actually came into 
being – the stories that gauge the influences of different histories of different cities and nations, 
the governmental and institutional settings, and the affective charge associated with futurity, 
globalization, technological advancement, the aspirations for a quality of life that are inextricably 
bound and entangled with the information and communication technologies (ICT), as seen in the 
epigraph above. Instead, we are often times stuck with the ‘corporate storytelling of smart cities’ 
(Soderstrom, Paasche, Kaluser, 2014) that take technological changes associated with smart city 
for granted and limit our task to modify, moderate, and improve their effects.  
 But what kind of a story could we tell about a smart city, if we take the epigraph above as 
a point of departure, charting the broad range of sociotechnical, material, and cultural transitions 
that conditioned the emergence of a smart city in a non-Western context of South Korea?  
 Before I describe the plan for this dissertation, a brief sketch of different narratives about 
the smart city is necessary to establish the ground for this work. Many stories about the smart 
city that I summarize below are versions of the stories we have heard before, about the ‘old’ 
technologies when they were all once ‘new’. The steam engine, the radio, the television, the 
Internet, and the smartphone had their own versions of these narratives that marked each 
technology as the crucial conjuncture in a linear progress of history. We live in a technological 
society, but the stories we often hear about it follow similar repertoire. One such repertoire 
frames the history as consisting of ‘waves’ of changes, which are instigated by the main 
protagonist(s) who invented technology. Changes are seen as self-generative, if not inevitable. 




habitually reproduce this kind of narrative – although some of the recent projects recognized the 
criticisms and instead now claim that “cities always have been smart” (Toronto Sidewalk Lab).    
 Defined as a popular urban planning strategy, development model, technical 
infrastructure, or a form of urban intelligence, smart city is often seen as an outcome of an 
invention or a series of inventions that benefit our lives in the cities. A softer version of this 
extremism posits the smart city as an optimal solution to the problems that arise from the 
accelerating pace of urbanization: traffic congestions, deteriorating air quality, rising energy 
consumption, crime rates and so on. As the argument goes, smart city is distinct from other top-
down planning strategies, in that it responds to the citizen demand for increased mobility, safety, 
and cleaner environment.  
 The narratives like the above assume the instrumentalist and positivist view of 
technology, which sees technology as a value-neutral means to serve human ends (see Christians, 
2014, for the three traditions in the philosophy of technology). Hence the proponents of the smart 
city overwhelmingly focus on the internal computational logic of the smart city and the intended 
impact on mobility, sustainability, resilience, governance, and society (Gershenson, Santi, & 
Ratti, 2016). Smart city in and of itself is not thought of as having any meaning or intention, 
since it is abstracted from the given society’s character or histories – instead, its meaning is to be 
found in the impact it has on the society. The “new urban science” that the smart city promotes 
stands on this tradition that renders technology as tools to improve efficiency, speed, ubiquity, 
and adaptability of urban systems.   
 However, insofar as the means and ends of technology are separated, “pleading for more 
concern about ends is futile” (Christians, 2014, p. 518). If the smart city’s claim to be open, 




skepticism, one of the reasons for this is that its concerns for the societal ends only come up in an 
afterthought. In other words, smart city as a form (e.g., computational capacities of sensors) 
preceded the particulars of the content and the values (e.g., sustainability, civic participation), 
which not only separated the means from the ends but also limited the parameters of applicable 
contents that could be rendered through the form. While urban policy analysts attempt to address 
the split between the means and the ends, they always work within the assumption that 
technological progress is a given fact and only ask how to make it operate more effectively and 
with less repercussion. They never address the fundamental questions of social relations and 
institutional arrangements that underlie the problems in and of the city. To get out of this futile 
loophole, perhaps a different approach is necessary.    
 Critical scholars of the city and technology on the other hand, have offered different 
responses to the smart city. Approaching the smart city as a correspondence to the new form of 
social control and wealth accumulation (Holland, 2008, 2015; Greenfield, 2013; Wiig, 2015; 
Sennett, 2012; Sadowski & Pasquale, 2015; Soderstrom, Paasche, Kaluser, 2014; Morozov & 
Bria, 2018), the studies within this approach largely focused on analyzing the corporate 
narratives and strategies and the governmental initiatives of the smart city. They have made valid 
points about the perils of the dominant spatial logic inherent in the smart city, problematizing the 
techno-optimistic and generic caricatures of the city and the urban infrastructures that are 
configured to serve the profit motives of a few giant tech companies such as IBM and Cisco. For 
instance, in an early polemic against the smart city as a ‘self-congratulatory’ urban labeling, 
Hollands (2008) argued how the supposedly liberating potential of digital technology has in fact 
polarized the smart and creative workers and the unskilled and relatively poor populations. His 




‘creative cities’, which he sees as falling short of addressing the real problems of the city (i.e. 
inequality, poverty, uneven development). Without addressing these structural issues, smart city 
reproduces and exacerbates the problems that already exist in the cities, by serving the corporate 
end of anchoring wealth in land and infrastructures.  
 In these analyses, smart city is largely seen as symptomatic of macro-social structure: a 
lens to read off and critique the underlying politico-economic logic such as the expansion of 
neoliberalism, the corporate control over the city and business model that profits from the 
pervasive surveillance. In this view, technology is often conflated as the capitalist system itself, 
attributed as the main source of the problems including differential access and mobility, privacy 
invasion, limitation of civil right and freedom, and people’s entitled ‘right to the city’.  
 While these critical accounts of the smart city bring enlightening facts about the 
dominant corporate influence that generates utopian, homogeneous, and soulless “stupefying 
smart cities” (Sennett, 2012) and demonstrate that a provider’s good ‘intention’ alone is 
inadequate to fulfill the technology’s egalitarian promise, they tended to under-theorize the local 
specificities of these problems. Smart city was reduced to the matter of dominant corporate 
narratives and the urban developmental policies, not reflective of the “wider socio-technical 
assemblage within which it is embedded” (Kitchin, 2016).1 
 As a result, the critical approaches to the smart cities undertaken by the scholars from the 
Global North produced sweeping statements about the smart city’s overwhelming potential to 
exacerbate the corporate structure of control, surveillance, and exclusivity, while not taking a 
cautious approach to the differing cultural norms, political systems, countries in other parts of the 
 
1	What Kitchin intends to explain through the notion of ‘socio-technical assemblage’ extends from his 
earlier writings on code/space, a concept he used to emphasize a co-constitutive relationship between 
code and space. By reframing his concept as socio-technical assemblage, Kitchin attempts to extend his 
view by calling attention to the situated-ness of the code in the discursive, economic, and material 




world. While the structuralist approach can serve as a corrective to the instrumentalist approach 
to the smart city, its macro-view of society underestimates the mattering of culture in 
deployment of technologies. When a new type of technology emerges, it is not deployed across a 
flat and homogeneous terrain; it is overlaid on a heterogeneous domain that has developed in 
response to preceding technologies and cultures that are not reducible to any overarching 
‘structure’.   
 Alternatively, a third approach to the smart city can offer a more close-up view of 
technology in actions, including the human practices of manufacturing, designing, fabricating, 
and using the technological products as well as the cultural and historical conditions that frame 
those actions. This approach largely informed by the ‘co-determinist view’ of technology and 
culture frequents terms like ‘networks’ and ‘assemblages’. In Heideggerian sense, the emphasis 
is placed on the ‘existence’, rather than the ‘essence’, of technology that reveals its truthfulness 
in a given situation, as it goes through the processes of ‘translation’ (Callon, 1986) and ‘friction’ 
(Tsing, 2005).  
 This third approach does not necessarily attempt to grasp technology in its full totality 
through structural or phenomenological dimension but instead, attends to the localized process in 
which technology reveals through human discursive and physical practices in an ‘actually 
existing smart city’ (Shelton, Zook, & Wiig, 20015). Writing in the context of Italy, for instance, 
Alberto Vanolo (2014) observes how the concept of the smart city, which had been transferred 
from the US to the EU, and from Brussels to Italy, implies a disciplinary mechanism through the 
new urban imaginary of the smart city as a ‘good’ city. He especially notices how technology 
and environment have become main ways of framing urban problems in smart city discourse, 




city. While cities are called out and made responsible for its reinvention and for the achievement 
of ‘smartness’, any different paths of development, he argues, are framed as being deviant.    
 Beside the above work, there has been a steady increase in the smart city research 
undertaken beyond the context of the global North, such as in South Korea (Shwayri, 2013; Shin, 
H. B., 2017; Sonn, Shin, & Park, 2017), India (Datta, 2016; 2018, Mertia, 2017), Turkey 
(Hoyng, 2016), and Singapore (Tay, 2019). As an illustrative example, consider Ayona Datta 
(2018)’s study of the India’s national ‘100 Smart Cities Mission’ and her interpretation of 
intersecting popular myths (e.g., myth of speed, myth of moral nation-state) and the underlying 
power relations of postcolonial urbanism that are articulated in the scale of the smart city. Datta 
ably shows how smart cities in India break the universal mold of the smart city that is primarily 
data-driven and instead are situated in the range of intersecting narratives and temporalities 
including the postcolonial futurism, the conflation of urbanism and nationalism, and the myth of 
speed and technology. Through multiple strategies, smart city becomes an instrument of power 
and a stage for the paternalist nation state’s performance of moral governance where multiple 
modalities of time (past, present, and future) and scales of entities crisscross and converge.    
 The topic of this dissertation shares the philosophy and goal with the above studies taking 
a localized and cultural approach to the smart city, in order to decentralize and pluralize the 
account of smart city – which is one of the defining goals that guides this research. Contesting 
the unilateral, deterministic, and totalizing narratives about the smart city, this dissertation 
highlights the multifaceted nature of the smart city, which consists of a combination of 
seemingly distant and unrelated moments of decision making, planning, and preparations, by 
radically contextualizing its context and articulating the interconnections among those multiple 




cultural contexts that I bring together with the smart city: globalization and digitalization, 
securitization and surveillance, sustainability and environment, and techno-futurity and creative 
economy. As it will be shown, smart city manifests differently in these arenas of social problems. 
I aim to illustrate how the emergence of a smart city brings together multiple strings of history 
and problematizations that are contingently interweaved at a given time and space.  
 Thus, the task of ‘radically contextualizing the current conjuncture’ (Grossberg, 2010) of 
smart city in this dissertation first involves capturing the instances in which smart city exists in 
multiple, diffused, and decentralized forms. However, the challenge then arises, in terms of how 
to bring the knowledge to the question of technology itself, to make visible the relationship 
between a knowledge produced in one context with another (and to even produce a consistently 
written dissertation about it!).  
 Although this dissertation borrows a great deal of insights from urban ethnographies of 
technological infrastructures (Dourish & Bell, 2007), and for that matter, from cultural 
geography (Amin & Thrift, 2002), this dissertation not entirely about the everyday life 
‘experience’ of technology. What is instead, distinct about this dissertation and its contribution to 
the field of smart city research is that it foregrounds the fourth, another crucial dimension that 
has to be added in our ‘cultural approach’ to the smart city, as a ‘technology and a cultural form’, 
which is about the cultural and historical continuity of technology. Raymond Williams (1974)’s 
useful insight into the place of television in the post-War capitalist societies, for instance, was 
concerned with the ways in which television, as a new technology, resolved the contradictory 
social pressures of mobility and privatized homes (decentralization) and the demand for a new 
means of social integration and control (centralization). Broadcasting technology functioned as a 




transformed practices of dwelling, work, and family life, as well as large scale political and 
economic processes that presented an imperative need for new kinds of communication and 
social contact. Television, which remediated and combined earlier forms of media, such as radio 
and cinema in particular, became a specialized means for the emerging social needs, cultural 
expectations, and a new model of communication, which led to the development of this new 
technology.  
 How can one apply Williams’ insight in the study of smart city, as a technology and a 
cultural form? How does the smart city resolve the dual social pressure of decentralization 
(individualization, ubiquity, automation) and centralization (standardization, synchronization, 
governance)? What kind of social needs, cultural expectations and broader transformation in 
political and economic processes are accommodated by the smart city? In establishing the 
ground for what I will call, ‘a cultural history of the smart city’, this dissertation offers a 
genealogical and diagrammatic analysis of the smart city and its articulation in the South Korean 
city of Songdo, taking into account the various social needs and large scale transformative social 
processes that intensified in the 21st century, such as globalization, security and safety, demand 
for clean environment, quality of life, cultural institutions, and creative economy. By placing the 
technology in question within the ‘continuities and shifts’ of cultural forms, this dissertation 
strategically modifies the instrumentalist, one-dimensional, and deterministic account of smart 
city. The genealogy of the smart city that I offer here is neither a linear nor a comprehensive 
‘history of smart city’, but a series of interweaved histories and urban ‘diagrams’, which multiply 
construct the smart city within varying scales and dimensions.  
 In the next section, I will explain in more detail, my plan for this dissertation. I 




and culture. These questions will be followed by a summary of the theories and analytical tools 
that I will use to answer those questions.  
Plan for the Present Work 
 This dissertation addresses the technological, spatial, historical, and cultural forces that 
have variously given shape to the smart city, especially as they manifest in the context of South 
Korean city of Songdo. Through the above introduction, I reviewed some of the existing studies 
on the smart city, discussed their approaches and philosophies of technology, and positioned my 
project as a cultural (as relating to the specific local context in which technology is articulated) 
and historical (as focusing on the continuity and rupture of technological changes) inquiry of the 
smart city in South Korea.    
 This dissertation primarily addresses the questions formed within three main categories:   
- Space: How does the smart city the resolve the need for a new spatial ordering and a spatial 
mode of governance? How do the emerging concerns for the ‘environment’ articulate in the 
smart city’s urban governance? Is smart city visually, spatially, materially different from any 
other kind of cities? What are some spatial features that stand out about the given smart city’s 
representational and spatial practices within and around it?  
- History: What are the related histories of the smart city? Are there any historical precedents of 
smart city (i.e. cybernetic city, information city, ubiquitous city)? How does South Korea’s 
unique historical trajectory (i.e., colonialism, militarism, developmental state) influence the 
cultural expectations and approaches to the smart cities in South Korea? Does smart city signal 
a qualitative shift in history? What were the social pressures of that change?  
- Culture: Are there intentions or values inherent in the smart city? What were the specific needs 




and posed as problems (made problematic)? What are the ways in which the smart city functions 
as a new form of governmentality (mode of rule)?   
To even begin this kind of interdisciplinary inquiry, one has to draw from a broad range of 
different theoretical resources. In the following paragraphs, I will summarize the main theories 
and concepts (e.g., technological zones, urban laboratory, diagram, media genealogy, 
governmentality, environmentality, governmobility, sociotechnical imaginaries) that I will 
primarily use to address the above questions. They offer useful insights that make connections 
between technology and government, the past and the present, discursive and non-discursive 
dimensions of the smart city. As it will be shown, by combining the perspectives from these 
keywords, my approach to the smart city will offer a comprehensive understanding of the 
relationship between technology, culture, and history and of the dynamic between the social 
demand for decentralization (i.e., freedom, speed, flow, mobility) and the political rationalities 
for centralized urban governance (i.e., control, security).  
Space 
To address the issues of ‘space’ in this research, I draw from theories, methods, and research 
from urban studies, cultural geography, and media studies. Within the Korean communication 
studies field, although the issues of space have been only marginally dealt with, there recently 
has emerged a group of scholars who engaged with anthropology and geography to address the 
grittiness of everyday life and locality (Lee, 2002, 2007; Kim, 2007). This intellectual movement 
reflects the influence of the ‘spatial turn’ in cultural studies in the 1990s (particularly inspired by 
the writings of Soja, 1989, 1996; Harvey, 1989; Lefebvre, 1991).2   
 The proponents of the cultural approach to the issues of space pitted themselves against 
 
2	As an early example, consider Jeon Gyu-Chan (2010)’s reading of modern urban landscape such as 
metro subway and his attempt to theorize the metro as the mass media and Lee Kihyeung (2007)’s 




those concerned with macro-economic process of urbanization, which found the logic of 
capitalistic accumulation as the predominant underlying cause of the transition. Lee Keehyeung 
(2002) counters the so-called ‘flexibilization thesis’, which treated culture merely as a 
metanarrative, by focusing on productive forces, technology, and information and by neglecting 
the micro-worlds of the every day. He contends that while “a monocausal use of the state-driven 
capitalism as the all-enveloping ‘colonizer of everyday life’” is pervasive in many critical 
literatures of geography and urban studies in Korea (p. 107), it is mandatory that cultural studies 
practitioners who ‘read’ these cultural zones should be cautious not to make sweeping statements 
with regard to the character and mediating role of these spaces as either ‘commodified’, or 
liberating (see pp. 106-109 for the Critique of Critical Urban Studies in Korea).  
 Apropos the tension between ‘the cultural’ versus ‘the critical’ approach to space and the 
challenge of articulating the spatiality of the smart city, to start off, we may benefit from 
Williams’ (1974) attempt to capture the dual pressure of centralization and decentralization, 
which he theorized through his thesis of ‘mobile privatization’. In a similar vein, Antoine Picon 
(2015) defines the smart city as a ‘spatialized intelligence’ that internalizes mechanism of 
learning, understanding, and reasoning, which has become intrinsic to the city itself. The new 
spatial intelligence of the smart city addresses the two competing kinds of social pressure: the 
intensification of the individualized relationship with the city and the ubiquity of computational 
ability on the one hand and the return of the utopian and ‘neocybernetic temptation’ on the other. 
Smart city exhibits a complex form of intelligence, which, unlike the Big Brother-type 
centralized governance imagined in the 1960s and 1970s, is envisaged as a cooperation between 
machines and humans and is generative of events and adaptive situations, rather than a 




  The co-constitutive spatiality of the smart city then, operates through the dialectic 
tensions between rule and freedom, between the forces of centralization and decentralization, and 
between stasis and movement. And these relations play out through different spatial planes, 
including the political, techno-scientific, and discursive domain. The three keywords that I 
summarize below correspond to the ‘zonal’, ‘laboratorial’, and ‘diagrammatic’ spatiality of the 
smart city, which I extensively utilize throughout this research.  
(1) Technological zones 
Technological zones, as contemporary forms of space that intersect with various techniques and 
technologies, appropriately capture the various technological characteristics of the smart city, 
including its material, legal, and institutional practices and protocols. Zoning has been integral to 
the history of modern urban planning, which divided the city space and partitioned specific 
activities (e.g., residential, commercial, industrial, etc.) into tightly programmed zones.  
 Many studies have pointed out how the zoning for the smart city now acquired financial 
and logistical practices, such as in Songdo’s Free Economic Zone (FEZ) where IT and business-
related practices are given selective ‘freedom’ from the government (Park, 2005; Easterling, 
2014; Halpern, Mitchell, Geoghegan, 2017). Ostensibly, Songdo’s master plan replicates the 
formal order of a midsize American city of the mid-twentieth century, by segregating work space 
(to take place in the Central Business District) from residential clusters and designated cultural 
complex (Greenfield, 2013). More broadly, zoning technique is also an integral strategy of the 
government (Ong, 2006) for a city such as Songdo, especially as it disperses and realigns market 
strategies and resources, leading to the differential distribution of freedom to differentiated 




     In a similar vein, through the term ‘technological zones’, Andrew Barry (2001) expands 
the notion of zoning in urban planning sense and emphasizes how the zones have centrally 
functioned as the space of the government. Barry explains how various forms of zones cut across 
territorial boundaries (i.e., nation-state) and how they are constantly being contested, maintained 
and securitized by political actions associated with their boundaries. Technology is a formative 
part of how a zone is governed, in the sense that it is an integral component of the material 
construction of space and that it figures as the primary criterion for assessing the performativity 
of that given space.  
 Barry’s notion of ‘technological zones’ is helpful for analyzing a space that is shaped by 
multiple techniques and technologies of the government such as the smart cities, which are 
marked by a significant level of differentiation and variations, as they overlap with or contain 
other zones (e.g., clouds, wifi zones, data platforms, infrastructures, financial and logistical 
zones, residential zones, commercial zones, industrial zones, etc.). As a result, smart city does 
not exist as a singular zone but as multiple zones that are fractured and contested. While 
openness, flexibility, flows and circulations are the main criteria of success of these zones, the 
inevitable instability that comes along with it requires a frequent security effort. Technological 
zones are secured and governed by boundaries, standards and protocols that regulate and 
synchronize the activities within the zones. The shift toward the data-driven governance of 
technological zones intensify the depoliticized appearance of these zones, as they relegate 
important decisions to the technological devices (e.g., using passwords, encryptions, RFID card 
access for ‘security’ purposes) and the social problems are mainly addressed through deployment 




sustainability, CPTED system for security). Through generating these automated decisions, the 
technological zones of the smart city become what Barry calls, the ‘political machine’. 
(2) Laboratory  
Laboratory has been a recurring spatial theme in the smart city literature, where the cities are 
portrayed as sites to demonstrate, beta-test, and simulate an array of technologies such as the 
Internet of Things (IoT), smart CCTV, self-driving cars, and automated homes. Since as early as 
the days of Chicago School urban sociologists, city has been thought of as a laboratory, a stage 
for urban planning, and a liberal government’s demonstrative site of exercising its power (Joyce, 
2003). I benefit from the view of smart city as an urban laboratory, a platform for the ‘new 
spatial science’ (Shelton, 2017) and the ‘test-bed urbanism’ (Halpern, LeCavalier, Calvillo, & 
Pietsch, 2013), which has become a breeding ground for a culture of ‘smartness’, perceived to be 
bound within the space demarcated as the smart city.  
 Etymologically, the word ‘laboratory’ originates from the medieval Latin 
word laboratorium, meaning a “place for labor or work.” In modern science, laboratory has been 
an integral component of its new form of knowledge production, which involved the purified and 
sanitized laboratory setting itself, as well as the group of experts who collectively witnessed the 
process of testing and proving the validity of the knowledge. According to Shapin & Shaffer 
(1985), the empirical science in a modern sense democratized the work of natural philosophy 
that previously had been contained within the minds of a few geniuses, and instead gave 
authority to the scientific facts that were generated from literary texts, data, and experiments 
conducted in a controlled laboratory setting.  
 Articulating smart city an urban laboratory, the proponents of ‘smartness’ continue to 




productive of useful knowledge for the society. However, the laboratorial disposition, entrenched 
in the myth of ‘purification’ (Latour, 1991), de-differentiates the contingent local contexts and 
suspends any concern about histories, for the sake of establishing a universal truth. Smart city 
proponents apparently extend the laboratorial thinking, especially when they aim to make the 
city into an ‘exportable’ model and to replicate its results elsewhere (e.g., South Korean Ministry 
of Future Planning’s ‘K-Smart City’ project). Despite its claim to resolve the problems of the 
‘real world’ (e.g., traffic, energy, security), the smart city’s technocratic approach to the ‘reality’ 
assumes an abstract and controlled spatiality and defines the ‘problem’ as in need of intervention 
by a specific kind of smart people who befit the value and visions of the smart city industry.  
 Reading the smart city as an urban laboratory helps me to identify another important 
dimension about the space, regarding its relations to the process of knowledge production and its 
relations to the issues of power. Smart city is neither a single invention nor a finished product – it 
is always in a process of becoming, updating, and anticipating (Halpern & Günel, 2017). 
Besides, both the zonal and laboratorial spatialities of the smart city are pervaded by cultural, 
normative, and governmental dimension of space, through which power is distributed, realigned, 
and exercised. I turn to my next keyword ‘diagram’ to elaborate this dimension.     
 (3) Diagrams  
Through the notion of ‘diagrams’, Osborne & Rose (1999) offered a useful insight for analyzing 
how the city has become an instrument for the government’s ‘laboratory of conduct’. The 
diagrammatic approach to the city identifies the ideas, techniques, practices, and operations that 
construct certain ethical relationship between the city and the self, which involves a close 
reading into the broad discursive formation of a ‘good city’ (i.e. ‘smart’, ‘creative’, ‘innovative’, 




approach to space is that it emphasizes the normative ways in which the city is imagined, 
constructed, and governed and the ways in which the whole process of normalization is enacted 
through the voluntary participation of the ideally forged personhood.  
 As previously stated, smart city is neither a single technological invention nor an entirely 
social construction. Rather, it becomes a smart city “only by association with the idea of the 
smart city and the narratives, logics, practices, and symbolism of which it is constituted” 
(Sadowski & Bendor, 2018, p. 2). In diagrammatic terms, it is through the relations between 
different urban diagrams that the smart city weaves itself into the various dimensions of urban 
life including health, security, culture, and economy. In this way, smart city becomes more than 
just a geographically demarcated space or a technical infrastructure, but a necessary instrument 
for the ‘good’ urban governance that is mutually constructed by the stylization of ‘good’ civic 
virtue and conduct. 
  Osborne & Rose (1999) borrows the concept of ‘diagram’ from Deleuze’s interpretation 
of Foucault’s notion of dispositif, which is defined as “a map of dispersed social relations 
through which power is exercised” (Deleuze, 1988). While a diagram can literally refer to the 
schemes, policies, and programs of actions, it can also include the “mundane techniques of 
gathering, organization, classification, and publication of information” (Osborne & Rose, 1999, 
p.739). Diagram is a way of ‘mapping’ the assemblage of multiple social forces that constitute 
power that is not reducible to a single logic of economic structure or a technological 
infrastructure. Consisting of spatio-temporal multiplicity, diagram shows how power is realized 
and exercised through relations that are distributed in space and how in that process, diagram 




More crucially, these diagrams map constant forces that claim certain ‘truths’ about the city, in 
as much as an exercise of power is inseparable from the process of knowledge production. These 
forces do not necessarily originate from a central power source alone (e.g., technological 
infrastructure, economic activities, neoliberal logic) but rather flow through the dispersed 
practices, techniques, and narratives.  
 In this way, ‘urban diagram’ that denotes both the discursive and non-discursive ways in 
which government has been territorialized in an urban form, becomes a useful framework for this 
research to bridge the zonal and laboratorial concerns about space (primarily concerned with 
technoscientific, institutional, and rational dimensions of space) and the normative, ethical, 
aspirational, and affective dimensions of space. For instance, smart city’s diagram of urban 
security involves an array of surveillance technologies, techniques of policing and risk reduction, 
as well as the scientific knowledge about urban crimes and disasters, the image of the city 
portrayed as a potentially dangerous place, and the idea of self understood as a field of 
responsibility to prioritize the safety and health of itself and the others.   
 Thus, to think of smart city as consisting of multiple urban diagrams is to suggest 
attending to the technical as well as cognitive, not merely ideological or ideal but functional 
dimension of its spatiality. Bringing the three keywords ‘zones’, laboratory’ and ‘diagram’ 
together and applying these insights into my research on the smart city, I articulate the operative 
rationality of four distinct but interrelated urban diagrams – ‘global city’, ‘secure city’, green 
city’, and ‘creative city’ – which respectively correspond to the topic of my chapters. In 
articulating these diagrams in separate chapters, I offer a long historical context pertaining to 




narratives about globalization, security and safety, quality of life and environment, culture and 
economy in South Korea.   
History 
Besides a few exceptions (Halpern, 2014), there currently is a significant paucity in the strand of 
research that focuses on the ‘long history of smart city’. While there are a number of ways that 
this history can be charted, a thorough version might trace the evolution of the diversity of 
concept from the ‘architecture machine’ (Negroponte, 1970), ‘city of bits’ (Mitchell, 1995), 
‘cyber city’ (Graham, 2004), ‘cyborg city’ (Gandy, 2005), ‘digital city’ (Aurigi, 2005), ‘smart 
homes’ (Allon, 2004; Kember & Zylinska, 2012), ‘smart communities’ (Eger, 2005), as well as 
many other related models including the ‘intelligent city’, ‘knowledge city’, and ‘information 
city’.  
 The key internal logic of computational urbanism that undergirds today’s smart city idea 
is rooted in the cybernetics. According to Halpern (2014), architectural engineers have been 
working since the 1950s to apply cybernetic approaches to human habitation. Norbert Weiner 
coined the term ‘cybernetics’ from the Greek word meaning a ‘governor’, which posited an 
analogous relationship between a city government and a control device in a large feedback 
control loop. For instance, E. S. Savas (1970)’ essay “Cybernetics in the City Hall” suggests 
concrete ways in which an analogy can be drawn between cybernetics and the city government, 
which can be understood as an organized and adaptive system. If that relation can be understood 
properly, it could improve the inefficient bureaucratic system. Because the problems of the city 
are often complex and contingent, Savas suggests designing multiple minor-feedback loops 
instead of a large, all-encompassing one, meaning, the government could merit from opting for a 




this scheme, city government becomes one of the agents acting upon the system of the city, along 
with many complex factors and interest groups that affect the city life – corporations, banks, 
unions, medical societies and so on. In this way, Savas even saw the potential of participatory 
democracy through cybernetic principle, by viewing the city as an information system and 
citizens as part of that information feedback, an idea that is reincarnated in many of today’s 
smart city proposals (Goodspeed, 2015).3              
 With that being said, as I previously stated at the beginning of this introduction, this 
dissertation charts a history of a smart city from a different point of departure from South Korea 
in the 1980s. To trace the broad range of sociotechnical, material, and cultural transitions that 
conditioned the emergence of a smart city in South Korea today, in the city of Songdo in 
particular, the chapters in dissertation each take a form of ‘genealogy’. Through these specific 
genealogies, this dissertation traces the multiplicity of the ruptures and continuities that manifest 
in the scale of different urban diagrams that correlate to the topics of globalization, security and 
safety, environment, and culture and economy in South Korea. To repeat, this dissertation 
situates Songdo and its current smart city scheme within a broader context of South Korean 
modern history and explores the multiplicity of the sciences of the city (including urban 
planning, data-driven urban governance), the privileged place of science and technology in the 
state-led industrialization, public administration of culture, science, and technology, and 
normalization of surveillance in militarized modernization in South Korea. Although my 
research focuses on the case of Songdo as a prime example of South Korean smart city, through 
 
3	The contemporary sense of ‘smartness’ in the smart city denotes dense instrumentation of software and 
digital technologies that distribute computational function into objects and spaces, altering conditions 
through which the space and time of everyday activities are produced (Kitchin & Dodge, 2011). These 
‘intelligent’ and networked objects and spaces then constitute the minor-feedback loops in the city that is 
in turn, organized as a large complex system that operates and controls the relationships among these 
technical objects: ubiquitous computing, wifi, ambient screens, radio frequency identification technology 




this genealogy, I demonstrate how the current initiatives for the smart city in South Korea co-
evolved with multiple urban diagrams and a series of techniques and practices.  
(1) ‘Media genealogy’ 
In conjunction with the diagrammatic orientation of this dissertation that charts the multiplicity 
of techniques, discourses, and knowledges that make up the smart city in the present, I deploy 
the concept of ‘media genealogy’ (Monea & Packer, 2016) as a guide to trace a long history of a 
smart city. Foregrounded as a response to the recent interest in ‘media archaeology’ (Parikka, 
2012) as a prominent method of media history, ‘media genealogy’ problematizes the former’s 
lack of interest or inability to address the issues of power and contends that it needs to be more 
systematically politicized. Instead, Monea & Packer (2016) suggest that we recognize the 
distinction between archaeology and genealogy and synthesize both as analytical tools for the 
historical critique of the present.  
 As a way of exploring genealogy as a useful method in media studies, Packer (2013) 
gives an overview of the intellectual history of Foucault’s work in particular and investigates 
possible ways of using his approach to guide our examination of the current media technology 
and institutions. The apparent distinction between archaeology and genealogy is that the former 
best describes Foucault’s work from the 1960s whereas the latter describes the one he began in 
the early 1970s. Whereas archaeology, most extensively elaborated in Archaeology of 
Knowledge, is about investigating the historical constitution of a specific field of knowledge 
(such as psychology, medicine, human sciences, economics, biology, linguistics), genealogy 
more holistically investigates how power has been historically constituted and resisted through 
governmental rationalities, forms of knowledge, and practices of the self. The genealogical 




works on governmentality and biopolitics. A significant difference between archaeology and 
genealogy seems to be the extent to which they foreground the relation of power and its 
concurrent rendering on the institutions, knowledge, and technologies of the self. One could say 
that genealogy incorporates archaeological approach but extends it by putting into perspective 
the power relations and the questions of subjectivity. In Foucault’s own words, archaeology is 
“an analysis of local discursivities” and genealogy is “tactics on the basis of the descriptions of 
these local discursivities” through which “the subjected knowledges [sic] which were thus 
released would be brought into play” (Foucault, 1980, p.85).    
 Foucault’s turn to genealogy reflects his attempt to counter the positivistic and totalizing 
account of history, especially as he says the goal of writing history is to construct a ‘historical 
knowledge of struggle’. The primary objective of his struggle would be the scientific forms of 
knowledge that hierarchize and centralize power, which is then linked to the organization and 
function of a society dependent on the scientific discourse – so much so that Foucault goes on to 
declare that “genealogies are precisely anti-sciences” (p.83).  
 Although Foucault was not directly concerned with media and communication 
technology in his analysis, Packer (2013) makes a case that it is apparently possible to draw 
significant insights from his work which will help us to understand the “centrality of 
communication technologies in the reformulation of governance” which is a defining feature of 
media histories (p.4). Bringing genealogical and archaeological approach together can be useful 
for “understanding how subjects come into being through mediation, entwined within 
technological and governmental relations of power, whose existence depends upon scientific and 
vernacular knowledge productive of and produced by media technologies, institutions, and 




understanding of media technologies, institutions, and forms and to achieve a historical and 
politically engaged media studies scholarship, which gets out of the division between the textual 
analysis versus political economy analysis of media, or historical versus ethnographic approach 
to media.   
  In order to more substantially utilize media genealogy as an analytical tool for this 
project, I will briefly explain below another critical notion of Foucault that I will frequently use 
throughout the dissertation.  
(2) Problematization 
In Genealogy as Critique, Koopman (2013) states the goal of genealogy is to articulate the 
‘submerged’ problems that are neither readily apparent nor come with supposed solutions. It is a 
“critique in the form of the historical problematization of the present” (p.2), which involves 
identifying a network of multiple strategies of power and a various thread of thought and 
practices that are woven together to shape the present. In this way, problematization, as a mode 
of critique, makes intelligible the complexity and contingency of the problems that we face in the 
present, and in so doing, uses history as a means to intervene in the present as we know it, which 
has been contingently made up.   
  Following this problematization approach, this dissertation articulates the intersections of 
power, knowledge, and subjectivity within a given problematic field and traces the emergence of 
the present where the smart city is becoming stabilized as a solution to the problems. In other 
words, if the smart city is offered as a solution, we have to ask what the supposed problems 
actually are that it proposes to solve, and what the historical and social conditions were that 
made the problem saliently problematic. For instance, while the smart city is perceived as a 




of the problems came to matter in the present and how technology is supposed to address those 
problems are not carefully thought about. Therefore, the genealogy I offer in this dissertation will 
investigate the problems that are at stake in the smart city, explore the sociocultural and 
historical conditions that have shaped those problems in the present, and ask in what ways, the 
smart city came to assume a privileged position to solve those problems.  
Culture 
Lastly, this dissertation brings forth the question of ‘culture’ of the smart city. More specifically, 
I ask how the smart city has become a crucial motif and a popular imagery of the future city and 
a form of governmentality that enrolls certain type of personhood and a practice of the self. To 
address these questions, I draw from cultural studies and governmentality studies to 
contextualize the broader domain of culture of the smart city within which power is exercised in 
specific ways and with multiple technologies.   
  As I stated previously, of a particular interest in this dissertation is the technological as 
well as cultural organization of smart city that involves complex technological, historical forces 
and flows through which the infrastructures, information, and meanings, take shape. To think of 
smart city as a ‘cultural technology’, I echo Dourish & Bell (2007; 2011)’s view of the mutual 
relationship between technical infrastructure and culture and their claim that a landscape is not 
simply a physical topology, but also a cultural and historical one (Dourish & Bell, 2007, p.422). 
But extending this view more significantly, this dissertation benefits from a particular group of 
cultural studies scholars (Bennett, 1998; Hay, 2006, 2012; Ouellette & Hay, 2008; McRobbie, 
2016) whose concerns about the culture involved more than a textual analysis of symbolic 
representations and misrepresentations and recognized the broad range of spatiality, history, and 




subject and the practice of the self. Building on their insight, one crucial issue this dissertation 
explores is the link between the smart city’s automated form of intelligence that grants autonomy 
to the machines and the sociological discourse about the individualized responsibility to 
‘autonomously’ manage and maintain personal safety, mobility, and self-care. Through this 
investigation, this dissertation traces the linkages between the practical and technical activities 
related to the smart city and the ways of constructing the material and ‘affective’ landscape of 
the smart city. In this vein, I deploy following concepts (governmentality, environmentality, 
governmobility, sociotechnical imaginaries) to explore the cultural dimension of a smart city, 
relating to the normative, intimate, and indirect ways in which the technologies of the 
government permeate and stabilize in the everyday life world.      
(1) Governmentality  
Foucault’s concept of governmentality is the central framework for this research as it aims to 
understand how power infiltrates into an intimate sphere of individual life, such as in one’s 
relation to itself and to others and its management of conduct. This is another way of examining 
the operation of power the in-direct realm of ‘culture’ and in the non-state actions including the 
personal ‘conduct of conduct’. In a simple term, “governmentality refers to the arts and 
rationalities of governing, where the conduct of conduct is the key activity” (Bratich, Packer, & 
McCarthy, 2003). Thinking through governmentality directs our attention to the ways in which 
the relations between persons and culture are organized within the context of particular 
governing technologies and programs of social management, to observe how “culture works in 
the service of power or better yet, how culture works as the power” (Bennett, 1998, p.62).  
 Governmentality perspective opens up a primary line of inquiry in this research, which 




The investigation involves the question of how the power operates ‘at a distance’ in a non-
coercive fashion, in a way that supposedly invigorates and empowers the lives of the individual 
citizen. For instance, the collective aspiration to prosper and ‘live well’ during the rapid 
modernization period of South Korea relied upon the process of particular subjective formation 
of ‘the dutiful-nationals’, which effectively aligned the goal of the citizen-subjects and the goal 
of the government to resurrect the national economy and procure national security. In smart city, 
there are various governmental strategies and techniques through which this subjectification 
processes occur. This dissertation particularly focuses on how that process has continued and 
evolved in the real and imagined domains of environment, mobility, and futurity.  
(2) Environmentality 
As Jennifer Gabrys (2016) ably elaborated through the Foucauldian notion of ‘environmentality’, 
the smart city functions as a mediated environment that deploys multiply distributed 
computational agencies in the background of daily activities in the city and spatializes the 
governmental aim to ‘govern through milieu’. The growing trend of contemporary governance 
adds a more sophisticated and holistic layer to the previous ways of governing through direct 
intervention in the policy realm and in the life world of the population, by organizing the 
environment as the new subject of governmentality. Although the goal may be the same (i.e., to 
change the behavior) the environmental mode of governance indirectly pursues that goal for 
instance, by embedding and distributing the ubiquitous computing in the city that functions at a 
fine-grained micro-level. Environmentality implies a changing perception of the nature as a 
quantifiable, programmable, and thus manageable realm (i.e., IBM Smarter Planet initiative), to 
which both human and nonhuman agents are invariably enrolled. This conceptualization of 




acted upon) plays a crucial role in the discursive formation of the smart city that is articulated as 
the green and sustainable city. This dissertation engages with this concept of environmentality 
particularly to observe how the computational environment of the smart city has gained 
legitimacy in the globalizing context of Songdo and how it served the government’s 
problematization of sustainability.   
(3) Governmobility  
Extending Foucault’s concept of governmentality, Baerenholdt (2013) coins the term 
‘governmobility’ to point at how society is increasingly governed through mobility and how the 
regulations of mobility are internalized and operated automatically in people’s mobile practices.  
This perspective is also very useful in analyzing how the infrastructure in Songdo’s smart city is 
organized in such a way to manage and optimize mobility. Especially in viewing Songdo as a 
global city, the officials envisioned a frictionless space of flow and circulation wherein an array 
of techniques and technologies were deployed to ensure and expedite the smooth flow of 
physical and informational mobility. Mobility in this sense, is infused with power and is 
deployed as a political technology. The approach I take here is distinct from other mobility 
studies that focus on the micro dimensions of personal movements and the politics of access and 
border-crossing such as migration and tourism, in that I attend to the fundamental and macro 
dimension of how mobility organizes and governs societies. I take this approach most explicitly 
in my discussion of globalization and informationalization in Chapter 2, wherein governmobility 
encapsulates the mechanism of the government that is not only about defending borders but is 






(4) Sociotechnical imaginaries  
An STS scholar Sheila Jasanoff (2015) proposes the term ‘sociotechnical imaginaries’ to denote 
the “collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable 
futures, animated by shared understandings of social life and social order attainable through, and 
supportive of, advances in science and technology” (p.4). The term highlights the discursive and 
imaginative dimensions of science and technology and its linkages with desires and aspirations 
that guide the visions of future. Sociotechnical imaginaries as a theoretical concept opens up the 
less frequently encountered area of research in STS, which is the cultural landscape of desires 
and fears that contextualize the matter-of-factness of science and technology – including the 
desire for well-being, recognition, upward mobility, social anxiety, and insecurity. In the context 
of South Korea, the collective desire for well-being was mobilized by the authoritarian 
government to drive the highly rapid industrialization since the 1960s and the developmental 
mentalité formulated in this period continues to shape the present and the privileged position of 
science and technology in society. Chapter 5 of this dissertation explores how the sociotechnical 
imaginaries of the smart city are manifested in various forms of representations in Korea and 
analyzes how the intersecting temporalities are projected onto the imagined sociotechnical future 
articulated in the scale of the smart city.   
 Thinking through the above concepts, following chapters will illustrate how making 
Songdo as an exemplary smart city in South Korea entailed techniques and technologies that 
pursued managing multiple problems of the city – transportation and communication, global 
reputation, sustainable development, security and safety, and economic growth. 




relationship between history and space, as well as how the dispersed mechanism of power drives 
forward and enacts techniques and technologies of governing time-space.  
Research Site: Songdo  
At the time of the writing in 2019, Songdo has already long passed its novelty stage as many 
other municipalities in South Korea (including Busan, Sejong, Yongin, Goyang) actively jumped 
into the smart city competition. Although different cities have different definitions and emphasis 
(i.e., work, transportation, energy and water management), they are invariably onboard with the 
national government’s economic agenda of the “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” a new model of 
job creation and regional revenue stream generation through innovation in the ICT, such as the 
Big Data, Internet of Things (IoT), and the Artificial Intelligence (AI).  
 In 2013, when I first visited Songdo, the term ‘smart city’ was just starting to gain 
tractions among urban planners, business consultants, and municipalities in South Korea and 
around the world. Songdo was frequently cited as one of the early case studies discussed along 
with the Masdar City (United Arab Emirates) and the PlanIT Valley (Portugal). A surge of 
Anglo-European academic and journalistic accounts laid hopes for their future city on Songdo, 
while many others were skeptical of the project’s success, due to its narrow technocratic 
ambition and the top-down approach to the city design. Songdo have been depicted as a “failed 
project” (Greenfield, 2013), a “stupefying smart city” (Sennett, 2012),  a “no man’s city” 
(Korean Exposé, 2016), a “ghetto for the affluent” (Le Monde, 2017), and even a “Chernobyl-
like ghost town” (Daily Mail, 2018). Often glanced at as a ‘case study’, Songdo was ostensibly 
read as just another failed project that deprived the city of an organic liveliness of the 
neighborhood and the messiness of the good old community life that Jane Jacobs reminisced in 




into existence were reduced to a hype and vanity for exclusivity, or a mere ideological cover for 
the endless greed of real-estate businesses and IT corporations that exploited the taxpayers 
money and public right for privacy, equal access, and freedom of mobility.  
 There are a number of limitations to the above kind of critique, while we see the 
repertoire of critique applied to many other smart city development projects that are occurring 
around the world. First of all, they overlook the internal point of view of the city, including the 
fact that the population has steadily grown over the course of years in Songdo and that many 
Korean families still fantasize and aspire to live in a place like Songdo. From a critical point of 
view, one should ask then, what that aspiration consists of, how the elements of that aspiration 
reflect the deep historical grid, cultural drives, and the ‘structure of feeling’ that pertain to Korea 
in the 21st century, and how these cultural forces persist and traverse the different domains of 
public concerns about economy, safety, environment, and the way of desirable life. In other 
words, a deep critical understanding of Songdo and its smart city should look beyond the 
immediate decisions and activities that attempt to build or modify the technical infrastructures, 
but instead, uncover the historical and cultural conditions of its emergence as a smart city, as a 
complex, multiple, and non-individual formation, which are not subjected to the present only.  
 Upon this realization, it became the primary aim of my project to address these omission 
and misunderstandings about Songdo – and about the smart cities in general. It seemed 
insufficient to say that the smart city is an effect of the neoliberal logic, or the structure of 
domination and control behind the governments and corporations, as many critics had suggested. 
To effectively confront and analyze the workings of political power, it was deemed necessary to 
track the little-known points of activities, places, and forms where the power was exercised. As a 




multiple visits to Songdo spanning from 2013 and 2017. During this period, I visited Korean 
smart city expos and conventions, K-smart city forum hosted by the National Assembly, IFEZA 
smart city control center, Incheon history museum and gallery, techno parks, smart apartment 
complexes in Songdo, where I talked with the smart city center managers, a smart mobility 
startup associate, a managerial assistant for the public fund supporting small and medium sized 
enterprises, a university lecturer, and a former construction site manager who worked in Songdo. 
I also talked to the residents of Songdo and families who live in the neighboring districts of 
Songdo, both face to face and through an online community called the “Songdo Moms Café.” 
For secondary sources, various Korean archives have been examined: including the IFEZ 
monthly journal, Donga Science magazine, SPACE monthly journal, Culture City-Culture 
Welfare monthly journal, and Naver old newspaper archive, Big Kinds news data archive, IFEZ 
and Incheon Metropolitan City policy document archive, IFEZ promotional brochures and online 
shorts published on the YouTube, music videos and television shows shot in Songdo, 
autobiographies written by the former mayors and urban planners of Incheon, and the official 
websites of the Cisco, IBM, and Gale International, the Ministry of Future Planning, Incheon 
Development Institute, Korean Center for Creative Economy, UNESCO Creative Cities 
Network, the US Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED), and the Association Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED).    
 These eclectic source materials were gathered to provide as broad coverage as possible, 
as I cast a wide net to diagrammatically and genealogically understand the constellations of 








Outline of the Dissertation  
 
Chapters of this dissertation correspond to the different but interlocking urban diagrams that are 
co-articulated in Songdo. Therefore, each chapter focuses on specific problems and genealogies 
– mobility, security, environment, and futurity – that constitute different aspects of the current 
formation of Songdo.  
 The pre-history of Songdo charted in Chapter 1 sets the stage for the other following 
chapters that are more or less directly related to Songdo. This chapter draws upon existing 
literature on South Korea’s urban history (e.g., the professionalization of urban planner and state-
led urbanization since the 1960s), media history (e.g., the early history of newspaper, television, 
and electronic media), history of militarized modernization (e.g., authoritarian state and the 
formation of ‘dutiful nationals’), and the history of engineers (e.g., authoritarian state’s strategic 
support and investment in science and technology). The goal here is to illustrate different 
perspectives of viewing Korea’s modern history and to enact some interplay at the linkages 
among these different perspectives. Seen in parallel, the seemingly distant historical moments 
interact with one another, collectively giving emergence to the present. 
 Chapter 2 traces how Songdo has been diagrammed as a global city and shows how its 
transition can be understood as a part of the long history of mobility (perceived as a problem of 
the government and a mode of rule) in South Korea. This chapter primarily focuses on how the 
government of mobility was exercised through the pairing of communication and transportation 
infrastructure (e.g., highway-microwave network, airport-Internet) and how the smart city is the 
latest example that systematically merges communication and transportation (e.g., the ‘smart’ 
mobility features that cater to the personalized and automated forms of mobility). The chapter 




freedom and regulation of mobility as well as responding to the social pressures and emerging 
cultural sensibilities and demands for a new model of communication and physical movements. 
From the mobility perspective, articulating Songdo as a global city involved synthesizing the 
new transportation infrastructure for the global mobility (through the airport), the new model of 
global communication (through the Internet), and institutional arrangement for the global 
financial mobility (through the Free Economic Zone).  
  Chapter 3 presents a different, if not a paradoxical, dimension of the same mobility 
regime charted in Chapter 2, which is concerned with the problematization of security and risk 
management. Ostensibly, the language of national security tension was gradually replaced by a 
less-overtly militant program of personal safety and self-care in the 21st century. While fissures 
and disagreements persist among different groups and generations with regard to the issues of 
security and safety in today’s South Korea, there exists an enduring, yet constantly evolving, 
form and function of the government that constructs and problematizes various forms of risks. 
Chapter 3 illustrates how the techniques and technologies of the smart city’s security and risk 
management rely on and draw resources not only from technical advancement in data 
visualization and analysis but also from South Korea’s long history of militarism, the geopolitics 
of national security, and the culture of defensive self which organized individuals as the primary 
locus of self-defense and the city as the spatial frontier of crime prevention. Read in parallel, 
Chapter 2 (on freedom and mobility) and Chapter 3 (on security and risk) contextualize the 
contradictory dimension of the mobility regime, in which the global aspirations to achieve open, 
flexible, and transparent urban governance have depended on a program of highly disciplining 




intertwined into the dual architecture of the smart city system, which distributes and disperses 
and regulates and synchronizes media in space at the same time.  
 Chapter 4 interrogates how the environment became an emerging objective of and 
problem for the government in the 2000s. The topic of this chapter extends the problematization 
of risk in Chapter 3 (on urban crimes and personal safety) and recognition of how risk was 
increasingly understood in situational terms of time and space. Following this line of inquiry, I 
ask how, the risk, which has seemingly evolved into spatial forms of the city, is rearticulated in 
the smart city’s management and governance of the ‘environment’. While chapter 3 focused on 
the criminal aspect of urban risk, this chapter investigates how the risk has been also envisioned 
and understood at a global scale since the late 20th century, especially within the discursive 
context of the sustainable development and the growing civic demand for a better quality of life. 
This chapter discusses how the techniques and technologies of environmental mode of urban 
governance (e.g., LEED certification, which is used to rate the building and the cities’ 
environmental performativity) relegate the governmental accountability to the protocols and 
standards and at the same time, mobilize the moral responsibility of the citizens and their 
demand for a better quality of life to distribute and settle the shifting mode of governance in the 
everyday life world.  
 Lastly, Chapter 5 charts how the problem of ‘development’ and ‘futurity’ articulated in 
the regime of smart city in Songdo and how the idea of ‘smartness’ has been kinesthetically, 
visually, and governmentally communicated through the smart city’s norm of mobility and 
progress. This chapter explores the inter-textual flows of these norms that traverse the K-pop 
music videos, festivals, architectures, and the nationalist mythologies of techno-futurism, which 




which in turn, normalize the constant mobility and progress in the present. The chapter also 
demonstrates how this futurity is conditioned by multiple modalities of temporalities and 
spatialities – the historical trajectory of South Korean industrialization and urbanization, the 
techno-nationalist approach to development, the global imperatives for creativity, innovation, 
and entrepreneurialism, and the affective charge associated with the kinesthetic and visual norm 
of smartness – which are co-articulated in the initiatives to commoditize and export South 
Korean cultural technology, the ‘K-Smart City’. This chapter concludes that the smart city, as a 
form of governmentality, forges a particular disposition for life and future, which gains 
momentum from the city and the citizens’ passion for self-improvement, prosperity, and a better 
























CHAPTER 1. A PRE-HISTORY OF SMART CITY IN SONGDO 
 
 
“We can turn the tragic war into our advantage through a new city plan for Seoul. (...) 
The first aim of our plan is to provide equal opportunities so that people can maximize 
their capacity. The second is to achieve and maintain a balanced cultural economy that 
will fully expand in due course of time.” 
 (Yoon Jung-Sub, Gyeonghyang Shinmun, 1955.03.11).     
Yoon Jung-Sub was the first master student to graduate from the Department of Architectural 
Engineering at Seoul National University in 1953. Immediately after his graduation, he took up a 
position as a researcher in Urban Planning Committee for Seoul, taking charge of drawing a new 
comprehensive plan for the city that had been devastated by the three-year-long Korean War. 
During the formative years of South Korean urban planning, Yoon actively participated in the 
establishment of the Korean Association of Land Planning (Taehan gukt’o gyehoek’ ak’oe) in 
1959, followed by a new legislation of Urban Planning Act in 1962. As Yoon writes in the above 
newspaper column in 1955, the city planners of Seoul in post-War Korea envisioned the future of 
the new city that posited ‘people’ as the primary aim of the government. The plan also envisaged 
the city as enabling ground of maximizing individual capacity, where opportunities were equally 
distributed to everyone and economy prospered in balance with culture.  
 Planning, as the art and technic of government that consists of interplay of rule and 
freedom (and of stasis and movement), has always drawn upon the vision of the foreseeable 
future and consisted of various techniques and resources to address the gap between the present 
and the imagined future. Planning, as an inherently optimistic, future-oriented, and yet a 
regulatory endeavor, has always problematized the present in need of reparation and 
normalization. In the 1950s in South Korea, the new city plan for Seoul manifested the vision 
and hope for the future of South Korea, while many Koreans were still grappling with the painful 




cities became an internally harmonious and orderly space that is governed in such a way as to be 
mobilized and connected to the exterior world. Techniques of urban planning and scientific 
thinking were deployed to enact and enable efficient mobility of people, goods, and information 
throughout the city, while the nation was precipitated into science and technology-driven future.  
 The reason why I bring up the long history of urban planning and the modern history of 
South Korea is to support one of the main themes of this dissertation: which is that the historical 
formation of the culture of speed and mobility buttress the current preoccupation with the smart 
city in South Korea. How then, does one start composing the genealogy of the smart city in 
South Korea? I began this dissertation by acknowledging the socially embedded nature of the 
planning techniques and practices, which involves techniques, technologies, visions, and 
problems that are entangled with the given historical and geographical context. I also hinted that 
the history of planning is not (and should not be) only about the story of experts and visionaries 
whose ideas and solutions were successfully or unsuccessfully carried out.  
 As I introduced this dissertation in the previous chapter, this dissertation as a whole 
situates the history of planning the city of Songdo in a broader perspective concerned with the 
institutional arrangements of urban planning, cultural memorialization, public discussions of 
security and safety, as well as parallel societal shifts such as industrialization, globalization, and 
informationalization. While tracing the divergent and overlapping histories that multiply 
influenced Songdo, I seek the interconnections between multiple genealogies that have co-
shaped today’s Songdo and its manifestation as a smart city of future. That is, the genealogy of 
smart city in Songdo I offer in this chapter attend to the interrelations between the changes that 
occurred within the field of cities, media, technology, and culture, each of which in turn, has its 




 To repeat, the narrative advanced in this chapter charts the discursive and material 
formation of the city and its planning practice that preceded the ‘birth of Songdo’. The aim for 
this chapter is to demonstrate the long process through which the city became a central motif of 
the government as well as its field where different imaginaries of future have been tested and 
played out. This chapter also illustrates the processes in which the city was produced as an 
assemblage of material, imagined, and lived space and was productive of social relations and 
identities that pertain to Korean urban culture.  
 In order to achieve this aim, I draw upon a broad array of existing literature on the 
Korean history of urbanization and industrialization, history of media and government, public 
discussions of security and safety, and social history of technology and engineering. By bringing 
these histories together, I demonstrate that the account of smart city in Korea has to factor in the 
history of the state, its militarism and strategies of ordering and unifying population. It is through 
these strategies that the cities in Korea have become a field in which power is spatialized and 
embedded. The statist power relations mediated through the city persists in today’s strategies and 
practices of governing the city, even as the surrounding economic conditions are seemingly 
changing into a more open, transnational, and flexible ones. To be sure, governing strategy 
shaped the cities, but the cities were the fundamental instrument for the government’s exertion of 
authority.       
 The historical narratives presented in this chapter also demonstrate how culture and 
technology were primary instruments with which the city became a field of government. On the 
one hand, the privilege accorded to the science and engineering profession, the availability and 
speed of technological advancement, and scientific administrative techniques (such as the 




the government’s aim to achieve rapid industrialization since the 1960s. On the other hand, the 
technological advancement and the growing emphasis on the effective urban and national 
governance reflected a particular understanding of a nation that has been always on the move, 
insecure, and under threat, surrounded by the hostile and competitive reality of Cold War and 
globalization. As the culture of the insecurity, anxiety, and aspiration associated with the 
technological development still resonates in today’s South Korea, this chapter will trace the 
historical precedents of such affective formation, in order to draw comparison between the past 
and the present and in so doing, pursue a deep historical understanding of the present.  
Colonial History and Techniques of Urban Planning  
 In the first decade since Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910, the then capital city 
Kyŏngsŏng (K)/Keijo (J) (now known as Seoul) underwent gradual respatialization that involved 
street straightening and widening, mostly concentrated in the area that would improve the living 
spaces of Japanese settlers (Henry, 2014). It was within this colonial context the modern urban 
planning practices were applied in early twentieth-century South Korea (1910-1945). The effect 
of modernization was most visible in the cities, as widening roads, rising buildings, and 
expanding streetcar and bus networks were transforming the urban environment and downtown 
area in Seoul. In parallel with the transformation in the city center, slums were coalescing around 
the periphery of the city where the immigrant and impoverished peasants were becoming new 
factory workers. By contrast, the colonial state extensively surveyed the land and confiscated 
privately owned lands, which were met with resistance by colonized Koreans; however, a series 
of ordinances coerced the population into accepting the collective goal of constructing a 
rationalized urban form.4 The prevailing logic was that the efficient circulation of goods and 
 
4	According to Todd Henry (2014), in enforcing the urban reform, the colonial government invoked the 




people through widened roads would benefit commercial activities in the city center, which 
would in turn benefit the nation.   
  From the 1920s on, the transnational city planning movement gained prominence as the 
colonial state experimented with the strategies of ‘cultural governance’, wherein the provision of 
educational institutions and public amenities such as parks, schools, and theaters was perceived 
to help ‘enlighten’ and ‘civilize’ the colonized Korean population. Keijo (Seoul) City Planning 
Research Association (KCPRA) established in 1921, modeled upon Urban Planning Research 
Association of Tokyo, functioned as a semi-governmental advisory board comprising of colonial 
planners who frequently met with the officials from Tokyo and sought to superimpose a unified 
structure on the city as a harmonious organic body (p.44-45).  
 But it was not until the implementation of Chosŏn Urban Planning Order (Shigaji 
gyehoengnyŏng (K)/ Shigaichi keikaku rei (J)) in 1934 that the expanded capital city area 
integrated diverse communities as well as new public facilities such as the city hall, railroad 
stations, and commercial districts as parts of the unified whole. By implementing the 1934 order, 
the Government General attempted to solve the emerging problem of the cities with a 
rationalized design, by redrawing the boundary of the capital beyond the city wall to triple the 
area to accommodate the massive influx of population and by rolling out roads and railways 
(Poole, 2014, p.119-120). The 1934 order was exemplary colonial governance that relocated 
authority over urban planning from other towns and cities to the central Government General 
located in Seoul (p.120). It adopted a zoning strategy by demarcating urban areas as residential, 
commercial or industrial, which became the starting point for the modern urban planning in 
 
to the selfish and ‘uncivilized’ Koreans. In this logic, those who refused to relinquish their land were said 
to be disrupting the order necessary for achieving the collective good, such as having a safe and clean 
living space. This racialized characterization of Korean population further reinforced the colonial 





 Liberation from colonial Japan in 1945 did not bring a full political independence for 
Korea, as it was subsequently occupied by two foreign powers, under the United Nations 
trusteeship administered by the US in the southern half of Korea and the Soviet Union in the 
northern half of Korea. The US supervised the general elections in the southern part of Korea in 
1948, establishing Republic of Korea (South Korea) with Rhee Syngman as its first president, 
while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) elected Kim Il-Sung as the 
Premier, ascertaining the permanent division of two Koreas ever since. Arbitrarily partitioned 
two Koreas flared into an all-out war, which lasted for three years only to end up with an 
armistice without a peace treaty. After the Korean War, ruling elites of South Korea gradually 
sought to consolidate power and suppress social disorderliness through whatever means possible.  
 Yet, from the US perspective, Koreans were perceived to be premature to enact the ‘art of 
self-government’ taught under the US trusteeship (Lee, J. 2006). The US Army Forces in Korea, 
due to the lack of knowledge about Korea, had largely retained the existing Japanese colonial 
government apparatus and even the Japanese Government General (p.46). Occupation of US 
military also utilized the Japanese collaborationists who were trained either in Japan and the US, 
fluent in English, staunchly anticommunist, such as Rhee Syngman, who was an exemplary case. 
The US military found the Korean leader such as Rhee to be an indispensable ally to lead the 
future of Korea and to share common strategy to contain Soviet influence in Korea and thus 
conferred official support for him (p.50). 
 At the same time, Korean War changed the course of the US security policy toward 
declaring the struggle against communism as a global proposition (Edward, 1996). Throughout 




the 1960s, components of “smart” weapons were developed such as guided missiles, cruise 
missiles, and advanced jet aircraft (p.15). US military presence in Korea supported the president 
Park Chung-Hee (1961-1979) whose rise to power through military coup was staged amid the 
anxieties that captivated Korea. Park made himself the head of the Supreme Council for National 
Reconstruction, which then created the Economic Planning Board to serve as its main agency for 
highly centralized planning for economic development. The board initiated comprehensive plans 
to rebuild a nation and to centralize government operations on the nationalized economy, such as 
the Five Year Plan for Economic Development. Park’s program was in line with the US 
government’s new approach to fighting communism, which was to foster economic development 
in countries that were deemed at risk, by building the industrial capacity and by initiating export-
led growth. It was because only then, could democracy flourish to resist the perils of communism 
(Han & Downey, 2014). The board relied on extensive borrowing of funds from banks in Japan 
and Europe as well as significant amount of aids from the US, in order to build infrastructures of 
transportation and communication. In turn, the borrowed funds were used to massively purchase 
communication equipment and facilities from the US companies.  
 It was in this sociopolitical context – Japanese colonial legacy, US military, Cold War, 
anticommunist authoritarian state – that the Korean Association of Land Planning was founded 
in 1959, which is now known as Korea Planning Association, followed by the legislation of 
Urban Planning Act in 1962. Urban elite such as Yoon Jung-Sub was an active member of the 
association. The Urban General Plan they announced in 1966 anticipated the population in Seoul 
to grow to 6.3 million by 1981, although the number was surpassed already in 1972. Rapidly 
changing urban ecology demanded constant revision of the plans, resulting in a series of short-




state under Park Chung-Hee regime (1961-1979) enacted rational and scientific urban planning 
that focused on efficiency, control, and speed. State-led urbanization process was unusually fast 
– especially from 1960 to 1990, population growth in urban areas grew from 40 percent to nearly 
70%, and about 25 percent of the nation’s population lived in Seoul. The total population of 
Seoul in 1960 was about 2.5 million, while the number increased to 10 million in 1990 (Kim, S. 
C., 2007).5  
 Still, the unmanageable speed with which the cities grew became a major concern for 
Park’s regime, not only because the inefficient use of space was causing costly maintenance of 
overloaded urban facilities of transportation and communication, but because the exacerbating 
condition of life in the cities was deemed to be crippling the nation’s overall productivity. 
Especially for a country that has a steep mountainous landscape with little space to be utilized for 
a living and working, it was imperative to maximize the economical use of the given space.   
 Rational urban planning became more and more of a vital necessity for the government, 
especially as it was integral to the continued economic development and national security. Urban 
planning practice was gradually professionalized and institutionalized throughout the 60s. In 
1968, the Graduate school of Public Administration in Seoul National University introduced a 
new curriculum for urban and regional planning and produced ten master degree recipients in 
1970. At that time, urban planners and architects who were mostly trained in Japan and the US 
and returned to Korea played a central role in solving what was perceived as a national crisis. 
Architects influenced by the modernist works of Le Corbusier and Mies van der Rowe 
envisioned a new plan for the city and the nation that would optimize the space and resource and 
 
5	During the 1960s and 70s, South Korea experienced highly rapid urban transition. In spatial terms, in 
this period, the government built export-oriented industrial complexes in selected industrial sites in Seoul 
and the southeastern part of Korea. Dominant manufacturing firms relocated to nearby Incheon and 
Suwon in the 1970s and early 1980s due to rising land price and active government policies to disperse 




alleviate the overcrowding in the city that resulted in a profound unevenness across the country.   
 The early modern history of Korean urban planning I charted above shows that the urban 
planning was an integral method for the government to address the problems: problems of the 
cities were problems for the economy and for the national security. The disorderly settlements in 
makeshift housing in fringe areas such as Moon Village were seen as the seeding grounds for 
poor hygiene, traffic congestion, pollution, and crime. Besides, overpopulation was perceived to 
be counter-productive for the long-sustained economic growth. In other words, the problem for 
the government was then to figure out how to sustain growth and movement, while containing 
that growth in an orderly manner.   
The Urban Planning Act of 1976 and the Housing Construction Act in 1977 facilitated 
the speedy construction of high-rise apartment complexes. Through these acts, the government 
could even decide where and how to build an apartment and who was allowed to build them. As 
the government-subsidized housing projects were the instrument to tackle the urban problems, 
high-rise apartment complexes in Seoul became a dominant form of residence in the 1970s and 
the distinct landscape and architectural style in Korea.  
 The growing ‘need’ of the government to disperse and integrate population was 
seemingly resolved by the new communication technologies. Throughout the mid-1990s and 
early 2000s, information and communication technology (ICT) firms clustered in Seoul, 
especially in the “Teheran valley” located in the River South region of Seoul (Lee, 2002). 
Tofflerian ‘information utopianism’ became the critical constitutive discursive element in the 
1990s and the national level information policy took shape. High-tech focused satellite cities in 
Pangyo, Bundang, and Songdo (Incheon) sprang up to absorb the talents from ICT sector and 




Due to such a highly rapid manner in which urban economic transitions have been carried 
out, Cho (1997) assesses Seoul and cities in South Korea as exhibiting features of ‘urban 
schizophrenia’, or ‘urban bipolarity’, where modern and pre-modern aspects co-exist.6 It could 
be restated that the emergent and residual forms of spatial arrangement co-inhabit in today’s 
South Korea.  
 In relation to the rapidly changing urban living conditions and government’s 
developmental drive, there emerged what one could call the new urban culture. After all, the goal 
of planning was not merely a matter of providing a space for dwelling but instead a broader goal 
of creating a harmonious and orderly urban space. It is evident in the ways in which the 
apartment complexes built in the 1970s were portrayed as “an ideal instrument for increasing 
contact among the family or neighborhood groups based on association and cooperation 
belonging to humanity and improving their ability, creativity, and conducts” (Seoul City 
Government, 1974, quoted in Kim, 2007, p.54). Consumerist desire and pursuit of ‘urbanity’ 
(dosidaum in Korean), a mentality as well as a category of cultural distinction, correlated with 
the emerging urban middle class in the 1970s and their lifestyle.   
 To link the urban-material transition with the urban-cultural formation and to trace the 
genealogy of ‘urban mentality’, it is necessary to briefly chart the genealogy of modern Korean 
subjectivity that has been produced and reproduced by the Korean media during the same period.     
Cultural Governance and the Formation of the Dutiful Nationals  
 Rapid transformation of urban landscape charted above was coeval with the ‘cultural’ 
strategy of government. As many historians of Korean mass media (i.e., newspapers and 
broadcast television) tell us, media served the pedagogic function for the masses and formation 
 
6	Even when the politico-economic system and institution acquire the modern appearance, the pre-modern 
Confucian ideology still ruled society, as the state was able to keep its paternal status in society and lead 




of their subjectivity. Park, Kim, & Sohn (2000) analyzes why the state power had such 
overwhelming presence in Korean media history, especially since the Korean War. South 
Korea’s traditionally strong authoritarian-state that has its roots in Confucianism and colonialism 
was established in 1948, inherited the oppressive ruling system of the Japanese colonial 
government. The power of the state was further reinforced by a military regime, which came to 
power through a coup d’état in 1961. The division of the Korean Peninsula between South and 
North Korea also provided the underlying conditions for nurturing the superior position of the 
state as it made possible to organize society for wartime mobilization and justified dictatorial 
rule by the state and enlarged the military sector (p.98). Based on these conditions, the state 
enjoyed enormous power, repressing and controlling not only the political and economic forces 
but also the daily lives of people and their culture. 
 As media historians of Japanese colonial period, Lee, Jae-jin and Lee, Min-ju (2006) 
describes the strategies of Japanese colonial ‘cultural governance’ [Shingminji Munhwajŏngch'i] 
in the 1920s. Japanese colonial authorities relieved somewhat of the harsh measures of direct 
military rule for the first decade of colonialism. It was shortly after the Independence Movement 
on March 1st, 1919, Japanese alleviated direct and violent method of control and instead 
permitted publication of three indigenous newspapers, Chosun-Ilbo, Donga-Ilbo, and Sisa-
Shinmun, as a gesture to mitigate the local resistance. Lee and Lee (2006) argue that Japanese 
cultural governance was a means of reinforcing its oppression, instead of weakening it. The 
undergirding logic was that it was difficult to maintain the oppressive system through physical 
violence and it was more effective through governing through ‘culture’ (Munhwajŏngch’i), by 
utilizing cultural institutions as a way of reinforcing the colonial power. They were indirectly 





 Scholars noted that it was this period that saw the ‘birth of the dutiful nationals 
[kungmin]’, the discourse and subjectivity adopted by the colonial government that mobilized 
every individual into a so-called article of empire (Jeon, G. C. 2005). ‘Kungmin’ as a 
terminology applied the concept of ‘nation’ imported from the West and called into being non-
individuated collectivity seen from the colonial eye. Translated as ‘the nation’ or ‘the national’, 
the ‘dutiful nationals’ refers to the multitude of people incorporated as a member of the Japanese 
empire as a whole. Discursive formation of kungmin as a colonial subject from the late Japanese 
colonial period continued to the present. In this conception, the individual is not allowed to exist, 
but only as a dutiful subject that acquires meaning in relation to the family and the nation. 
Japanese empire inculcated the kungmin ideology that equated the obligation for one’s parents 
with the obligation to the nation, where the superiority lied in the power of the nation. Voluntary 
conscription, for instance, was seen as exercising one’s duty and a way of becoming the proper 
kungmin. 
 According to Jeon Gyu-Chan (2005), as colonialism changed its form to nationalism, the 
predominant discursive formation of kungmin persisted through the later years of successive 
military regimes and its exclusive character was reinforced through anti-communism as the 
military government’s major governing strategy. An exclusive and unitary sense of identity that 
precludes otherness (i.e., women, foreign, queer, illegal) constitutes the collective sense of ‘we’ 
in today’s South Korea. 
 In a similar vein, Lim Jong-Soo (2011) analyzes television program of KBS, the first 
state-run national broadcasting service in South Korea since 1961. The military regime of Park 




broadcasting to promote the government’s policies. Notably, since the declaration of the state of 
emergency from 1972 to 1979, Central Intelligence Agency of Korea (KCIA) collaborated in 
scripting the ‘Real Story Theater [Shirhwa Gŭkchang]’, the so-called ‘purposive drama’ that had 
an anti-communist message.   
 The programming of television synchronized with Korea’s modernization project during 
the authoritarian regime, carrying out the task of preaching the value of family and modern 
nation-state both in times when the state directly intervened its programs and when the 
broadcasting had relative autonomy over its contents. Establishing the ‘we-feeling’ through the 
formation of the family and the nation with the ideal personhood as ‘kungmin’ at its center.  
Television in the 1970s was “the modernizing machine that tied together development, anti-
communism, and the nation-state” (Lim, 2011, p.117). 
 While the 60s and 70s are considered a dark period of Korean media through the long 
history of militancy and authoritarianism, the democratic constitutional reform in 1987 marked a 
significant social transition into democratic society. The absolute power of the state started to 
weaken in the 1980s and globalization became a buzzword. Kwak, Ki-Sung (2012) assesses the 
Democratic Movement of 1987 that resulted in a constitutional reform as the watershed of the 
political history of South Korea that reshaped the relationship between the media, the state, and 
civil society.   
 The new constitution saw the government censorship over media contents as 
unconstitutional, and people were given the right to vote for the president through direct election.  
In this period, the Korean press developed from a ‘voluntary servant’ to ‘equal contender’ 
(Youm, 1996 cited in Yang, 2004, p.62). During the period of partial democratization, Korean 




entail a fundamental shift in the authoritarian nature of political leadership (p.3).  
  All the above references provide useful insight into the discursive formation of the 
Korean nationhood and ‘the dutiful nationals’ (kungmin) and various disciplinary technologies 
that were deployed through culture and media, which are still significantly shaping today’s 
Korean political-economic policies and media policies. Long after the globalization has become 
the national agenda in the 1980s, the imperatives for the national economic growth and national 
security have not abated and the nationalist sentiment is a significant part of Korean structure of 
feeling. While mainstream media have largely conformed to the dominant national policy 
throughout the authoritarian period and to the present, some meaningful resistances have been 
made, which led to the democratic transition since 1987. Scholars like Kwak (2012) pin their 
hopes on the rise of online media and citizen journalism for the promise of more democratic and 
participatory mode of communication. Still, it is necessary to expand our scholarly focus beyond 
just looking at the content of the media, attending to various ways in which the rationality of the 
government is mediated and contested. Given the rapidly evolving trend of media that is 
becoming ubiquitous, operative, and environmental, it is crucial to incorporate the spatial context 
of discursive formation within our frame of analysis.  
Militarized Modernity and the Birth of Defensible Subject  
 
In examining the formation of Korean subjectivity of the dutiful nationals and its manifestations 
in the life-world of everyday life, one can notice that the political climate of the Cold War and 
anti-communism in the late 20th century Korea plays a decisive role in problematizing security 
and safety as the central agenda of the nation and molding the idea of self as bearing the 
responsibility to protect oneself.    




techniques for disciplining and physically violating its population. Authoritarian regime of Park 
Chung-Hee, who served in Japanese colonial army, purged the administration of elite scholar-
officials trained in law, philosophy, and other areas of humanities and social sciences and instead 
recruited senior advisors and personnel who were trained in military schools. During the first 
decade of Park’s rule, nearly 70% of senior administrations had a background in the military 
(Han & Downey, p.55).  In extreme historical circumstances of the Korean War that resulted in 
the division of two Koreas, the birth of militarized modernity was directly conditioned by the 
anti-communist strategies of the Korean nation-state and the Cold War strategies of the US. 
 In a broader scope, the militarized modernity formed the national identity of South 
Korea, which was founded by differentiating itself with the other, North Korea. Moon (2005) 
understands the interpretation of modernity by the military regime as a nation-building project. 
Her conceived period of militarized modernity (1963-1987) consists of three interrelated 
sociopolitical and economic processes: construction of modern nation as an anticommunist 
polity, making of its members as duty-bound ‘nationals’, and the integration of the institution of 
male conscription into the organization of the industrializing economy (p. 2).    
 In 1962, the Park government institutionalized the ‘resident registration system’ as a way 
of exercising surveillance on population and as a crucial step to mobilize the population as a 
whole. Under the system, every individual was assigned a unique identification number at birth, 
which was used to monitor the population’s movements for a variety of purposes, including 
military service, taxation and criminal investigation (p.28). Through this system, the state was 
able to keep a comprehensive record of the population in order to issue the notice of enlistment. 
Every individual was required to carry his/her own fingerprinted card, on the base of 




 Moreover, in the 1970s, Park’s regime strengthened its ideology of national security 
under the motto of ‘total national security’ and ‘total unity’. It involved various disciplinary 
technics of reinforcing anticommunism such as displaying anticommunist mottoes in public 
spaces, schools and on television. People were instructed to actively report any ‘suspicious 
individuals’ who were considered to be spreading ‘groundless rumors’ about the government. 
They were mobilized to participate in monthly civil defense training and were required to pay 
defense surtax. Those who failed to conform to the norm were violently punished.  
 Surveillance was normalized in everyday life in the 1970s after a Lesser Crime 
Punishment Law was executed in 1973. Police officers commonly patrolled the streets and 
regulated men’s unacceptably long hair (that covered ears and touched the shirt collar), women’s 
unacceptably short skirts (seventeen centimeters above knees), and color of clothes, in the name 
of maintaining public orderliness. When caught, the police would cut men’s hair on the street as 
a punishment.  
 What is especially insightful about Moon’s analysis is that the military aspect of 
modernity was integrated into other spheres of life. The labor market was one of those spheres, 
as the government established the connection between the military service and employability – 
the completion of military service was becoming an essential criterion for applying for jobs. This 
automatically meant that women, who were technically exempted from the service, were less 
eligible. Also, as the military service was recognized as work experience, conscripted men were 
guaranteed higher pay and faster promotion after the employment. While such compensations 
elevated morale of those who served in the military, it constructed and maintained a strictly 
gendered notion of citizenship where women were considered as a second-class citizen. Not to 




characterized by rigid hierarchy, one-way command mode of communication, and collective 
ethos that justify individual sacrifices.  
 Moon’s analysis of militarized modernity lends a useful insight regarding the 
technologies of the modern Korean government that disciplined and surveyed population at an 
excessive degree. Pervasive messages of anticommunism and national security justified and 
normalized the experience of surveillance in everyday life and mobilization of dutiful nationals 
(kungmin) in military service entailed prioritizing duty to the nation above the right of 
individuals. This mentality still undergirds the general attitude toward surveillance technology in 
today’s South Korea, where the urgencies of maintaining public safety and preventing crimes 
defeat the necessity of protecting individual privacy. This may be presented as one of the reasons 
why the pervasive use of surveillance technologies in Korea has lesser repercussions than in the 
Western countries where there is a different notion of individualism and human rights.   
 The confluence of transitions – rapid urbanization, the formation of dutiful nationals, and 
militarized modernity – that collectively drove South Korea’s historical path toward 
modernization functioned as the plane on which the country’s unique disposition toward 
technology – understood as the driver of progress and development and as the source of national 
pride and survival – was formed. In the next section, I delineate the specific genealogy of how 
technology became not only the government’s instrument of population management but also the 
people’s aspirational category of self-improvement and survival.        
Technology and National Development  
There existed an earlier imperative to modernize Korea in the late nineteenth century Chosŏn 
Dynasty (1392-1910), by a group of Confucian scholars known as kaehwap’a (enlightenment 




bureaucrats made a case for the principle of tongdosŏgi (Eastern way, Western technology) 
which was based on a separated notion of the mental sphere from the material sphere. The notion 
was conceived as a way to preserve Confucian social order while adopting technologies from the 
West to strengthen the military system. Shortly before the Japanese colonial invasion, rulers of 
the Chosŏn Dynasty quickly imported Western technologies to build the railway, telephone lines, 
streetcars, and a telegraph system. 
 Han & Downey (2014)’s work illustrates the historical formation of engineers in Korea 
from the late nineteenth century to the present. The period in question largely overlaps with 
Moon (2005)’s period of militarized modernity, as they focus on the rapid industrialization and 
modernization process under Park, Chung-hee’s regime (1961-1979), which offered a concrete 
guideline for establishing the concept of scientist-engineer and science-technology. Techno-
nationalist initiatives during Park’s regime elevated the social status of the scientist-engineers to 
that of scholar-officials, who were traditionally considered at the highest rank in Confucian 
social order. Park’s vision for the modernization with Korean characteristics prioritized the 
economic development above anything else and national security as the natural outcome of the 
wealthy nation with the strong military. 
 By the time Park seized power in the Blue House, the presidential residence, the US and 
the United Nations were pouring aids to war-torn Korea, so that it recovers industrial facility and 
infrastructure in order to build capacity for further economic development. South Korea being 
the frontier of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, not only did the US provide 
funds for training South Korean military, even support for a Korean Office of Atomic Energy in 
1959, they aided building infrastructures in transportation and communications: railroads, 




  Park jointly shared the views with the US military in antagonizing communism. 
Especially recognizing that the new Kim Il-sung University in the north supported the Soviet 
Union’s plan for rapid industrialization with emphasis on engineering and medicine (p.40), Park 
also helped found Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST, now known as Korea 
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, KAIST) in 1966, in the hopes that it would 
encourage students to pursue degrees in science and technology. Park government also 
encouraged students to study abroad seeking degrees in engineering and sciences. Park offered 
scientist-engineers the opportunities to become national icons of industrialization.7 Many held 
prestigious positions in the ministry or lucrative positions in the growing number of private 
conglomerates. This was a crucial strategy to contest the communist regime in the North, by 
upbringing ‘technical soldiers’ of Korea.  
 Under the Cold War circumstance of regime competition, Park’s advocacy of science-
technology had an explicit goal of achieving national reconstruction through economic 
development. The emphasis was less on conducting basic research than on applying the 
knowledge to solve problems, to develop and improve the quality of products for export. When 
techno-national experts trained mostly in Japan and the US returned to Korea and found their 
way into the dominant projects of industrialization,8 they were given the task of performing 
research that would benefit the country, by expanding industrial production and exports. Science 
was understood as scientific research directed to benefit industry, increase exports, and create a 
new Korea free from external dependence. This is the beginning of the formation of government-
 
7	Between 1972 and 1978, the total number of mostly men students entering engineering each year 
increased from 19,300 to 33,035. This increase exceeded the increases of men and women in the 
humanities and social sciences from 13,020 to 20,915 and in education from 5,010 to 11,835 (Han & 
Downey, 2014, p.90). 
8	Between 1953 and 1967, nearly 8,000 Korean students studied abroad, nearly all male. About 86% of 




academy-industry complex, with the government as the headquarter or the chief of staff, the 
academy as the think-tank, and the industry as the executive officer, that is shaping R&D and 
industrial policies in today’s South Korea.  
 During Park’s regime, the purpose of education was to prepare populace with nationally 
oriented mindset. It belonged to what he called the ‘second economy’, meaning the economy of 
mentality or spirit. Through campaigns including the New Village Movement, Movement to 
Promote Science to the Whole Nation, initiated in the early 1970s, the government called on all 
populace to acquire at least one skill or technique so that they could improve their own lives and 
contribute to the country’s development (p.96). Scientific living and thinking were considered 
the key to personal advancement as well as national development.  
  Such interest in scientific thinking is reflected in Park’s government’s extensive use of 
statistics and quantification, including the deadlines, budgets, and growth rate. Quantification 
increased the government’s control over the rate of implementation and delivery of results. Once 
the government set goals, it had to be achieved no matter what. Quantified economic goals 
pervaded private realms, including personal saving, literacy, family planning, foods, and 
consumer behavior (p.93). A longtime senior advisor for economic policy during Park’s era 
recounted: “When expressed in numbers, people easily recognized and understood the goal. It 
was not difficult to compare the current status at the point of planning and the expected status at 
completion. It was also easy to assess how far the process had come along the way.” (p.59 O, 
2010, cited in Han & Downey, 2014) 
 Han & Downey (2014)’s work is a useful reference that shows the centrality of science-
technology in the military government’s goal and techniques of power. This aspect of militarized 




decades, including the ones that have driven rapid development of electronics industry and 
information and communication technology industry. This reference is particularly useful for 
analyzing “Creative economy” policy in Korea proposed by the president Park Geun-Hye (2013-
2017), the daughter of Park Chung-Hee. There are many resemblances between two periods, 
including the nationalistic initiative that drove innovation and creativity (ex. K-pop, K-drama, K-
Smart City) as well as the government’s active role in intervening and promoting the export of 
Korea-made cultural contents and technical products.  
* * * 
The intersecting histories I have charted so far in this chapter will set the stage for the chapters 
that follow. Urban history ‘mobility’ in chapter 2, security and safety and defensible selfhood in 
chapter 3 as I discuss the surveillance aspect of the smart city, cultural governance in chapter 4 
on green city and chapter 5 on creative city. Mythologization of technology and statist power 














CHAPTER 2. FROM A TRANSIT CITY TO A GLOBAL CITY: 
HISTORIES AND TECHNOLOGIES OF GOVERNING THROUGH MOBILITY  
 
 
In this chapter, I examine the history of mobility in Songdo, and see how it has been driven and 
problematized by South Korea’s developments in relation to global networks. Through this 
history, I investigate how the urban forms in South Korea were organized and managed to serve 
social activities that were increasingly becoming mobile throughout the 20th century. This 
chapter outlines a brief history of Songdo’s regional and global mobility transformations in the 
20th-century. In tracing these transformations, I pay a particular attention to the process of 
building the infrastructures of transportation and telecommunications (highway and microwave) 
in South Korea’s modernizing period, leading to my analysis of the period in which the global 
imperatives started to target South Korean cities from the mid-1980s. I will illustrate how the 
city of Incheon conceived the birth of Songdo, as part of its aspiration to reinvent itself from a 
peripheral ‘transit city’ to a northeastern Asian mobility hub of ‘global city’. 
  The ‘idea’ of making a global city was materialized through building infrastructures such 
as airports and electronic networks (telecommunication ports) to mediate mobility on a global 
scale. This process entailed a different conceptualization and application of zoning practices in 
urban planning, which had to address the problems associated with financial, logistical, 
informational, and physical mobility. In exploring the long history of modernization in South 
Korea, this chapter draws attention to two parallel periods; one in which the techniques of 
managing unified connectivity was an essential aspect of the authoritarian government’s nation-
building project, and another when the when the techniques of financial and informational 





  This chapter attempts to illuminate the interdependency between the infrastructure 
technology and the discursive formation of globalization that shaped the affective landscape of 
progress and development in South Korea. I pursue three specific aims in this chapter. First, I 
emphasize the significance of infrastructure and discuss the broader spatial and material concerns 
for transportation and communication infrastructures, as a productive ground for studying media 
technology (Parks & Starosielski, 2015).9 Second, I draw on South Korea’s urbanization and 
industrial history to understand how Songdo transformed itself into a global city. Finally, I focus 
on mobility as the government’s primary rationale that cut across the territorial scale of the city, 
the nation state, and the network of global entities.  
 I also offer a genealogy of political rationality and governmental technologies, targeting 
the freedoms and regulations of mobility, emphasizing how this genealogy has been a critical 
aspect of organizing social relations and of governing population in the 21st century. In this 
genealogy, I examine the technology of the transportation and communication infrastructures as 
well as techniques for constructing, managing, and regulating them. Both technology and 
techniques constitute the technological zone of mobility that is deployed by the discourse of the 
global city. As the main thematic thread of this chapter, mobility here is theorized as a critical 
instrument and objective of the government. Mobility has been a crucial principle that guided 
how society was to be organized and has been a “reason of and for the government,” so much so 
 
9	Media infrastructures theorized by Parks & Starosielski (2015) refer to “situated sociotechnical systems 
that are designed and configured to support the distribution of audiovisual signal traffic (p.4).” 
Recognizing the multiscalar dimensions of infrastructures that cut across the micro level of bits and 
protocols to the macro level of fiber-optic networks and cables, they emphasize the layering of distinct 
systems and interconnections between the environment, infrastructures, and users. Further, Shannon 
Mattern (2015) in the same volume offers a counterpoint argument for making a historiographic 
intervention in critical infrastructure studies, maintaining that cities carry in them “residue” of all media 
technologies past and that much can be learned from the past embodied in the present media forms. 
Excavating the layering of an emergent system upon the existing ones, hence echoing Zielinski, “deep 
time of media infrastructure.” Recognizing the relationality of infrastructure involves conceptualizing it 




that government itself is governed by mobility. “Governmobility” (Baerenholdt, 2013) is a term 
used to draw attention to how society is increasingly governed by mobility, and how regulations 
of mobilities, in turn, are internalized and followed intuitively by people.  
  In idealizing mobility, Songdo’s scheme for becoming a global hub envisions a 
frictionless space of flow and circulation wherein an array of techniques and technologies are 
deployed to ensure and expedite the smooth flow of physical and informational mobility.   
History of Governing Mobility in South Korea 
By outlining the history of the present in Songdo, I recognize that the government has not 
necessarily been unified and coherent in its plans and strategies. The post-war South Korean 
government’s primary objectives were economic development and national security. The city 
was a means to spatialize those aims by providing spaces for industrial production and military 
training. At lower administrative and private levels, however, there existed a long-held 
frustration regarding Incheon’s historically marginalized status as the “transit city,” where roads 
and railways were built to transport resources and goods to Seoul but not to attract people’s 
attention to the city itself. City planners involved in the Songdo’s project shared this concern and 
took Incheon’s peripheral and transactional status as an advantage to turn the city into a trans-
northeastern Asian mobility node.  
 However, Songdo’s fascination with the global city idea stemmed from many anxieties 
that other cities were experiencing, regarding the transitory sense of time and space that rapid 
urbanization was bringing in. In order to understand this insecurity, it is necessary to examine in 
detail, how different motives and problems were brought together and inscribed in the long 




 Before elaborating on this history, I offer an overview of how mobility has been 
instrumental to the government’s program of unifying the population and creating a sense of 
space that transcended individual’s immediate physical surroundings. If highways were the main 
arteries of the nation, microwave networks connected the nation through telephone lines, and 
radio and television broadcasting programs, which helped cultivating a united sense of family-
like nation.  
(1) National Governmobility: Highways and Microwave Networks  
A political void in post-war South Korea and the subsequent insertion of the country at the 
frontier of Cold War brought about a sense of anxiety deepened by the looming threat from the 
outside world. While communist North Korea represented a demonic enemy, anticipating South 
Korea’s demise, poverty and lack of infrastructures were viewed as major domestic ills. It was 
imperative to restore the order and defend the nation at all costs. It was believed that only 
through rapid construction of vital transportation and industrial infrastructures could the nation 
be saved.  
  The volatile and harsh reality of the Cold War inspired the nationalistic idea of the 
“modernization of fatherland [joguk geundaehwa]” by means of a “rich nation and strong 
military [buguk gangbyeong].” In 1967, as part of Park Chung-Hee’s Second Five-Year Plan for 
National Reconstruction, a project was proposed to install a new microwave network that would 
connect the whole country through radio transmission lines, long-distance telephone calls, and 
television broadcasting. The Ministry of Communications [Chesinbu], supported by the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), proposed a project that would bring the nation 





  A total of 15 cities were enrolled in the microwave network, divided into three separate 
routes, and connected Seoul to the southeast, southwest, and the northeast parts of the Korean 
peninsula (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1967.12.10). This new infrastructure – in the form of intercity 
telephone lines and television programs – consolidated a sense of nationhood, reconfigured 
affective geography of unified nation-state, and allowed different regions and populations to 
coalesce. The use of advanced technology for mobilizing the populace toward unified nation 
embodied the post-war collective Korean mentality that “unified we live, divided we die.”   
  The primary aim of this infrastructural development was to pursue the nation’s goal of 
centralized governance. Technologically advanced futurity, symbolized by the microwave 
network, served the political purpose of the authoritarian government, which sought to spatialize 
its highly centralized governance. The microwave network was perceived as a pedagogic tool of 
transmitting the government’s vision of a united nation state. Park’s military regime since the 
mid-1960s well understood television as a symbol of modernization and was keen to exploit its 
symbolism to promote its policy and achievements. The government’s central role in the 
formation of television contents and formats, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, resulted in 
the opening of Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) (1961), TBC (1964), and MBC (1969). 
KBS’s opening on December 31, 1961 was propagated as “the government’s Christmas gift to 
the nation,” and its programs pursued the government’s thematic focus on the family and the 
nation state (see Lim, 2011).    
   While the microwave network was expected to unite the country toward a singular 
national identity through the dispersion of telephone and television sets, it was also seen as 
addressing the demands from the middle- and upper-class households that desired to acquire and 




consumerist culture whereby “salarymen were already setting up monthly installment plans to 
purchase a television” (Dong-a Ilbo, 1968.01.01).  
   Microwave network was closely tied to the dual purpose of materializing the military 
government’s political purpose by promoting its vision of a unified nation state and of laying the 
ground for the middle-class urban consumer goods market. More importantly, however, the 
military government’s infrastructure development project was aligned with the liberalist goal of 
the international organizations such as UNESCO and ITU (International Telecommunication 
Union). ITU, in particular, which had been forming its structure by coordinating and regulating 
radio frequencies among different countries, shifted its focus in the mid to late 20th century 
toward assisting developing countries to advance their telecommunication infrastructures. On the 
recommendations of the international organizations, such as ITU and the US military, the South 
Korean government began to take out a series of loans in 1969 from foreign banks to purchase 
radio equipment from the US company Collins Radio. The radio company, based in Cedar 
Rapids, Iowa, initially designed and produced the equipment for short wave. It was through the 
common narrative of “development,” shared by both ITU and South Korea, albeit for different 
interests, that the new communication infrastructure – the microwave network – emerged. 
Military government’s consideration for national sovereignty converged with ITU’s view of 
international communication as a pacifying way of balancing power among different nations.  
  The project of virtually uniting the nation correlated with the efforts to physically bring 
the nation together by connecting the capital city of Seoul and the southeastern port city of 
Busan. Since the relay stations for microwaves involved building roads to the high altitude points 
(e.g. the mountains), the subsequent road construction projects facilitated easier access and 




Chihyung’s (2010) original study of Gyeongbu Highway details Park’s strategies for mobilizing 
materials and ‘spiritual resources’ needed to construct the “road to modernization and 
unification.” As post-war Korea’s first mega-infrastructure project that linked Seoul and Busan, 
Gyeongbu Highway was given the metaphor of the “main artery of the nation’s economy.” When 
completed, it was expected to become material evidence of the strength and perseverance of a 
country that managed to ‘win the battle’ without substantial foreign aid or guidance. The 416 
kilometer-long highway was completed within just two and a half years, causing 77 deaths 
among workers who were forced to expedite construction. Confronted by critics who condemned 
the oppressive and harsh way the project was being carried out, Park roused massive anti-
communist sentiments, encouraging workers and the whole nation to “fight as we construct,” and 
extolled the construction workers as the crusaders of freedom. Dual aim of facilitating faster 
economic growth and stabilizing a rigorous system of military to compete against the communist 
regime afforded the government sufficient legitimacy to move with this project and many others. 
For Park, who had declared the absolute commitment to protecting freedom, freedom was 
viewed as a desperate matter of self-preservation. 
  The involvement of the military personnel and facilities in the organization of 
industrializing economy buttressed mega-construction projects, such as Gyeongbu Highway. 
Soldiers whose sweat and blood were necessary to achieve higher goals were praised for their 
sacrifices, expected of worthy and deserving nationals. In the process of militarized 
modernization, the identity of a dutiful-national was politically framed as an ideal personhood, a 
patriot and a productive worker. Male workers in heavy and chemical industries had been 





(2) Global Governmobility: Airports and the Internet  
The government increasingly viewed globalization as a major problem in the 1980s. Airports and 
the Internet gained new significance as material foundations that enable mobility across the 
national borders and as the spatial technologies that reorganized the management of distance and 
time.    
   In 1986, Park Yeon-Su, Incheon’s urban planning chief, drew a plan for the “northeast 
Asian international business center city project.” The ambitious mega-urban construction 
development sought to reorganize the city’s territorial relations with the other successful 
cities/countries in East Asia, such as Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Singapore. Having been directly 
and indirectly involved in Songdo’s project for over two decades, Park was able to make 
valuable contributions about how the concept of international business hub had been envisioned 
and executed through Songdo’s “New Information City” plan. The plan consisted of “applying 
cutting-edge technology into real life to maintain the environment, transportation, and security so 
that one can communicate knowledge, information, and culture anytime, anywhere.” It also 
involved designing an “urban environment that possesses ample green space, water, and 
architectural aesthetics.” Ultimately, the plan envisioned a city that pursues “a multicultural 
society through deregulated and global business activities” (Park, p.100). Materializing this 
vision involved expanding the frontier of the city by reclaiming the tidal flats on the west coast, 
building a city literally from the ground up. The plan also consisted of constructing a built 
environment equipped with high-tech urban information infrastructures and linked to a new 
international airport on Yeongjong Island and an international leisure district for tourists.  
  In the mid-1980s, when Park was drawing the plan for the city, Incheon was “shut out 




(Park, 2008, p.21) By regulation, he meant the national government’s effort to suppress the 
sprawl from Seoul Metropolitan Area and to distribute resources to the rest of the country. 
Incheon’s proximity to Seoul in this sense was regarded as burden rather than a benefit, which 
overshadowed the city’s earlier industrial development. Incheon’s proximity to North Korea was 
seen as a security vulnerability that further discouraged public and private investments in the 
regional development. The growing manufacture industry in China further fueled added 
insecurity for the city that had mainly relied on the heavy and chemical industries, with a 
majority (77.2%) of its workforce involved in the manufacturing industry (p.22). The abundance 
of cheap labor in China, opened up to the international markets, was going to make Incheon and 
South Korea’s relative advantage of skilled labor increasingly untenable (p.26). 
   The vision behind the government-initiated Incheon Public Development Center 
managed to secure Incheon and South Korea a strategic position in the rapidly changing East 
Asia region. Park referred to Songdo’s project as part of the city of Incheon’s “Post-Hong Kong 
Strategy,” meaning that Songdo was designed to replicate Hong Kong’s successful template in 
South Korea’s west coast. With the intensifying intercity competition in East Asia and 
Shanghai’s rise (Chen, 2009), a systematic transformation of Incheon was deemed inevitable, 
although the transformation in this case mainly involved putting in place the technologically 
advanced mobility and urban service infrastructures.  
  Thanks to the government’s support and South Korea’s competitive high-tech industry, 
Songdo New Information City scheme anticipated a synergistic effect of combining the 
transportation infrastructure of Incheon International Airport (opened in 2001) with the new 
telecommunication infrastructure. The expected mutual benefit was that the airport would bring 




add permanent value to the city so much so that corporate executives and professional 
knowledge workers would direct their investments toward Songdo. The plan also included 
hosting scientific and knowledge-intensive facilities such as corporate R&D (research and 
development) centers that would focus on information and biotech industry.     
  However, one of the many challenges facing the committee was the national 
government’s regulation that sought to suppress further expansion of the Seoul Metropolitan 
Area. The city planning board in the post-war Seoul was formed to deal with issues such as 
overpopulation and rising property prices. The board emphasized the necessity to distribute the 
population away from the metropolitan area. On the other hand, as the project drew public 
attention, influential stakeholders such as the regional delegates to the national assembly, real-
estate developers, and homeowners clamored for opportunities to obtain short-term profits by 
building more residential apartment complexes than what was originally planned by the 
committee. Both the legal-institutional constraints and the demand from local power holders 
were weakening the committee’s long-term vision for constructing the international business 
hub, which would require costly investments and significant political support.  
     At the same time, the suburban new towns such as Bundang or Ilsan were becoming bed 
towns for commuters who worked in Seoul. The committee initially had a vision that 
distinguished Songdo from those residential suburban towns that represented the town’s 
dependence on Seoul. To resolve these challenges, the committee decided on a strategy that 
involved reiterating the value and the imperative of proactively addressing the demands of 
globalization, by putting in place infrastructural and institutional frameworks that would 
accommodate the increasing level of mobility and flexibility of the world’s economy. If 




its position in the network of global markets and create profound opportunities for business, 
tourism, and economic growth. In other words, between the two different accumulation strategies 
– business hub strategy and residential development strategy (Sonn, Shin, & Park, 2017) – the 
long-term strategy had a winning position at the early stage of Songdo’s development.    
  This long-term strategy seemed to be especially convincing at a time when the seemingly 
borderless space of telecommunications was introduced alongside the national government’s aim 
in the 1990s to go global. In this decade, the South Korean government systematically increased 
its support to nurture IT industry, and in 1994, the Ministry of Information and Communication 
was established to take charge of the national information and communication technology (ICT) 
policy, pursuing the goal of achieving the whole nation’s “informationalization” [Jeongbohwa] 
(Ko, 2013). This shift toward the information and knowledge-based economy was almost the 
inevitable call of the millennium for many economic experts and government officials, who 
religiously cited the quotes from Alvin Toffler’s book The Third Wave since its introduction to 
Korea in the early 1980s.  
 The rationale for informationalization was further consolidated in the 1990s by the term 
“globalization” [Segyehwa], which was largely perceived as another significant and impending 
transition ahead of the country (Kim, 2007). Abundant evidence suggests that the government 
perceived these two goals – informationalization and globalization – as the essential components 
of the same process. Continuing the export-oriented tendency of the industrial economy since the 
1960s, South Korean government was actively imagining and engaging with the time-space of 
the global developments through its investments in the ICT sector and new urban infrastructures. 
These were regarded as a new source of national economic growth and a means to extend the 




  As the national government was readily accepting the challenges of globalization 
through informationalization, the boundary of the nation-state that had hitherto shielded the local 
municipalities was increasingly seemed permeable. The changing sense of global time-space put 
pressure on the cities to face the challenges of having to “govern themselves.” This new 
challenge, on the surface, seemed to emanate from the initiation of the new national policy of 
local self-rule or self-government [Jibang jachi]. This new policy that was implemented in 1995 
gave citizens the right to directly elect their local representatives for the first time in history, 
rather than having them appointed by the national government.  As such, the city officials took 
on the dual challenge of having their governing practice conform to the national policy and 
addressing the citizens’ demands and expectations. Amid the changing political climate of the 
1990s that witnessed the declining national sovereignty vis-à-vis the seemingly formidable 
forces of globalization, the cities found themselves in a position to compete with one another 
within and beyond the national border.  
  It is against this backdrop that technologies of governing mobility through 
communication and transportation began to play a key role in South Korea’s major cities’ 
strategies to respond to the new challenges of globalization. Songdo project team in the 
Incheon’s development committees actively sought the national government’s support and 
funding for the new ICT infrastructures and the opportunities to develop the city’s logistical 
networks. In 1996, the committee proposed the “Tri-Port Strategy,” supported by the then mayor 
Choi Ki-Sun, which suggested creating an intermodal logistics hub that combined seaport, 
airport, and telecommunication port (Dong-a Ilbo, 1996.07.01, Choi, 2016). In this plan, Songdo 
was designated as the central zone for IT-related research facilities, such as the Techno Parks, as 




vision to foster mobility across multiple infrastructural forms, which would constitute the 
material foundation for Songdo’s efforts to claim the global and innovative city status.  
     Following this strategy, the transportation and logistics designs in Songdo considered 
not only the efficient and optimal flow of movement within the city but also the city’s temporal 
and territorial relations with the other cities in East Asia and beyond, the prime example of 
which is Incheon Bridge. The Incheon Bridge, one of the world’s longest bridges, stretches for 
twelve miles across the Yellow Sea, connecting Songdo and Incheon international airport on 
Yeongjong Island. The bridge became the symbol of Songdo’s proximity with the outside world, 
supported by the fact that the airport gave people access to megacities in East Asia (e.g. 
Shanghai (accessible within 1 hour flying time), Tokyo (1.5 hours), Hong Kong (2.5 hours), and 
Singapore (5.5 hours)), rendering Songdo “a gateway to more than a third of the world’s 
population in just 3.5 hours of flying time (Songdo International Business District (IBD) official 
website).”  
  The calculative rationality that converts the distance in temporal terms assesses the value 
of the city by the extent of its speed and access beyond its territorial border. In the new economic 
geography of the global city, as discussed by Sassen (2000, 2005), Songdo was imagined as a 
neutralized and frictionless utopia where technologies of managing distance and mobility were 
indispensable for extending its frontier beyond the borders of the nation state.  
  When globalization and informationalization were established as the government’s main 
concern of the mid-1980s to the 1990s, the new logistical space of the airport and the Internet 
provided reliable material grounds for resolving those concerns. It is significant to note that until 
the mid-1980s, air travelling outside of South Korean territory was strictly regulated and was 




gradually eased the restrictions regarding passport issuance and even allowed the overseas 
tourism for the first time, on the condition that one provides a financial affidavit by a close 
family member or relatives who is already staying overseas and that one is over 50 years old 
(Lee, 1981.06.17). When the age restriction for overseas tourism was lifted in 1989, overseas 
tourism became rapidly popularized, with increasing numbers of air travels that grew by 16.7% 
annually in the 1980s and by 8.6% in the 1990s (Hankyoreh, 1995.05.17).  
 Such rapidly increasing popularity and aspirations toward the airplane and the airport 
reflected how the tropes of new global time-space had already permeated South Korea’s 
imagined community, which was perceived as approaching and approached by the spaces 
beyond the boundaries of national border. The new mobility infrastructure of the airport was not 
only seen as a distinct sign of affluence and freedom but a material means of bringing the world 
closer. Incheon planning committee’s vision for Songdo channeled these aspirations and tropes 
to develop a new urban form accommodating the increased demands of mobility. Their vision 
was also concomitant with those of urban planners and architects in the other parts of the world. 
John Kasarda, a professor of business at the University of North Carolina, who advised the 
developers in Incheon airport with his widely preached urban development model “aerotropolis,” 
referred to the airport as “the physical Internet.” Kasarda viewed the airport as central for the 
cities seeking to become the hub of the global business networks. He declared that the “airports 
will be in 21st-century cities, what train stations were in the 20th-century cities” 
(Kasarda&Lindsey, 2013). 
  The nature of the new global economy that relied on the constant exchange of 
knowledge and trade accorded a new prominence to the airport, although previously the areas 




due to noise and traffic. However, the real-timeness of the Internet that was already accelerating 
and reconfiguring people’s everyday mobile practices (e.g. purchasing bus and flight tickets, 
making hotel reservations, coordinating work at a distance, growing number of international 
travelers, and so on), corresponded with the demand for increased physical mobility that 
transcended the borders of the cities and the nation state.   
  To repeat, the mutually dependent relationship between the airport and the Internet in 
shaping Songdo was firmly related to the feelings of anxiety and fascination that surrounded the 
impending reality of globalization and informationalization, which were the government’s 
critical problems since the 1980s. While the mobility through airspace was conceived as 
reconfiguring the urban geographical landscape in relation to the new economic reality of 
globalization, the emerging significance of information and knowledge-based economy pressed 
the cities to reinvent themselves as the “milieu of innovation,” or “technopoles,” so as to solidify 
their presence and position to the network of global cities.  
(3) Networked Governmobility: Smart City  
Recalling Songdo’s historical and geographical contextualization, the infrastructures and 
technologies of governing mobility in the smart cities can be understood as a combination of 
both residual and emergent forms of the urban governance through mobility. This phase of 
development was beginning to take shape in the 2000s, long since the physical foundation of 
infrastructures had more or less been completed. Until the 1990s, the schemes for building IT 
infrastructures in Songdo were limited to providing office space and model production factory 
space for IT companies and research centers. This was mainly the case because IT companies 
and research centers affiliated to universities were focused on innovation in electronic and 




intended to make a difference in the way buildings and roads were designed, or urban public 
services were offered. Knowledge and Information Industry Complex in today’s Songdo retains 
the facilities and institutional arrangements that were to nurture cutting-edge research and 
development in information technology, biotechnology, and sustainable energy. It was in the mid 
to late 2000s that Songdo became a laboratory for enterprises and research centers, seeking to 
experiment with the then-new ubiquitous technology in an actual urban environment. “U-City 
(Ubiquitous City)” initiative in Songdo, in particular, was programed in line with the national 
government’s policy orientation that aimed to build the “First u-Society on the Best u-
Infrastructure” (Ko, 2013, p.60).  
 Smart mobility services in today’s Songdo bring logistical, financial, and computational 
mobility in a more intricate form, although their operations have become more automated and 
less visible. At a micro-behavioral and logistical level, through the Internet of Things (IoT), 
computational agencies get embedded in the built environment of the city to observe and manage 
people’s everyday mobile practices at a micro-level (e.g. walking, parking, driving, and 
shopping). Whereas previous forms of mobility governance were designed around an assumed 
homogeneity of the mass population, the emerging forms of smart mobility such as ride-sharing, 
taxi-hailing, and traffic monitoring are catering to individual users’ preferences and their 
mobility patterns. Any smooth operation of services is predicated on high-density network 
infrastructure that allows unimpeded WiFi access or cellular connectivity currently at 4G LTE, 
which is soon expected to migrate to the next generation of cellular connectivity of 5G, an even 
more massive bandwidth, by the early 2020s. Smart mobility technology that monitors and 
manages mobile practices at such a micro-level extends the techniques of previous forms of 




 This progression of technology poses several implications. First, it is the mobility of data 
that has acquired an infinite level of freedom and accessibility to pervade and coordinate 
movements of human bodies, vehicles, and things. More accurately, it is the signals and not the 
individual humans that carry the data moves so that one no longer has to circle an entire block 
looking for an empty parking space or go to the bank to transfer cash. In some of Songdo’s 
apartment complexes, they even eliminated the need to take out the garbage outside the house, 
thanks to an underground built-in disposal system that would transports the garbage from each 
household to a central disposal site. In short, personal mobility that is increasingly becoming 
digitally mediated minimizes, if not eliminates, the need for physical bodily movement.  
 To be sure, emerging features of digitally mediated forms of mobility coexist with the 
residual forms of mobility, including highways, microwave networks, airports, and the Internet. 
The emerging forms of mobility augment and repurpose the old network functions and customs 
of use in order to make their new features prominent. In other words, along with the 
government’s object of unifying the nation, which rationalized the construction of highways and 
microwave networks in the 60s and that of globalization that supported the creation of airports 
and the Internet in the 90s, the smart city and the Internet of Things are endorsed by an 
optimized and networked urban governance that supposedly liberates the individuals from earlier 
constraints of mass-scale infrastructures. What remains constant in these transitions is the fact 
that mobility is a principle for organizing the geography of the nation and the cities. People, 
either collectively or individually, are governed by and through mobility, a trend that will 
continue as the technology continues to evolve. 
 There is another important point worth mentioning about the significant role of mobility 




relationship between the financial/logistical mobility and mobility differentials among the 
different population groups, and further explore the ordinances that turned Songdo into a “special 
zone” of economic mobility. I will discuss this aspect in the following section.  
Zoning as a Technology for Governing Differentiated Mobilities 
The concept of zoning was first introduced in Korea (by the time Korea was called by its pre-
modern name, Chosŏn) when the country was gradually coming under the influence of foreign 
colonial powers. Writing about the foreign settlement zones that formed around ports in Incheon 
around the 1880s, Harold Noble (1929) studied the early modern form of treaties signed by the 
Korean government, which granted an indefinite “lease” of its property rights to the foreign 
countries, including Japan, Britain, Germany, America, and Russia. The primary condition of 
these treaties required that Korean government sublet small areas to foreign powers, transferring 
complete legal control of the leased areas, although the sovereign title presumably remained with 
the Korean government. Port of Jemulpo in Incheon, was one of the key points of entry for the 
foreign ships.10  
  The nearly empty lowland began to gain prominence. Demands for foreign trade helped 
the growth of the city of Jemulpo – to be subsequently absorbed by Incheon prefecture. Treaties 
imposed asymmetrical power relations between the Korean government and the foreign powers, 
among which the Japanese government held the highest interest. After 1919, Japan monopolized 
trade with Korea, and its influence increasingly grew to the extent that the Japanese elites were 
 
10	Noble describes the scene at the port of Incheon when a series of colonial treaties were signed: "The 
nearest port to Seoul was Chemulpo [sic], a squalid fishing village distant from the capital twenty-six 
miles by road and fifty-three miles by river, situated on a large bay having a daily tide of thirty-three feet. 
It was four miles from Inchun [sic], the prefectural town. Half of the day the waterfront was a long 
expanse of mud flats and only the smallest boats could approach the shore. Nevertheless, this place was 
chosen as the most convenient port for direct communication with the capital, and as early as 1880 the 
Japanese minister, Hanabusa, selected part of the uninviting mud flats just above tide water as a site for a 




residing in the cities and exerting control over the business, government administration, and 
urban planning. Japanese modeled the Korean cities on the Japanese ones, although Korean and 
Japanese residences were segregated, shaping a dual structure within the city.11  
  The concept of zoning reappeared in the modern planning of the cities at a time when 
South Korea was struggling to recover from the Korean War. Under the banner of the “growth 
first” economic strategy since the 1960s, the nation was geographically mobilized and 
reorganized into key industrial production sites, clustered in soon-to-become “developmental 
bubble cities” (Kang, 1998). Satellite cities surrounding Seoul conurbation area in Gyeonggi 
Province became the manufacturing sites for semiconductors products, automobiles, and heavy 
chemical industries. Smokestacks and pollution became the representative gray image of the city, 
while any matters of personal concerns such as health and quality of life were suppressed at the 
expense of achieving higher goals – the fast reconstruction of the nation. The sacrifice of a 
“small freedom” (individual rights and dignity), it was said, was worthwhile to achieve a “big 
freedom” (self-sustained nation). As a result, South Korean urban policy from this period 
squarely focused on the construction of infrastructures for industrial production and economic 
growth (Kang, 1998). 
 This period in the modern economic history of South Korea is critical in understanding 
today’s national economy, which is highly dependent on the import and export industries. The 
military government strategically designated several “export processing zones” in the major 
southeastern coastal cities including Busan, Ulsan, Pohang, and Masan. With unprecedented 
 
11	According to Todd Henry (2014), in enforcing the urban reform, the Japanese Governor-General 
invoked the language of civic morality that deployed a racialized dichotomy of civilized Japanese settlers 
in contrast to the selfish and ‘uncivilized' Koreans. In this logic, those who refused to relinquish their land 
were said to be disrupting the order necessary for achieving the collective good, such as having a safe and 
clean living space. This racialized characterization of Korean population further reinforced the colonial 




investments from the government in port facilities and highway construction projects, these 
zones functioned as strategic nodes for export-oriented industrialization policies. This zoning 
strategy is normally adopted by developing countries that have cheap labor and are willing to 
lend their authority to foreign companies. Factories and companies within these zones were 
given exceptional leverage to “freely” conduct their business-related activities, while the military 
government assured that such economic liberalization was separated from political 
liberalization.12 Through export-processing zones, the government flexibly experimented with 
different forms of sovereignty and governance in accordance with the status quo (Park, 2005).  
In 2002, Incheon development committee received official permission from the national 
assembly for the establishment of a special economic zone called “Free Economic Zone” (FEZ). 
FEZ was a revival of the protocols from the export-processing zones from the 60s. Incheon Free 
Economic Zone (IFEZ) followed the same strategies, which included giving income-tax 
exemptions to companies, providing legal benefits (minimal regulations on land-use or labor 
relations), and encouraging foreign direct investment in the zone. Due to FEZ’s special legal 
status, the support for the new legislation brought together city officials, lawmakers, think tank 
policy researchers, and the national government officials who readily internalized the global 
imperatives that had lent significance to the new FEZ:      
 
It is important that the government's commitments be very strong. (…) They must ensure 
the foreign investors that the regulations will work, there will be tax incentives and the 
 
12 Regulatory environment within the special zones was designed to encourage export and manufacturing 
activities of the companies and to minimize bureaucratic procedures that otherwise would have required 
them to undergo proper oversight. The special status of the zone was exceptionally capable of organizing 
a form of labor exploitation in the mostly labor-intensive manufacturing businesses (textiles, plywood, 
and wigs) since the competitiveness of these zones were predicated on the availability of cheap and 
disciplined labor. The military government justified the suppression of labor on the basis that South 
Korea was surrounded by a peculiar political circumstance. Besides, many Korean people who challenged 
the undemocratic nature of the military government nonetheless positively responded to the 




labor-management issue will be controlled. (Huh, Chan Guk, the director of 
macroeconomic studies at the Korea Economic Research Institute; quoted in Brooke, 
2004.09.24) 
 
Seoul would pass the special economic zone measures on schools, hospitals, and labor 
relations, as a sign shown by the government of how much we welcome foreign 
investment, and how much the government is willing to make the environment friendly to 
foreigners. (Hong, Jae Hyong, a National Assembly member; quoted in Brooke, 
2004.09.24) 
 
Under the new scheme, Songdo (20.6 square miles), Yong-jong (8.42 square miles), and Chung-
ra (6.87 square miles) districts in Incheon metropolitan city were designated as special zones. 
Songdo focused on high-tech industry and international business; Yong-jong concentrated on 
transportation and import/export; and Chung-ra aimed at leisure and tourism.    
  IFEZ’s spatial strategy to become a hub of the emerging network of the global economy 
was mainly concerned with creating an institutional framework favorable to financial and 
logistical forms of mobility. IFEZ offered incentive packages to the renowned ‘global’ 
educational institutions and non-government organizations on the condition that they would 
relocate in Songdo. As of 2017, the United Nations Green Climate Fund (UNGCF) along with 
sub-regional offices for the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNESCAP), Asian and Pacific Training Centre for Information and Communication 
Technology for Development (APCICT), and the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) have been sharing the same office building in the G-tower, where the 
main office building for the IFEZ authority is located. The space for the World Bank Group’s 
new office in Songdo was leased for free, thanks to IFEZ’s support. IFEZ also actively forged 
partnerships with the Anglo-American higher-education institutions, such as the State University 
of New York, George Mason University, Ghent University, and the University of Utah, by 
allowing them to launch their Asian branch campuses in Songdo. These global campuses are 




hoping that they would foster the mobility of the highly educated and skilled students through 
student-exchange initiatives and university-industry partnerships. These strategies of 
incentivizing private corporations and global institutions were facilitated by the exceptional legal 
status of FEZ that relaxed the domestic regulations regarding foreign direct investments and 
establishment of public institutions, such as schools and hospitals. It was hoped that they would 
enhance IFEZ’s reputation as a global epicenter of knowledge-based enterprises.   
 The zones that are exempt from direct-state regulation are promoted as spaces of 
liberalism, openness, and flexibility. Yet, these apolitical cities are not entirely absent of rule; 
they are instead ruled by and through freedom. Easterling (2014) describes the proliferation of 
zoning technologies in developing nations as a form of “extrastatecraft” – a form of complex 
extra-administration technique that merely replaced the previous forms of the state bureaucracy. 
Zoning technologies are the spatial instrument of the government that selectively liberates 
special zones by partially giving away its power to its proxies such as multinational corporations 
and non-governmental “global” organizations; they are given leverages to skew governmental 
programs and ordinances to their favor. These proxies possess a high level of mobility, meaning 
that they can simply move to other zones that offer better incentives. As a result, governments 
that are keen to utilize zoning technologies compete with one another to offer cheaper labor pool 
and tax incentives. This, in turn, results in highly uneven geography within a national territory, 
affecting various segments of the population. The population within these zones are governed by 
different rules and regulations and are conditioned to work with exceptional privileges and dis-
privileges based on their expertise and nationalities.  
 It is important to note that the popularity of zoning technologies in this context may 




conform to a global norm” (Easterling, 2014, p. 65). In South Korea, the legacy of special zoning 
technique is inextricably linked with the popular nostalgia for the rapid industrialization and 
economic growth of the 60s. Those who are critical of the undemocratic and discriminatory labor 
policies of the authoritarian regime, nevertheless respond positively to the developmental 
initiatives of the government. The same public sentiment that favors development and prosperity 
over equity and justice throws its support behind a mobile and global city like Songdo.  
Songdo, a Global City? 
Part of what is distinct about today’s Songdo, often dubbed as the “Songdo International City,” is 
the government’s preferential treatment and the performative dimension of its assertions about 
the future. Although Songdo (and the greater Incheon metropolitan city) is situated within the 
long history of colonialism and militarism in South Korea, it has keenly adorned its landscape 
with elements of multiculturalism and globalism, believed to have been inherited from such a 
tumultuous history. In 2009, Incheon Development Institute, the city government’s policy think 
tank, published an edited volume of research report entitled New City, New Incheon (Korean) 
through which it suggested a new paradigm and a value system for the next development model 
for Incheon. Openness to continual change and dynamism was not only the key to success but of 
vital matter of life and death of the city. According to this report, what was demanded for the 
city’s new transition were strategies for a cultural economy that encourages multiculturalism and 
of low-carbon growth befitting the image of the new city. If successful, these strategies would 
help Incheon to re-establish its identity that had previously been overshadowed by Seoul. The 
report also emphasized the role of Incheon in becoming the node of communication across the 




which had been eclipsed by the Cold War hostilities. It was only through revitalizing the space of 
communication that Incheon could truly reinvent itself from a transit city to a global city.  
  What is involved in conjuring the new idea of the city is the new attitude that is 
demanded of the citizens who are the crucial part of making the project successful:    
I want to create a high-class city where everybody wants to come to live in. In order for 
Incheon to become one of the top ten major cities in the world, we have to provide a 
certain quality of space and the infrastructure. While preserving our cultural heritage, we 
have to publicize such cultural values to the outer world. […] Incheonians should not 
reserve from opening themselves up to the world and from directly competing with 
foreign countries. It requires our citizen’s willingness and active attitude.  
(Ahn, Sang-Soo, mayor of Incheon; quoted in Nae-il News, 2009.07.17) 
 
Ahn, Sang-Soo, the “gung-ho” mayor of Incheon from 2002 to 2010, was especially keen to 
display an open and competitive attitude by actively enticing foreign investments toward 
Songdo.13 He made the above remark when addressing the residents of Incheon, envisioning 
entrepreneurial subjects who do not “reserve from opening themselves up to the outer world” 
with a certain “willingness and active attitude,” based on his understanding of the competitive 
reality of the globalization that pressured the city to drive forward to the outside world. His 
repeated use of expressions such as “high-class city,” “top ten major cities in the world,” and 
“willingness to directly compete with foreigners” emphasize his recognition of the financially 
successful Shanghai and Singapore, the models he tried to emulate in Songdo, inspired by 
“directly competing with the foreign countries.”   
 As the city grapples with the imperatives for change and dynamism, its effort to make 
peace with its memory of aggressive and asymmetric mobility can be seen through its 
narrativization and “ornamentalization” of the past (McCarthy, 2015). In the old city center of 
 
13	Ahn even met with the then businessmen Donald and Ivanka Trump in New York City in 2008 to 
discuss building a 120-story Trump Hotel in Songdo. The project was later scrapped after Ahn failed to 




Incheon, where various historical venues including the train station, Chinatown, and history 
museums are located, the imperative for the city’s precipitation into a global future is articulated 
through the city’s past that is made to seem relevant in new ways. Globalization is seen not 
simply as an externally imposed reality but a hybridized stage of history that inherits the colonial 
and industrial history – a history that portends the cosmopolitan sensibilities for a global city 
(Incheon History Museum, 2011).   
  In a promotional venue of Songdo, I-vision center, a narrative connecting the past, the 
present, and the future of Songdo is more explicitly articulated – from Incheon’s opening of the 
port to foreign colonial powers in the late nineteenth century and its development into a giant 
gateway to the international trade. The teleological narrativization of this history is completed by 
Songdo’s current international city status as the end point, proudly representing “Another Face of 
Dynamic Korea.”     
 Yet, Songdo’s performative assertion about its global city status, articulated through its 
architectural landscape, seems to suspend that history: “Central Park,” “American Town,” “The 
First World,” “Canal Walk,” and “Jack Nicklaus golf course” are names of the main apartment 
complexes, parks, and shopping centers in Songdo, which either borrowed their names from 
iconic global cities in the West14 or were brought up to denote the city’s grand worldly ambition.  
 The fate of the “Tomorrow City,” a u-technology exhibition hall that is now vacant and 
only frequented as a bus stop, is a painful reminder and cautionary tale for planners and 
strategists who are vying for costly provision of technology that will eventually fall from public 
 
14	Explaining the design principle for Songdo, Jonathan Thorpe, the Chief Information Officer from the 
American developer Gale International, refers to the exemplary design elements that the plan drew from 
the Western cities: “We have a performing arts center that is situated on the water out on the point, just 
like Sydney's Opera House. The idea was to have something iconic like that. We have a central park, with 
high-rise buildings surrounding the central park. Just like New York Central Park. And lastly, we have a 
grand canal within the central park that is so much similar to Venice's canal. Even with the water taxi, so 




favor. The case of the Tomorrow City that has gained notoriety of “the Ghost of Smarter City 
Past” (Lindsay, 2010.02.01) illustrates how the government’s futurist vision alone does not 
induce desirable outcomes. The initial vision of U-Life (Ubiquitous Life) exhibited at the 
Tomorrow City was demoed by LG (the Korean conglomerate), consisting of u-shopping, u-
health, u-learning, and virtually u-everything that was expected to set an example in the world. 
While its novelty soon drew attention from planners and strategists around, before long they also 
learned that one could not just push down a new technology and expect it to be taken up by 
consumers, and even less likely to create a city by dropping the idea on the map.      
 The lesson has since been shared among IFEZ officials as well as many experts on smart 
cities in South Korea. They have recognized and reflected on the technocratic tendency inherent 
in the previous application of U-City idea and understood the need to adopt a citizen-centered 
approach to make the smart city more successful. Government’s shifting of emphasis concerning 
the smart city’s sustainability, security and safety, employment, and the quality of life reflects its 
change of strategy to address the “real-life” problems of the city and citizens. Such changes in 
strategy will be elaborated in the following chapters, as it involves a more sophisticated 
technology and techniques of governing a smart city that is reinvented to be sustainable, secure, 
and creative. This entails a technical focus migrating from screens and texts to an environment 
that is more intelligent, inconspicuous, yet always-on. 
 This chapter traced South Korea’s long history of mobility, its relation to the changing 
status of government’s problematizations, and subsequent strategies of dealing with the given 
problems through mobility infrastructures. In the following chapters, I will complicate the 
relationship between the government and mobility by attending to the ways in which the very 




government’s management of security, risk, and environment. The transition from this chapter to 
the following chapters will unravel the binarism of freedom and control, in a sense that the 
interplay of freedom and control is the key mechanism of power. In chapter 3, I will discuss how 
the smart management of urban crime and risk draws momentum from South Korea’s long 
history of militarism and the formation of defensive citizenship that recast the self as the locus of 
self-protection and self-defense. In chapter 4, I will discuss how the smart city is supposedly 
designed as an alternative method to contain the planetary risk of climate change, to build the 
capacity of urban resilience and sustainable development. The ways in which the city manages 
various forms and scales of risks and keeps itself prepared for disasters and threats – by imposing 
codes, standards, and measurement of the urban environment – are inextricably bound with its 
goal to foster and support physical, informational, and financial freedom and mobilities. Mobility 
always predicts risks. And risks always require technologies and techniques of managing and 














CHAPTER 3. SONGDO, THE SAFEST CITY IN SOUTH KOREA: 




In previous chapters, I have traced South Korea’s history of communication and transportation 
infrastructures and observed how they materialized and spatialized the government’s changing 
relationship with the national, global, and urban networks in the 20th century. I demonstrated 
how, in that history, mobility served as a significant mode of rule and administration of South 
Korea, even when the organization of society and individual mobile practices seemed to have 
acquired the means to bypass the national territorial boundary. South Korea’s modern 
transportation and communication infrastructures (highways and microwave networks) embodied 
the problem and objective of the government in the 1960s, in so far as it served the nation’s 
efficient functioning and mobilization of resources for industrialization and national unification. 
As the government perceived the new challenge of globalization and informationalization in the 
1980s, the airport and the Internet functioned as the then newly found zones through which the 
nation could engage with the time-space of the global. This new time-space entailed the 
imagined features of openness and freedom, which seemingly brought in new opportunities as 
well as insecurities associated with the tropes of globalization, a punishing and competitive 
reality that mobilized the citizens’ willingness and attitude to prepare for the new level of 
competition.   
  In explaining how mobility served as an essential instrument for the government, I also 
emphasized how the government associated the values of freedom with the new communication 
and transportation infrastructures – even when the economic freedom was separated from the 




and communicative potential of the population by allowing them to overcome physical distances 
and to be united across the regional and national borders.  
 In this chapter, I present a different, if not a paradoxical, dimension of the same mobility 
regime, which functions as another significant aspect of the contemporary urban governance – 
security and risk management. While the language of national security is gradually giving away 
to a less-overtly militant program of personal safety and self-care in the 21st century, creating 
fissures between different groups and generations,15 there exists an enduring, yet constantly 
evolving, form and function of the government that constructs and problematizes various forms 
of risks. Defining, predicting, and controlling risks are the central concern of the government that 
devises systems and measures to securitize the cities and the nation. As it will be shown, the 
techniques and technologies of the smart city’s security and risk management rely on and draw 
resources not only from technical advancement in data visualization and analysis but also from 
South Korea’s long history of militarism, the geopolitics of national security, and the culture of 
defensive self which organized individuals as the primary locus of self-defense.  
  Read in parallel, the previous chapter on freedom of mobility and the current chapter on 
risk and security demonstrate the contradictions imbricated in the liberal aspirations to achieve 
open, flexible, and transparent urban governance, which also rests on a program of highly 
disciplining and centralizing tendencies. Both the centrifugal and centripetal relations of media 
and space are intertwined into the dual architecture of the smart city system, which distributes 
and disperses, and synchronizes media in space at the same time.  
 My investigation of the smart city’s security management involves questioning and 
understanding how the risk and security have become the central problem of urban governance: 
 
15	The ongoing protest against the demolition of General McArthur Statue at the Freedom Park in 
Incheon is an illustrating example that shows the generational divide surrounding the memorialization of 




what role does the risk, as a material reality, a discourse, and an ‘affective fact’, play in the 
‘smartification’ of the city such as Songdo? To answer this question, I cast a wide net to view 
both the residual and emergent forms of perceiving and governing risk that have shaped the 
current technical and affective landscape of Songdo.  
  In the first part of this chapter, I demonstrate how the long history of South Korea’s 
security governance has been inextricably bound with the authoritarian government’s program of 
national security, the geopolitical reality of Cold War, and the militarized modernization. The 
government’s initiation of mandatory conscription, civil defense training and its influence in 
workplace management and high school curriculum were among the array of instances that 
constituted the formation of militarism and defensive citizenship in South Korea. While the 
rhetoric and legacies of the Cold War is not entirely absent in the 21st century South Korea, this 
aspect of militant national security is becoming less conspicuous and substituted by personalized 
perception of risk and safety management. What has become more prominent in this process is 
the techniques of defending oneself and the demand and responsibility for safety that are more 
mundanely mediated in everyday life in the cities, against evolving forms of risk that is 
increasingly multi-scalar: from the planetary crisis of the climate change to the more immediate 
threat of violent street crimes, hacking, virus, food poisoning, and so on.   
 Following the discussion of the history, I discuss how the data-driven security programs 
in the smart city can be understood as an intersection between the residual and emergent forms of 
envisioning, managing, and controlling risk. This chapter particularly focuses on the programs of 
urban crime management while the next chapter investigates how the smart cities programs are 




change. The fact that the cities are constituted as risk-managing machines informs a significant 
technical and ethical aspect of the smart city’s governance.  
 Regarding the above emergent form of urban risk management exemplified in the smart 
city, I discuss two interlinked observations that pertain to the evolving mechanism of security 
and control. One is about the new urban design and technology trend toward architecting an 
intelligent environment. As computational agencies migrate from desktop to the environment and 
as the city becomes more connected and networked, the responsibility to secure the city is 
seemingly dispersed and distributed across the environment. This trend parallels with the 
emerging conceptualization of the risk as ‘environmental’, meaning that the risk is increasingly 
defined in situational terms of space and time (O’Malley, 1996). As a result, the growing 
ambiguities of surveillance blurs the distinctions between the private and the public sphere, 
making less tenable modern categories of distinction of the individual identity as the primary unit 
of social analysis. 
 The other observation is about the changing relationships between the government and 
individual subjects, particularly about the ways in which the population is enrolled in the 
program of urban securitization. As it will be shown, in everyday life level, it is not easy to 
distinguish people’s willing submission to the government program from covert operations of 
‘dataveillance’. While the self is foregrounded as the central site of defensive responsibility, 
visible in the surge of domestic CCTV, in-car dash cameras, and mobile apps for personal safety, 
the very notion of the individual self seems to dissolve into a matter of actionable events and 
information.  
  Before I begin to elaborate on these observations, I start this chapter by acknowledging 




current regime of smart security governance. Under this program, it was understood that the 
completion of national security was a necessary precondition for personal safety and that it was 
one’s national duty to fulfill mandatory military service and training to protect oneself and one’s 
family.  
National Program of Civil Defense and the Birth of Defensible Subject   
South Korea’s nation-wide civil defense training was initiated since 1969 under the anti-
communist military regime. Along with the nation-wide conscription program that enlisted all 
adult males in South Korea – a constitutional mandate that continues to the present – the military 
regime initiated a mandatory training program that involved college students and high school 
students. Through this program, former officials from military schools were dispatched to each 
college and high school to execute regular defense drills. During the regular high school defense 
drills, students were taught how to assemble and disassemble guns, how to shoot, how to give 
emergency treatments, and how to be prepared for an actual war. The student defense training 
was part of a national program for mobilizing the whole population into militarized 
modernization in South Korea. The institution of civil defense enacted a program of self-
protection that organized individuals into a patriotic, anti-communist, and defensible subject, 
wherein the citizens were involved in the active role of defending their own country’s security. It 
was only by defending the nation’s security could personal safety be guaranteed. Many Koreans 
considered the completion of military service and training as a measurement of one’s civic 
virtues. 
 Since the late 1990s, curriculums at high schools gradually diminished the ‘old 
fashioned’ military training program by switching it from mandatory to selective training, until it 




wellness education in 2011. The new programs included fire drills, disaster prevention, self-
defense, and nutritious diet.  
 What then, does the military defense training, the legacy of the former military regime 
and the Cold War, have to do with the security programs in the smart city today? I evoke this 
example not just because the Cold War framework is still very relevant, albeit with contestations, 
in South Korean politics and public discourse today.16 The long history of militarism and 
security consciousness, an enduring legacy of Cold War in South Korea, both directly and 
indirectly, is articulated and rearticulated in the programming of the security governance of the 
cities and in molding the civic duty and responsibility for being prepared for emergency and 
external threats. 
 In fact, Songdo is located just a few miles south from the Incheon Naval Sector Defense 
Command (INSDC), which regularly patrols the Incheon international airport and offshore 
islands up to the Northern Limit Line (NLL) that demarcates the Yellow Sea between North and 
South Korea.17 INSDC was formerly known as the Coast Defense Incheon Base established in 
1946, which later joined forces with the allies of the United Nations during Korean War. The 
 
16 The US and the South Korea’s joint military exercise continues today, while the wartime operational 
control rests with the Combined Forces Command (CFC), whose head has been the commander of the US 
Forces in Korea. Since the early 2000s, the topic of national defense and security consciousness have 
often been hotly debated, especially over the US control over South Korean wartime operation and the 
National Security Act, which had been extensively used by the military regime to incarcerate and torture 
people who sympathized with communism. The democratic movement of the 1987 pressured the South 
Korean government to liberalize its security policy however, the National Security Act persists to this day 
with highly anti-communist undertones.  
17	From its earliest conception, the area of Songdo was crucial for national security reasons. Korean 
Navy’s regular military training and operations are taking place at Wolmido, a nearby location to Songdo. 
In the year 1987 when the blueprint was drawn up for the New Songdo Information City, Ministry of 
National Defense complained about the nature of the development, concerned that any real estate 




joined force fought under the command of General Douglas MacArthur from the US Army 
during the Battle of Incheon, which took place quite close to where today’s Songdo is located.18    
 The primary objective of militarism and national security that organized the 
government’s operations and social relations during the 1960s gradually dissipated and was 
conjoined with the individualized programs of safety-management.19 As discussed in the 
previous chapter, by the time when the Incheon development committee was preparing plans for 
Songdo in the late 1980s, South Korea was coming under pressure to meet the challenges of 
globalization and knowledge-based economy. At the same time, the period was also marked by a 
dramatic political and social transition and a quest for liberal democracy and the civil rights. It 
was especially around the 1987 Democratic Movement that the collective desire for individual 
emancipation was actively expressed against the oppressive and authoritarian state power.  
 In this historical context, personal safety as a matter of quality of life came to matter in 
new ways, which was a concern that crossed the lines of political disposition or ideological 
difference. Faced with the uncertainties of the global reality, flexibilized condition of labor 
market, and growing anxieties that characterized the public mood toward the end of 20th century, 
the individuals, as the primary unit of responsibility and decision-making, were instructed to 
 
18	Various contemporary popular cultural texts and monuments have publicly memorialized the Korean 
War. For example, the movie Operation Chromite (2016, Directed by Lee, Jae-han, financed by CJ E&M 
Entertainment) revisited the Battle of Incheon focusing on the covert mission by South Korean squad 
infiltrating the North Korean operations. Casting Liam Neeson as the General MacArthur, the master 
planner behind the mission coded the Operation Chromite, making of the movie involved high production 
cost. However, it generated polarized opinions between the conservative aged groups and the younger 
population groups who were divided by the movie’s heavy dose of patriotism, anti-communism and the 
national security issues. The same division of public opinion was demonstrated in the collision that 
surrounded the General MacArthur’s statue in Incheon’s Freedom Park. The park, located in Incheon’s 
old city center, was established to commemorating the victory of the Battle of Incheon in 1947. The leftist 
groups have demanded the demolition of the statue since the early 2000s, which was met by resistance by 
the right-wing groups (OhMyNews, 2009.09.08).    
19	In Foucauldian terms, this transition can be interpreted as reflecting the shifting conceptualization of 
the government’s security techniques that aim to defend national sovereignty and territory toward the 




customize their own self-care regime to stay safe and healthy (Yang, 2016). In South Korea, the 
individualized notion of risk that constituted the technologies of the self, developed in 
conjunction with the expanding neoliberal economic policies following the financial crisis in 
1997 (Yang, 2016; Joung, 2011). Unlike in the advanced liberal countries in the West, South 
Korea’s neoliberal policies were brought in the vacuum of welfare state policies and institutional 
arrangements for minimum social safety. As a result, the responsibilities for risk management 
fell solely on the hands of the individuals, who sublimated the distrust and anxiety regarding the 
state power into an aspiration for personal survival, stability, and safety (Joung, 2011, p.278).   
 At the same time, the existing bureaucratic organizations were increasingly deemed 
incapable of managing and reducing risks that seemed to be evolving at various levels. 
Management of risks, except for national security, gradually transferred from the state to the 
non-state spheres of the market, technologies, and individuals. In the context of the modern 
history of South Korea, this shift also reflects the changing strategies and programs of the 
government. Under the previous military regime, risk was primarily conceptualized in relation to 
pro-North Korean activities and communism that threatened the national security. While the 
national government retained the executive responsibility of military operations, non-
governmental actors such as international organizations, insurance and technology companies, as 
well as individuals were taking on the role of managing risks either at a global scale of the entire 
planet (i.e., environmental disaster, global warming, nuclear war, etc.) or a much smaller scale 
(i.e., violent street crimes, hacking, personal health, etc.). In other words, the threatening reality 
of communism and national security has gradually given its place to a global reality of climate 
change and environmental disaster and a more immediate reality of financial management, 




is an envisioning of citizens who willingly induct themselves as safety conscious and self-
responsible inhabitants of the city (Park, 2015).  
 In the next section, I will discuss my observations regarding the emerging 
conceptualization of the risk that is becoming ‘environmental’, as the risk is increasingly defined 
in situational terms of space and time as well as the techniques of addressing the risks that are 
becoming more holistic, spatial, and constant.  
Environmentalization of Urban Risk and Crime Prevention Through Envionmental Design 
(CPTED) 
Our current image of the criminogenic city governmentalises [sic] risk as a spatialisation 
of thought and intervention. Using techniques pioneered by the commercial demands of 
insurance and based on informatics and postcode mapping, this spatialisation is now at 
the molecular level of urban existence. The contemporary city is thus visualized as a 
distribution of risks (Osborne & Rose, 1999, p.753).    
 
As Halpern & Günel (2017) notes, crisis and catastrophe are evoked as a constantly assumed 
reality in a city primarily preoccupied with security procurement. Security, one of the central 
problems of the city, serve as the governing principles of the city that is increasingly pervaded by 
smart devices, inducing an emergent form of monitoring and control (Andrejevic & Burdon, 
2015) In a depoliticized zone such as the smart city, security is a prevailing logic for the 
pervasive use of sensors, chips, CCTVs, and ubiquitous computing in the city.20  
 In this section, I demonstrate how surveillance is not only stemming from the profit-
driven IT companies and the government that pursue imposing asymmetric power relation that 
targets privacy. Instead, I offer a broader conceptual shift that is conditioning the emerging forms 
 
20	There are disagreements among critics regarding whether this emergent form of monitoring and control 
denote a rise of different mechanism of power and thus deserve different theorization of surveillance. One 
of many debates, Zygmund Bauman for instance theorizes the contemporary preoccupation with 
surveillance through the term ‘post-panopticon’, whereas Haggerty & Ericson (2000) instead suggests 




of monitoring and control. As it will be shown, contemporary cities are now charted as the 
spaces of potential risks. As far as the security management in the smart cities is concerned, risks 
are less defined in terms of demographic traits or a place than of probabilities and 
environmental/situational traits.   
 Smart city is designed on the premise that the risk is a mundane matter of everyday life. 
In 2017, Songdo’s Smart City Operation Center showcased its new platform service that could 
integrate data gathered from different districts in IFEZ, including the CCTV feeds over parks, 
streets, and bridges, as well as the license plate numbers captured at the city entrances. The vast 
amount of data were to be shared with the police and fire department, reinforcing the security as 
the first order of business. Employees at the Smart City Operation Center were enthusiastic about 
the efficiency and marketability of the new platform that would enable an automated security 
management of the city. At the same time, employees also seemed to generally accept that it is 
safer for the humans to be involved less with the work of monitoring the city. Their rationale was 
that, because humans have a much-limited attention span than the computers and therefore are 
more prone to errors, it is better for them to intervene only in the situations flagged by the 
system, and pass over the menial job to the machine of having to stare at the dozens and 
hundreds of monitors for a long time.   
 They did not seem to mind that the smart security program focuses on the types of risks 
that are only technically detectable through sensors and cameras, such as fire, earthquake, air 
pollution, and traffic violation. However, when it comes to the matter of security, there is never  
‘enough’ of data. The more is always better and assuring. Excessive volumes of data gathered 
from widely distributed sensors and cameras are now synced and networked through an 




2015). In this way, the Smart City and the Internet of Things are closely interlinked 
developments (Dourish, 2016), which ‘translates’ the city into large sets of data.  
 Besides, security has been a built-in feature of many residential and official buildings. 
Nearly all the buildings in Songdo had main gates that opened either with keypads or RFID 
cards, as well as exclusive accesses to fitness centers, reading rooms, and even trash bins – 
although in fact, these features are not exclusive in Songdo but already quite pervasive in many 
other cities in South Korea.  
 Such developments in urban security techniques have implications on at least two levels. 
First, just as the employees at Songdo’s Smart Operation center testified, the primary ‘work’ of 
watching the city is relegated to the machines, along with the accountability. More importantly, 
the prevalence and accessibility of data prioritizes a machinic way of thinking, and the way we 
view the cities (Mattern, 2015), in this case, the way we perceive and evaluate risks. In other 
words, smart city’s security technique defines risk as something that is locatable, quantifiable, 
and calculatable. 
 The quantifiable character of smart city’s urban governance model constitutes the 
foundational condition of a contemporary urban space that is driven by computational 
architectures and analytics (Crandall, 2010, p.76). Life in the cities becomes divided into 
‘actionable events’ reconfiguring the problematization of urban risk governance. In this scheme 
of city and security, the question of ‘where’ instead of ‘who’ becomes the prevailing concern. 
Thus, the ‘environmentalized notion of risk’ entails proliferating forms of smart devices that 
track down the potential risk in the form of environmental data (air quality, traffic movement, 
street CCTV, GPS location) reinforces this changing conceptualization of risk as locatable, 




investigation, analysis, and surveillance, in a sense that it is equipped with the computational 
power to locate and track potential risk and that at the same time, it is where the potential risk 
resides. This emerging trend of environmentalization of risk is concurrent with the contemporary 
urban environmental design that views the city as both the problem and the solution.     
  To be sure, to suggest that risk and security has become the key problem of smart city is 
not to assert that this kind of technically mediated surveillance did not exist before, but rather 
that a particular kind of surveillance mechanisms is mundanely involved in the digital 
urbanization. The examples presented above demonstrate a significant change in the way in 
which risk is conceptualized in the city. Unlike in the preceding decades when the risk was 
associated with specific profiles of dangerous people (communists, North Korean spies, street 
gangs, and so on), risk is increasingly thought in terms of probabilities, which involves the whole 
of the population.21   
 In fact, this environmental conceptualization of risk has been portended and regularized 
by the development in the field of environmental criminology. One such example is called the 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), a design-centered approach to 
crime that started in the early 1970s. The underlying logic behind this program is the assumption 
that the human behavior is primarily influenced by their environment, the environment is liable 
for criminal activity, and that we can create a kind of environment that can deter illegal behavior 
and encourage law-abiding behavior that promotes feelings of safety. Oscar Newman (1971)’s 
Defensible Space was one of the foundational texts for the CPTED idea, which generated 
guidelines to design out crimes in the cities, through strategies of territorial reinforcement, 
 
21	There is a striking resemblance between this trend toward the environmentalizing notion of risk and 
Foucault (2007)’s discussion of the power that operates through security. Whereas the disciplinary forms 
of power was associated with the totalizing gaze of the panopticon, the latter conceptualization of power 
(operated through security) does away with a central locus of power and instead distributes the gaze 




surveillance, access control, and legitimate activity support. These suggestions have been 
developed and applied to a series of urban design manuals regarding how to appropriately build 
walls, windows, gates, and fences. CPTED is currently adopted by the US Department of 
Transportation, Department of Education, Center for Disease Control and Prevention among 
others and is supported by the United Nations and many governments around the world.  
  In South Korea and Songdo, CPTED principle has been taken up since the mid-2000s. In 
2010, the Korean Association of CPTED (KACPTED) was established, bringing together the 
group of experts including architects, criminologists, and environmental engineers. The 
KACPTED has been expanding its institutional networks with the police agencies, local design 
centers, and research institutes that focus on security policies and architectural and 
environmental standardization. CPTED is widely promoted as the guideline for landscaping and 
building constructions that maximizes visibility of space through lighting, windows, and CCTV. 
CPTED also offers ways of organically creating ‘natural surveillance’ through designing wide 
and open streets for vibrant outdoor commercial activities. As a result, in 2016, Incheon police 
agency reported that the CPTED brought about 12% decrease in theft and that 76% of citizens 
responded positively to the program (Ko, 2016.10.30).   
 Smart security solutions in Songdo can be viewed as supporting the similar 
conceptualization of risk that the CPTED is predicated on. These urban schemes embody the 
environmentalized conceptualization of risk, in which the whole of environment is implicated as 
an object of management and operation. Based on this understanding of risk that results more 
from a particular kind of situation than from particular demographics, environment becomes the 
object of direct correction and guidance. The concern is more with the spatial and temporal 




 Besides, smart city governance embodies analytics and technologies that exert power to 
make the city visible in certain ways, but in doing so, programs the city space to be operational. 
This is the point where the smart city technologies like sensors and CCTV converge with the 
security aims that undergird the CPTED program. The mutual benefit of this convergence is the 
supposed flexibility and modularity of the platform, which can be perpetually renewed and 
maintained against the notion of contemporary risk that is becoming more and more uncertain 
and ill-defined.  
 In fact, the field of ‘environmental criminology’ is advancing through the data-based 
policing techniques including crime mapping techniques and the crime hotspot database. Crime 
mapping technique for instance, integrates the National Police Agency’s Crime Information 
Management Systems, GIS, and land use patterns, and demographic data, and typologies urban 
space into various levels of crime hotspots (Do & Pyo, 2010). It is expected that the successful 
use of such techniques will assist local authorities to find optimal spots to install CCTV, to 
dispatch patrols, and to alert the potential victims. While the advanced CPTED principle was 
effectively built into the design of the new towns, such as Songdo, old towns and public spaces 
with relatively outdated infrastructures are especially deemed in need of extra security 
interventions through CCTV and police surveillance.  
 The development of environmental criminology and crime-mapping technique reflect 
how the digitization and codification of urban space is the basis for the emerging mode of urban 
security governance. However, as the CPTED proponents have emphasized, the ‘mechanical 
surveillance’ through CCTV has to be supplemented by the ‘natural surveillance’ by the citizens 
themselves, to successfully design out crimes. In other words, the security governance is only 




surveillance mechanism and when the individuals, as the primary locus of responsibility, induct 
themselves into the role of defending oneself by managing risks. How the self is articulated and 
reorganized as an operative domain for enacting security regime will be explained in the next 
section.  
Technologies of the Defensible Self  
Risk reduction is to form part of the moral responsibility of urban citizens themselves. 
(Osborne & Rose, 1999, p.754).  
 
South Korea’s long history of militarism and defensive citizenship prioritized security and risk 
management as the central governmental problem. The evolving techniques of smart city and 
digital policing techniques constitute one axis of how the problem is to be addressed, through 
distributing the computational agencies across the environment. Another crucial axis of how the 
environmentalization of urban risk operates through the city relies not only on the dissemination 
of technology but also on the formation of the self and individuals who are enrolled in a 
particular program of actions. This requires a closer look into the way in which the city becomes 
a laboratory of conduct (Osborne & Rose, 1999).  
 Closed circuit televisions (CCTV) and radiofrequency identification (RFID) chips track 
and monitor selected activities in open space. Evolving techniques of data-mining and machine 
learning are designed to analyze and extract patterns out of the large data sets, to single out 
deviance from that pattern and to either exclude the outlier or bring the deviance back into a line. 
Increasingly, there are many proponents for adopting pre-emptive measures to calculate and 
predict the risk, which involves the nearly ubiquitous datafication of the city that renders the 
contingent and unpredictable nature of the city more knowable and thus more governable. From 




participation from the security conscious citizens and on capturing and analyzing data extracted 
from human bodies, while the sensors and cameras become the interface between the everyday 
physical space of inhabitation and the virtual space of data optimization.   
 However, such provision of technical systems alone does not determine the efficacy of 
control. Surveillance is immanent in the operative rationale of the smart city, which can be made 
operational only when the citizens internalize and enact a template for conduct in managing their 
own risk and safety. Such enactment of conduct involves a particular subjective formation that 
draws resources from popular imaginaries and understanding of the city and its inhabitants who 
take on the responsibility of protecting themselves and their neighborhood. This guidance of 
conduct situates the self amidst the constellation of relationships among technology, risks, and 
proliferating imaginaries of the city, constituting an imprecise and indirect, but more successful 
dimension of control and power.22   
 In South Korea, the majority of public opinion has been in favor of CCTV, which is 
almost regarded as a stand-in for the urban security and personal safety. As stated above, there is 
a long history of government surveillance in South Korea, which was largely concerned with 
watching pro-North Korean activities. The primacy of national security afforded legitimacy for 
the government to regularly monitor and police the public space over the years, by enforcing 
 
22	Critics of surveillance such as Zygmund Bauman and David Lyon (2013) discussed the difficulty of 
distinguishing ‘control’ and ‘care’ at the experiential level of surveillance, of distinguishing self-
surveillance as a mode of self-care. Especially with the growing recognition of life in the city at perpetual 
risk, the smart, automated means of monitoring and governing risk in the city is perceived as a way that 
the city reduces uncertainty and ensures the safety of its people. This point demands a further exploration 
on the changing public mood with regard to risk and security that mutually reinforce the evolving 




curfews after midnight (lifted in 1982), organizing civil defense militia [minbangwi dae] and 
checkpoints for neighborhood patrols.23  
 On top of the demand for stricter government regulations and policing of the public 
space, as of late, the sales of in-car dash cameras (black box), domestic CCTV, smart door locks, 
and smart home sensors have rapidly increased, reflecting how people have internalized the 
responsibility to protect their own safety. It is not a small coincidence that there has been a 
growing market size of the Smart Home industry, as the major telecommunication companies in 
South Korea are competing to introduce their new security services that combine human dispatch 
security with video security system, tailored to the needs of individual homes – while KT 
corporation (formerly Korea Telecom) launched the “Olleh CCTV Telecop Guard” service in 
2013 and has since provided the Home Security System for all single women in exchange for a 
monthly fee of 9,900 won (about US 9 dollars), SK Telecom acquired the security systems 
company ADT to build their “IoT Caps” service in 2016, now planning to apply artificial 
intelligence (AI) to their next security business model.24  
 The growing demand for commercial security services one of the indicators for the 
changing mode of dwelling in the city: more and more people choose to live alone and one-
person household accounts for 28.6% of total number of households in South Korea in 2017 
(Chosun Ilbo, 2018.11.04). And the dominance of single-person housing is attributed as the 
 
23	In South Korea, government’s regulation of the online space of the Internet has also become 
commonplace, as much motivated by the national security concern as by the public health and safety 
concern. In 2011, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family introduced the “Shut down policy” that 
blocks those under age 16 to access online gaming after midnight, on the ground that the Internet 
addiction poses as a threat to adolescent health and safety (Kim, 2011)  	
24	According to a survey conducted by Korean Information Society Development Institute (Cho, Yang, & 
Lee, 2016), population from above middle age group (above 50s) were said to be more open to trying the 
Smart Home services than other age groups. It is not a small coincidence that the Smart Home services 
are developing programs targeting the under-aged and aged population, the population less mobile while 




cause and result of the anxiety associated with living in the city. For this reason, despite the 
apocalyptic vision often attributed to the surveillance apparatus, banal encounters with its 
techniques such as CCTV, exhibit a rather nonchalant attitude of indifference in South Korea. 
Even the full exposure of ubiquitous mechanism of monitoring does not lessen the general 
support for a more rigorous control of space and extensive use of CCTV like in the smart city, 
since the majority of South Koreans view these measures not necessarily as a form of oppression 
but as an effective means to protect their safety, as well as a symbolic and emotional marker to 
ameliorate their anxiety.   
 In 2015, an infamous case incited public outrage toward one of Songdo’s infant care 
center. A footage was publicly circulated that captured a scene where an instructor was violently 
abusing a four-year-old girl for not finishing her lunch. The news drew immediate attention 
nation-wide and the angry public demanded a stronger system to protect children at the care 
facilities. Not only the instructor in question was prosecuted for an assault charge and was 
sentenced to two years in prison, the “Infant Care Act” was amended for compulsory installation 
of CCTV in all caring facilities and to allow the parents to access recorded footages. A group of 
daycare center instructors appealed to the constitutional court, however, it was finally ruled that 
the CCTV ‘prevents’ child abuse. Although the CCTV did not actually help with protecting the 
child in the said case, the reformed law in 2015 stipulated that CCTV as essential equipment to 
protect children from potential abuse from instructors.25   
 
25	By January 2015, 31.6% of daycare centers were equipped with CCTV nation-wide (43,763), while 
public daycare centers among them had higher rates (77.1%) of CCTV installation, compared to private 
ones that had only 10.6%. The debate around the privacy and autonomy of teachers was silenced by 
anxious parents demanding of their right to protect their children. Within less than a year in 2016, 91.2% 
of daycare centers installed CCTV within their facility (2016.5.10 Childcare policy brief). The Smart 




 The increasing public demand for CCTV and the popularity of smartphone applications 
that combines wifi and GPS indicated the growing tendency of the individuals who were 
motivated to protect themselves. Telecommunication companies as well as the government 
offices developed and distributed apps that could be used for emergency and self-protection. For 
example, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety developed smart phone applications called the 
“Emergency Ready App,” which was supposed to alert the users during emergency situation, and 
the “Smart Safe Return-Home App,” which enabled the users to send their locations every ten 
minutes to a designated guardian. Using this app, users were instructed to navigate the safest 
route to the destination via CCTV-surveilled ways. The app also combined the analysis by the 
crime mapping techniques, to send the users push notifications when they were supposedly 
entering a dangerous zone like crime hotspots.  
 The buildings and urban spaces that embody securitization through deployment of smart 
devices are corollary to the same regime that presupposes the kind of culture of the self that 
readily takes up the moral responsibility to defend oneself. The responsibility entails acquiring 
adequate information, skills, and manuals to govern their lives. Their manuals of conduct consist 
of myriad of activities including organizing daily travel routes through well-lit streets, receiving 
mails and packages through unmanned courier, regularly updating passwords and door locks, 
putting a bandage on the laptop camera, sending taxi license plate numbers to trusted friends, 
avoiding to go out at night, and so on.  
 Individual responsibilities to protect oneself can even take a collective form, through 
community support and neighborhood safety programs. In Songdo, as with other cities in South 




community partnership, to cultivate a security and safety conscious citizenship.26 The program 
thus extends the rationale of defensive self and reawakens the moral virtue of the citizens to 
protect their neighborhood, in order to ensure individual safety.  
 The examples charted above show how security has become a routinized part of every 
day life. In this way, control is not accomplished in totalizing and coercive manner, but 
maintained through breaking down daily lives into the matter of actionable events and 
implicating anxiety-induced individual ‘participation’ in the network of security governance. 
Besides, security is accomplished through benign forms of ‘DIY-panopticon’, through which 
gazes and visibilities are diffused and reciprocated.   
 In addition to the proliferating techniques of formulating subjects who take on defensive 
responsibilities, there seems to be another set of technical arrangement that is imposed upon the 
population. As human-machine interface is becoming a pervasive feature of in everyday life 
space, it is increasingly difficult to keep track of the amount of the data generated about the self. 
In fact, individuals are becoming ‘divisible data-bodies’ that ‘generate’ more than ‘participate’ 
(Andrejevic). While the covert mechanism that constantly generates data about one’s movement 
is vital for the smart cities’ operation, the mechanism itself does not necessarily go through one’s 
conscious decisions or awareness.   
Smart City as an Urban Interface and Datafication of Everything  
If, once upon a time, the mobilization of the promise of interactivity was characterized by 
the enthusiastic portrayal of heightened forms of active participation on the part of users, 
the automated collection of data “passive-izes” this interactivity. These days, we generate 
more than we participate – and even our participation generates further and increasingly 
comprehensive “meta”-data about itself. (Andrejevic & Burdon, 2015, p.20)  
 
26	While conducting my fieldwork in Songdo, I could observe several old men walking in groups wearing 
yellow vests, who were recruited to escort the elementary school kids back home after school. These 
publicly funded activities offer part-time jobs to retired senior citizens who do not generally benefit from 
social welfare programs. These programs are also propagated as opportunities for the retired citizens to be 




The smart city’s security governance that adopts advanced policing technologies heavily relies 
on collection and visualization of data. While the citizens’ ‘participation’ into the security 
program is a crucial element for its success, in fact, the citizens contribute more by generating 
data about themselves. As the mechanism of surveillance is increasingly dissolving into the 
fabric of the city, the ‘individuals’ are seemingly being broken down to the matter of actions and 
series of events that can be tracked, located and analyzed.27 Recent shift toward the data-driven 
urban security governance is predicated on the system wherein the humans are ‘routed around’ 
and become secondary to the operational logic of the machines (Dourish, 2016).  
 The smart city, as an ‘algorithmic assemblage’, consists of an endless array of mobile and 
fluid interfaces that mediates total visibility (Mattern, 2016). The city as an urban interface 
functions as a zone of mediation between the physical, social reality of the city and the virtual 
reality of the data and software. Through this interface, information about the city is translated, 
exchanged, and acted on, while the life in the city is increasingly read through the lens of 
machinic logic that renders the city quantifiable and measurable.   
 On discussing radiofrequency identification (RFID) technology, N. Katherine Hayles 
(2009) argues that “(w)hile surveillance issues are primarily epistemological (who knows what 
about whom), the political stakes of an animate environment involve the changed perceptions of 
human subjectivity in relation to a world of objects that are no longer passive and inert. In this 
 
27 However, while the data is touted as the central aspect of the Smart Home/City security solution, the 
problem that the data can solve is reconfigured and articulated in a way that can be visualized by data. 
What is implicated in prioritizing data and quantification of a matter as complicated as urban risk and 
security, despite its supposed transparency and omnipotence, is that it occludes the various aspects of risk 
that may not be visible or quantifiable by data. The measurement of carbon footprints and detection of 
infrastructural abnormality at home can only do so much to visualize the multiple aspects of risk that may 
not be translated or represented thoroughly through data. While risk is context-specific that has to be 
evaluated based on the historically and culturally specific situations, the Smart City’s much-promoted 






sense, RFID is not confined only to epistemological concerns but extends to ontological issues as 
well” (Hayles, 2009, p. 48). The question of surveillance then moves beyond the level of 
recording information but further towards the level of ontology, which generates new relations 
between human bodies, things, and the environment. That is, the new technological landscape of 
data-driven urbanism is not only making available a new means of visibility and knowledge 
about the city in unforeseen ways, but is generating a new condition of possibilities for politics, 
sociality, and participation in the city.  
 What then, does it mean that our environments become self-aware? That our walls and 
ceilings are not a passive background of our daily activities but that they listen to us and 
understand our mood? Through becoming environmental, technology may disappear from our 
immediate awareness, but it envelops our activities and moods in a quite intimate level.  
 The critical element of programming the smart city as an urban interface is a ‘translation’ 
(cf. representation) of space and human bodies into data, allowing the translation to crisscross 
human bodies and things to enable universal ‘interoperability’.28 The critical aspect of automated 
surveillance of the smart city is the interoperability based on universal protocol and 
standardization, which purify and align human bodies and actions according to standardizable 
units. In a cyborgized city such as smart city, now the translation happens both ways: the city 
tries to resemble a computer/machine (Leach, informational city, City as adaptive system 
reference), while the machine tries to resemble human and nature (AI, robotics). Now that the 
matter of communication is not exclusively addressed to humans, but includes machines and 
 
28	The etymology of translation comes from “to remove from one place to another,” also “to turn from 
one language to another,” carrying over and bringing over. In translating the city and human bodies into 
data, the movement between two separate universes of virtual and real becomes automatic and instant, so 
much so that the two universes interpenetrate each other. The work of translation mediated by the Smart 
City’s urban interface evokes a sense of transcendence, a dematerialized (dehumanized) field of rational 




things, a new ontological relation between things, humans, and the environment demand a new 
analytical lens to inquire as to who or what is observing, toward one regarding the practice, the 
nature of the program at work (Crandall, 2010). The human-centric and modernist notion of 
individual privacy no longer serves as an appropriate parameter for critique. What is lost may not 
just be privacy, but a lack of communicability between machine and humans, if not equipped 
with a proper literacy to translate each other’s language.  
 Another point worth mentioning here is that the translative act is occurring between the 
two increasingly asymmetrical worlds. Bodies and environments are already datafied and 
important decisions in our daily lives are already relegated to the machines – if in the power 
structure between the original and the translation, the original used to hold a significance, in the 
age of massive datafication, the original (i.e., human bodies and environments) gives away its 
‘aura’ to the exploding volume and velocity of data. Especially as the contemporary risk acquires 
uncertainty and ubiquity as its principal feature, the humans become more dependent on the 
machinic capabilities to predict and manage risk.  
 What then are the roles and responsibilities left for the humans? In Songdo and other smart 
cities in South Korea, people generating a sheer amount of data, through swiping RFID keycard 
to access buildings or through using apps to find a parking space and the shortest route to the 
destination. The point is that it is not so much useful to distinguish control and participation 
anymore. What may be more interesting is to inquire how the interface of the smart city is 
becoming the field through which the new kind of epistemology (the way we see the city) and 
ontology (the way we behave) play out and is charged with the new discursive formation of risk 
and security. It is through this complex network of technology, affect, and discourse that a 




 Technologies of self-tracking for instance, mobilize the form of datafied body and 
‘quantified self’, raising questions such as where does the control end and the self-care begin in 
the caring forms of digital surveillance? In a similar vein, when the Smart and Secure city 
proponents purports to execute a more transparent governance, engaging with the citizen 
participation, where does the boundary between the active participation and subordination 
exist?). Although current debates surrounding automated surveillance focus on personal 
information, the object of surveillance is being dispersed across and beyond individual human 
being as the target point. The surveillance assemblage incorporates events and patterns, including 
non-human entities, such as water, waste, and electricity flows. Everything is about pattern 
recognition. The power is not owned by any central authority but is dispersed and mediated 
through regulations and myriad technologies.     
A Paradoxical Landscape?  
This chapter charted the history of South Korea’s security governance and the defensible self, in 
relation to the discourse of national security. Following the history, the chapter discussed how 
the mechanism of control is increasingly embedded in the city, accompanied by a changing 
conceptualization of risk defined in environmental terms. The chapter investigated how the 
proliferating technologies of self-protection is amplified by a kind of culture that prepares 
individuals to be perpetually vigilant and at the same time, how the population is constantly 
made to generate data, as part of smart city’s efficient operation. It was assessed that the 
prominence of contemporary surveillance is not solely achieved through the advancement of 
technologies but through enrolling the individuals and population to the network of control and 




 Following the similar line of critique, in the next chapter, I observe how the city and 
citizens are responsibilized to respond to a risk (and a crisis) that is imagined at a global scale: 
the problem of environment and nature.  
On a closing note for this chapter, I want to point out that we are witnessing the rising 
trend that demands citizens of risk-taking, passionate, and daring attitude of an entrepreneurial 
subject. In making Smart city in Songdo, investors and urban planners themselves, when initially 
proposing the project, were perceived as taking on an enormous risk. How do we navigate the 




















CHAPTER 4. SMART AND SUSTAINABLE CITY: 
HISTORIES AND TECHNOLOGIES OF GOVERNING THROUGH ENVIRONMENT 
 
In previous chapters, I have charted a genealogy of smart city in terms of how mobility has been 
a primary concern for South Korea’s infrastructure construction (which depended on the 
development of transportation and communication technologies), which served the government’s 
objective of nation-building and globalization (Chapter 2) and how in these efforts, the problem 
of security has been integral the same regime that fostered the ‘freedom’ of mobility (Chapter 3). 
In this chapter, I continue to investigate the techniques and practices of governing the city, with a 
particular focus on the ways in which the environment has been defined, rationalized, 
operationalized, and problematized in new ways in governing a smart city. The narrative 
advanced in this chapter departs from the point where I left off in chapter 2, when the South 
Korean national government was responding to the challenges of globalization and digitalization 
in the 1990s, embracing the need to diversify the national economy through investment in 
information and telecommunication industry. In the 2000s, as South Korea was becoming the 
country with the fastest internet speed in the world, a new sociotechnical ordering of the city and 
the environment emerged, reflecting the government’s increasing concern with productivity, 
health, transportation, and overall quality of life of the population. In this chapter, I discuss how 
this concern was materialized in the shifting techniques and modes of the ‘environmental’ 
governance, which was less about an abandonment of its older objectives of economic 
development and national unification than about broadening and deepening of what those 
objectives entailed in the modernizing South Korea.  
 Taking a cue from this reflection, this chapter interrogates how the environment became 




‘problematization’ continues from my discussion in chapter 3 about the changing conception of 
risk that was increasingly understood in situational terms of time and space. Following this line 
of inquiry, I ask how, the risk, which has seemingly evolved into spatial forms of the city, is 
rearticulated in the smart city’s management and governance of the ‘environment’. While 
chapter 3 focused on the criminal aspect of urban risk, this chapter investigates how the risk, on a 
different level, was also increasingly understood at a global scale in the early 21st century.  
 Since the 1970s, Korean critics have raised issues with the detrimental effects of rapid 
industrialization and urbanization on the environment. However, it was in the 1990s that 
government officially recognized the mattering of the environment in a different way. On the one 
hand, there had been a universal consensus (i.e., 1994 Kyoto Protocol by the United Nations) 
regarding the necessity to seek an alternative framework of development that would mitigate the 
environmental impact of industrial economy. The framework was predicated on the willingness 
of each nation to cooperate in the face of climate change, which was presented as a planetary 
crisis. In this context, various international organizations, institutes for standardizations, IT 
corporations, construction and real estate agencies implicated themselves in designing 
technologies, regulations, and practices that would alleviate the environmental impact of rapid 
industrialization and urbanization and set the sustainable development as the new global agenda.  
 As has been discussed in previous chapters, this period in South Korea was marked by an 
escalating pressure by the economic imperative of globalization. Sustainability was brought in as 
one of the means for the government to claim membership in the network of global cities that 
recognized the environment as the central problem. Besides, the government also responded to 
the growing demand from civil society to take the environmental issues more seriously and to 




the government experimented with a new landscape design and town planning to showcase the 
city of the 21st century. In Songdo, sustainability discourse, rearticulated in the green initiatives 
of high-tech centered development paradigm, found expressions in urban design scheme, as the 
issues of environment, health, and well-being became the new objectives of the government.  
 The first part of this chapter charts Songdo’s reinvention from a global hub city to a green 
city, which enrolled multiple actors including the United Nations, real estate and construction 
company Gale International, IT corporation Cisco, and South Korean national government. It 
will be observed how the global agenda of sustainable development was articulated in South 
Korean government’s strategies for the green growth in the mid-2000s, which was seemingly in 
conflict with previous development strategy. Songdo was an exemplary case that reflected the 
continuity and rupture of government strategy that adapted to the changing relationship between 
the global and the local, as South Korea sought to establish ties with the network of global cities.  
 The second part of the chapter explores how the environment was increasingly 
recognized as the problem of the government and how the mode of governance was re-ordered 
through environment. The discussion is distinct from other approaches to the ‘environment’ that 
only focuses on the government’s ‘green initiatives’ and bring our focuses to the broader range 
of the modes of governance that operate environmentally. In this vein, this chapter explores the 
utility of Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’, which was later developed by Gabrys (2014, 
2016) with the term ‘environmentality’, expanding Foucault’s earlier concept to conjoin the 
discussion of smart city and sustainability. Foucault’s writing about governmentality discussed 
the concurrency of the modern Western liberalism as the practice of acting on (governing 
through) non-state actors, as a governmental reason/rationality (hence “governmentality”), as the 




(calculating, measuring, rationalizing) the life and health of the social, and in that way of putting 
life into order (exercising power in that way). What then, following that, is environmentality? I 
address this question in analyzing the new modes of governance emerging in Songdo. The 
examples in this chapter include the new urban design schemes, programs of standardization and 
ratings, and energy consumption meter, which demonstrate how the operative logic for the smart 
city involves government of urban life through technological objects and digitalized 
environment. After all, the value of smart city lies more on its ability to integrate data than to 
distribute data, although the more complex and distributed the data is, the higher value as an 
information.  These examples demonstrate the shifting mechanisms of the government that 
disperses its modes of governance through the environment in the smart city, as the city is 
rendered more and more knowable, governable, and intervene-able (Shelton, 2017).  
 Before I elaborate on my observations in Songdo, I take a slight detour and trace how the 
discourse of sustainable development gained global traction in the latter part of the twentieth 
century and observe how it communicated the universal and ethical imperative to problematize 
the environment. It is crucial to note the concurrency and relationship between the two governing 
strategy and discourses – of sustainable development and smart city – to comprehend how the 
proponents of the smart city responded to the broad social demand to resolve the problem and 
how urban life in the smart city as a whole became a site for technological intervention.  
Sustainable Development and Smart City  
 It is crucial to understand the historical development of ‘sustainable development’ if we are to 
understand the general assumptions and motives that drive the development of smart cities today. 
It is because in many smart cities in South Korea and beyond, sustainability figures as the 




performativity’ of the cities. The term sustainable development was first officially used in the 
World Commission on Environment and Development and its report, also known as the 
Brundtland Commissions Report, “Our Common Future” published in 1987. The report 
mandated multilateral co-operation of all countries to commit themselves to an alternative 
pathway of development, to meet the basic needs of all, and to extend the opportunity to all to 
fulfill their aspirations for a better quality of life. Sustainable development herein defined as the 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs,” (The United Nations, 1987) culminated in the first Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. With everyone from every country unilaterally enrolled in the 
challenge to offset the anticipated crisis of the future, the political will of the developing 
countries was regarded as especially important to improve their inadequate infrastructure. To 
compensate for the lack of resource and expertise in the developing countries, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were appointed as the conduits to help finance the 
project and implement policies in those regions, so that the need for quality of life for everyone 
can be accommodated without compromising the global economic system geared toward growth.  
 At the backdrop of this emerging paradigm of development were the intersections of the 
developing nations’ aspirations to become global, the practice of ‘good’ government, and 
rearticulation of the politics into a matter of technological advancement and environmental 
intervention. First, one of the crucial aspects of this discourse is the prevailing notion of the 
‘global commons’, constituted by the argument that everything is interrelated, that the problem 
of developing countries are indeed the problem for the developed countries, that the nature and 




prevent the ecological and economic disaster.29 It is casually assumed that the idea of 
sustainability is unquestioningly good and everyone’s stakes are involved in it, all the countries 
(and cities) have to contribute to tackling this imminent challenge of the global scale (for the 
depoliticizing effect of sustainability discourse see Swyngedouw, 2010). National delegates were 
mobilized to engage with the global forums such as the UN Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network (SDSN), creating networks to promote and transfer advanced technology, standards, 
and expertise from the developed countries to the rest of the world.  
 Secondly, the global imperative of the problem lent moral responsibilities to the local 
governments (as well as their populations), to practice ‘good’ governance. The problem that was 
conjured in global scale reinforced the urgency and ethical command to come up with fast 
resolutions. What is more, the “climate change as a scientific fact” discouraged the individuals 
and the local governments from challenging the authority and universality of the sustainable 
development discourse. Contemporary approach to the climate change and sustainable 
development comes down to regulation based on a universal standard, such as the carbon 
emission, which prevail as an objective and value-free criterion, to which countries and cities 
were supposed to submit voluntarily. Herein the role of the cities and their government are 
redefined through engagement with the technologically advanced, sustainable and efficient ways 
of managing and governing the cities (and environment by extension).  
 
29	This absorption of politics and social relations to the wholeness of the earth and nature, however, is 
untenable for at least two interrelated reasons. First of all, the wholeness of the global commons 
transcends the scale of ordinary citizens, cities, and countries and yet the privilege is given to the 
specialists, who do not belong to the politically demarcated territories (Latour, 1998). On the one hand, 
ecology integrates itself into everyday life and on the other, it becomes “inflated to the point of assuming 
responsibility for the agendas of all” while giving advantages to the group of specialists who speak on 
behalf of “a global unity which no longer has the political domain as its horizon (p. 3).” For instance, 
whose ‘needs’ are exactly being addressed in the sustainable development imperatives and who exactly is 




 Smart city, as a discourse and as a technical artifact, is situated in this intersection of 
science, technology, the ethics, and governing strategies. Cities and the population, bearing the 
globally imposed responsibility of sustainable development, are pressed to innovate their ways 
into developing and utilizing communication technologies to manage and monitor their activities 
to regulate their impact on the environment. Smart city has promoted its green benefits over the 
past few years, through numerous venues including expos, conferences, and corporate 
whitepapers that have sported the prefixes of ‘Smart’, ‘Sustainable’, ‘Green’, and ‘Eco’ (or a 
combination of two: Smart Eco, Smart Sustainable, etc.), which substantiates the argument that 
the “implementation to achieve sustainability directives under the guise of smart cities is a more 
recent tactic for promoting digital technologies” (Gabrys, 2016, p.185). Municipalities, 
engineers, business consultants, and entrepreneurs reproduce the articulation of smart city as 
green by working on innovative solutions not only to achieve sustainability goal but also to 
revitalize economy and create jobs. Some of the recent proposals in these venues have started to 
iterate their engagement with the local community. In the name of furthering liberal and civic 
ideals, they press the issues of how to make our cities more open, socially inclusive, and 
sustainable (indeed, how to make the matter of technology and science more ‘ethical’ one). What 
is also often been emphasized in their discussions is how going green actually saves costs for the 
municipality and businesses in a long term.30  
 
30 In Greenbuild Expo in Los Angeles 2016, for instance, many small and medium-sized startup 
companies from Silicon Valley showcased their new bundles of software and services that can cater to the 
desires of many cities to be smart. Through programs like ‘Internet of Things’, cities that installed high-
precision sensors throughout the city can eventually allow policymakers and researchers to understand 
and model the city environment like never before, predicting and managing individual activities at a 
micro level. It is often repeated that although the initial investment in the installment of the array of 





 South Korea was relatively a latecomer in joining the global imperatives for sustainable 
development, as the predominant ‘catch up mentality’ pressed the country during the rapid 
industrialization phase in the mid to late- 20th century. However, as it will be discussed in the 
next section, the national government plays a directive role in implementing the ‘green’ and 
‘low-carbon’ initiatives in South Korean cities in the first decade of the 21st century, as part of its 
development strategy to foster urban redevelopment and green industry. Apart from discussing 
whether those strategies were successful or not, I will primarily focus instead on how 
sustainability was materialized in Songdo, through urban design schemes and institutional 
arrangements where digital technologies were promoted as part of the government’s green 
initiatives. I make a crucial point about how techniques and technologies involved in recasting 
Songdo as a green city reflect the new and novel ways in which government operates with the 
citizen’s desires to have a good life and to better themselves and the ways in which technological 
objects in the smart city mediate the aim of the government and individual life of the citizens.  
South Korea’s New Urban Discourse and Sustainable City  
The relationships between the city, the government, and the environment evince both historical 
continuity and rupture in Songdo and South Korea. Until the 1990s, South Korean urban 
planning and construction occurred within the parameters set by the military government’s 
national development plans, which meant that the government-run institutions were in charge of 
designing the cities. They relied on three methods to effectively organize urban spaces: the 
concentric expansion of urban boundaries; the compartmentalization of city blocks and zoning 
techniques; and the construction of large apartment complexes (Jung, 2013, p.126).  
 In the 1990s, the approach came under scrutiny by the pro-democratic party and civil 




bureaucratic focus confined to technical management of zoning, density, and size. They instead 
demanded for an alternative planning that involved multiple stakeholders and asked that a wide 
range of efforts be made to rehabilitate natural environment that had been damaged during the 
fast development period. Jung (2013) points out that the sociopolitical shift in the 1990s directly 
influenced and fostered what she calls the ‘new urban discourse’ in South Korea, which brought 
forth the issues of urban ecology to the political agenda. Built environment, it was said, should 
be viewed as an integral part of natural ecology, instead of its anti-thesis. The new urban 
discourse stimulated a series of movements as the terms like toshihwan’gyŏng (city 
environment), saengt’aedoshi (eco city), and munhwadoshi (culture city) appeared regularly in 
the mainstream Korean media.    
 The new urban discourse also benefited from the sustained momentum toward 
democratization and globalization in the 1990s. It was in this period that the world-renowned 
architects participated in projects in Korea, the then emerging and significant market for global 
architectural community – Samsung-owned Leeum Museum of Art, designed by Jean Nouvel, 
Rem Koolhaas, and Mario Botta for instance, was a typical example. These projects set in 
motion a competitive spirit in Korean community of architects and landscape architects, and 
eventually urban planners, who sprinkled the buzzwords of ecology, high-tech, participation, and 
livability in their new projects and urban policies.    
 In the first decade of the 21st century, the ideas about the new urban design – ecologically 
conscious, community-based, livable, and global city – that occupied the public imaginaries of 
the 1990s were rearticulated in the technologies and techniques of national and urban governance 
and were curated within a construction-business-oriented developmental framework. This was 




the plans for ‘low-carbon’, ‘eco-friendly’, ‘green’, and ‘sustainable’ development, especially 
since 2008 when the Green Growth (Noksaek Seongjang) became the main thrust of national 
policy. President Lee Myung-Bak’s “Five Year Plan for Green Growth (2009-2013)” and 
“National Strategy for Green Growth” (2009-2050) presented a development paradigm that 
embraced the concern for the environment but did not compromise the policy priority of 
economic growth. Having had a marked career at Hyundai Construction company for three 
decades and a record of becoming the youngest CEO of the company at the age of 35, Lee 
Myung-Bak’s national economic plan for the green growth heavily relied on invigorating the 
construction businesses. The national mandate for the green growth was followed by numerous 
regional initiatives such as the ‘green city’, perceived as a new urban planning paradigm (Lee, 
Sohn, & Kim, 2013).31   
 Yet, the challenge of pursuing environmentalism in conjunction with the 
developmentalist goal was a major challenge for the government. In response to the problem, 
various old and new practices were deployed. On the one hand, the national plan for the green 
growth largely was a cosmetic revision of the industrial mode of ‘brown growth’ that was based 
on exploiting fossil fuels and focused on efficiency and mobility. In a way, the green growth 
strategy was an extension of the existing developmental paradigm in that it perceived ‘going 
green’ as complementary to Korea’s long-entrenched industrial economic model, based on 
 
31	During his term as a mayor of Seoul (2007-2007), Lee Myung-Bak completed a large-scale 
construction project that aimed to restore the bridge of Cheonggyecheon stream, an urban waterway that 
had been paved over by an elevated highway in the 1960s. By tearing out the highway that ran through 
the financial center of Seoul, Lee’s project re-created the underlying stream of Cheonggyecheon as the 
central feature of 6-kilometer-long public park. This project has been widely hailed as a political success 
for Lee, who was even featured in the Times magazine as one of the ‘Heroes of the Environment’ in 2007 




development and commercialization of exportable product (Kim & Thronburn, 2015).32 High 
degree of bureaucratic centralization remained in implementing green growth strategies in this 
period that provided opportunities for highly lucrative businesses for a handful of real estate and 
construction companies.  
 On the other hand, there were new and novel ways in which the cities and companies 
responded to the problem of environment with the problem of development. Numerous schemes 
to digitize economic activities and urban life involved reconfiguring the existing ways in which 
urban infrastructures have been managed. Songdo was a distinct case that most actively pursued 
and materialized the digitally enabled urban design scheme. Since 2007, Songdo has been widely 
promoted as a sustainable and green city. Publicly, city officials from Incheon Metropolitan 
government proclaimed their willingness to reshape Incheon’s urban policy in accordance with 
the national policy goal for the green growth. Songdo showcased the city’s commitment to the 
value of sustainability not only through its branding strategy, but through an array of 
technologies including the ubiquitous computing, radiofrequency identification (RFID), and 
sensors that re-configured the urban infrastructure. In private sector, this was most apparent in a 
planning document produced by the Gale International and KPF (2008), which charted the 
evolution of the plan from a hub city to a green city (Kim, C., 2010). Gale’s development 
scheme for Songdo was closely coordinated with Cisco’s ongoing project, Smart + Connected 
Communities, which sought to recast Songdo as the “Sustainable 21st Century San Francisco.” In 
this way, the government (Incheon Metropolitan City), real estate company (Gale), and 
multinational IT corporation (Cisco) came together under their shared goals to rearticulate smart 
 
32	Kim and Thornburn (2015) explains this extension of governing strategy as embodying the Korean 




city as a sustainable and green city, in accordance with South Korea’s changing economic, 
political, and social conditions.  
  ‘G-tower’, one of the landmarks in Songdo, changed its name in 2013 from ‘I-tower’, 
standing in for the city’s pursuit of its branded image as ‘Green’, ‘Global’, and ‘Growth’. As the 
headquarter building of the Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority, G-tower’s change of its 
name symbolically affirmed Songdo’s changing urban agenda from the ‘international business 
district’ to the cutting-edge, sustainable, and global city (Choi, 2013.06.26). Besides, one of the 
most often touted facts about Songdo is that it allotted 40% of its land to ‘green’ space (public 
parks) circumscribed by cycle paths and walking routes. Spatial layout of Songdo consists of a 
central park encircled by wide avenues with bicycle paths, partitioning high-rises for residential 
and office purposes.33 Songdo also hosts annual events like ‘Incheon Pentaport Rock Festival’, 
‘Bicycle Festival’, and other mega-scale international events that attract many tourists and 
visitors looking for a place to escape from the traffic-congested capital city area. 
 Furthermore, the widespread green image of Songdo was materialized in its 
infrastructural design. Songdo deployed various computing technologies such as ubiquitous 
sensor network (USN) and radio frequency identification (RFID) to actively monitor urban 
infrastructure systems including water, electricity, transport, and garbage disposal sites. Cisco 
environmental solutions deployed various sensing technologies in the environment - weather 
sensors that measure the wind velocity, temperature, humidity, level of fine dust, carbon 
monoxide, nitrogenous compound, sulfur oxides, and ozone amount. IoT sensors installed inside 
the houses and buildings provide real-time energy consumption levels to users so that the users 
 
33	It resembles what Ebenezer Howard (1902) envisioned in his diagram of the Garden City of Tomorrow 
– a perfect combination of the town and the country that brings the attractions of the both while 
suppressing their drawbacks. For the town aspect, the ideal city would bring the opportunities for jobs and 




can minimize the city’s overall energy consumption and maintenance cost (Lee, Kwon, Cho, 
Kim, and Lee, 2016). Songdo also utilizes ‘smart’ electricity grid system, a network technology 
that allows two-way interaction capacity built into the power utility to detect the peak hours of 
electricity use and to react to the individual demand of electricity. As a result, the residents in 
Songdo are said to be using 40% less energy than average cities. 
 What then, are the terms of relationships among technology, environment, and the 
government that the rearticulation of Songdo as a green city brings forth? One of the takeaways 
from this transition is that the green city embodies the changing mode of rule that implicates the 
environment as an object of government and technological intervention. The green directives in 
the smart city can be seen as an extension of government function that encompasses the matter of 
quality of life, health, and well-being of population and mediates the everyday life environment 
via dispersed and networked technologies. This extensivity on the ground level is achieved 
through layering of networked computing devices that monitor and capture the environmental 
data, which can be visualized and communicated across platforms. Furthermore, the extensivity 
entails the whole range of governing techniques that problematizes and redefines the 
environment in a way that supposedly brings the nature closer to the city, but nevertheless 
imposes technologically rationalized ways of managing and monitoring, so as to keep the nature 
confined and distant from the population. In other words, the new mode of rule enrolls the 
environment to the network of urban governance in a datafied and standardized terms, with 
which the government extends its aim of governing population to that of governing environment.  
  Upon this reflection, in the next section, I will more closely examine how the new mode 
of rule is articulated in Songdo’s infrastructure and urban design. It largely benefits from the 




of governance that deploys techniques and practices of sensing and monitoring the environment. 
The discussion continues from the ones from the previous chapter regarding how the security 
governance in the smart city involves the holistic visualization and monitoring of the 
environment through data, in order to pre-emptively design out crimes in the city. The same 
strategy applies to management of environment through the smart city, wherein the environment 
is made knowable, governable, and intervene-able through datafication and standardization 
techniques.  
Environmentality as a Mode of Governance  
Computing technologies are becoming increasingly pervasive in today’s urban environment. One 
of the major tasks given to the devices is monitoring carbon activities of individual movements, 
buildings, objects, and the environment. The availability of large volumes of data generated by 
the devices, in turn, is generating new opportunities to rationalize the governance and to 
marketize the services for the government, businesses and citizens living in the smart city. What 
supplements the technical base of data-driven urban governance is a series of calculative 
operations embedded in the distributed sensors, databases and urban control centers. These 
operations comprise of the interrelated dynamic between the centrifugal forces that distribute 
media (i.e., sensors and computing devices) in space and the centripetal forces of control that 
centralizes and reorders the data in a manageable and standardizable way (i.e., excel sheets, 
automated programs, rating systems, and protocols). Both the centrifugal and centripetal 
relations of media and space make up the dual architecture of the smart city system, which 
distributes and synchronizes media in space. In other words, the distribution of technologies goes 
hand in hand with rigorous ways of standardizing and ordering them. It is because the primary 




functions can interoperate. It is this capacity to disperse and integrate data that the smart city 
claims its merit for rational administration of environment. 
  Many proponents for the smart city consider their mandate as an equivalent for ‘going 
green’. Main reasoning behind this consideration is that the data-based management of urban 
infrastructures is supposed to better serve the aim of the government to monitor and control 
carbon activities in the city and organize urban activities based on the green performativity. It is 
crucial to reiterate that this articulation of ‘smart’ as ‘green’ has double connotations, which 
encompasses both the “environmentalist objective of the government” and “environmental 
modes of governance.” The difference between these two mechanisms of power is most 
appropriately explained by Gabrys (2016)’s discussion of ‘environmentality’, which she builds 
on from Foucault’s concept of governmentality and biopower developed in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. While the ‘environmentalist objective of the government’ refers to the green 
initiatives of the government that foregrounds the environment as the major problem for the 
government, the ‘environmental mode of governance’ denotes a broader trend of contemporary 
governance that modifies the way of governing through milieu, instead of directly affecting the 
individual or population as the governing subject. Although the goal may be the same – i.e. to 
change the behavior – the environmental mode of governance indirectly pursues that goal for 
instance, by embedding and distributing the ubiquitous computing in the city that functions at a 
fine-grained micro-level, while the environmentalist objective of the government has to do more 
with visibly and directly calling out individual subjects as green conscious citizens. For today’s 
smart cities, the environment is both the end and the means for the government, in a sense that 
several aspects of urban environment – energy use, air quality, waste amount, traffic – become 




population as individuals) and that these operations are legitimated and rationalized for the sake 
of protecting the environment and people’s well-being.  
 Environmentality as a concept allow us to capture the emerging characteristics of urban 
governance in which both the environmentalist objective of the government and the 
environmental mode of governance is interrelated. It also allows us to expand our view beyond 
the greening objectives of the government to comprehend how the modes of governance and 
control are embedded in urban life that has always already been permeated by the cybernetic 
means of control (Gershenson, Santi, & Ratti, 2016). Smart city can be seen as the latest example 
of the cybernetic city in which different urban functions including transportation, security, and 
health are automated through multiple internal loops (so that the government does not have to 
initiate the process anymore). In this view, a city is seen like a large and complex system 
consisting of multiple feedback loops and mechanisms of control, which are supposed to be 
decentered, dispersed, and automated, instead of being dominated by a centralized bureaucratic 
system. The governance is thought of as an alignment rather than a fixed and unified system. 
One of the illustrating examples is the ‘smart grid’ system in the smart city, an alternative energy 
management system that operates with distributed sensors that monitor the energy flow of each 
households and buildings. Since every sensor is connected and networked, it can be integrated 
and centrally managed by a digital platform, which is a means of gaining back the level of 
control for centralized balancing and monitoring of the flow of energy in the city. The key point 
here is that the automated internal loop initiates a mechanism of self-regulation that economizes 
the use of energy, (supposedly) without human direction or legal intervention.  
 These automated mechanisms of regulating the urban environment are presented as 




governance not only evade the conventional language of the politics (that pertain to the issues of 
social relations) and dissolve these matters into the availability of large sets of data, which are 
classified and assessed by the standards to rate the city’s overall environmental performance. In 
other words, through environmental mode of governance, smart city is made into a technological 
zone where the success of the government can be rationally measured and evaluated, largely 
based on the data.  
 It is on this background that the standards such as the Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design (LEED) gain prevalence in the smart city’s governance, as a proxy for the 
government. The LEED system was developed by the US Green Building Council (USGBC), a 
Washington D.C. based, non-profit organization that created a buzz around the green building 
since 1993. USGBC proposed a formal definition and standard of green building through their 
flagship program LEED, which is used to rate a building’s environmental performance. LEED 
sustainability rating and certification system currently is the most well-known and is promoted as 
the authority in green design across the US and the rest of the world. It uses a point system to 
grade all aspects of a building’s environmental impact, from water use, building materials, 
bicycle facilities, indoor air quality, storage and collection of recyclables, and the level of energy 
performance. LEED was a response to many municipalities and corporations that had demanded 
a plausible standard for certifying and approving the greenness of their building or their cities.34  
 Seoul Metropolitan Government and the USGBC signed an agreement to accelerate 
LEED in the capital city of South Korea in 2017, while Songdo had been proactively utilizing 
 
34	In 2016, more than 60,000 commercial projects were participating in the LEED, which is said to have 
spawned an entire green building industry worth up to approximately $248 million in the US (US Green 
Building Council official website). Going “green” has become a powerful incentive and a prerequisite for 
construction companies driven by the potential PR benefits. However, it has also been met with a 





the LEED standard in managing the city’s environmental performance even during its early 
construction phase. For example, Songdo Convensia is the name of an official convention center 
building that acquired the first LEED-certified status in Asia in 2009. According to Stan Gale, 
the CEO of Gale International, Songdo Convensia’s acquisition of the LEED-certified status 
demonstrated their commitment to “foster environmental awareness” which supposedly 
“engenders a real sense of eco-responsibility within the larger Songdo IBD community” 
(Yoneda, 2010.04.13). Residents as well as officials of Songdo took a great pride in the fact that 
their city became a “showcase to the world as a major example of sustainable development and 
green growth,” according to Soleiman Dias, director at Chadwick International, a K-12 
international school in Songdo (Yi, 2012.10.15).  
 Since 2009 Songdo has sped up submitting other buildings’ data to the LEED program, 
acquiring 22 million square feet of LEED-certified space as of 2017 (accounting for 40 percent 
of all LEED-certified space in South Korea) and in the same year, was recognized as the first city 
to earn pre-certification for the USGBC’s new ‘LEED for Cities’ classification (Stanley, 2017). 
USGBC’s LEED for Cities program was established in 2016, which was an expanded version of 
the LEED for buildings program that included socioeconomic categories such as education, 
crime, and employment data. The new program for the cities required each municipality to 
generate sustainability score across five categories – energy, water, waste, transportation, and 
human experience (Table 1).  
 In order for the cities to get certified, they have to commit to sharing a year of data with 
the USGBC at a pre-certification stage and optionally propose a goal and plans for carbon 
reduction, climate resilience, healthy community, and green infrastructure. The submitted data 




organization to the USGBC, which actually runs the LEED programs, before the city attains the 
LEED-certified status.    
Table 1: LEED for Cities Performance Score Categories (USGBC, 2016) 
Category Metric Unit 
Energy 1. Greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 
equivalent) 
Tons/year/person 
Water 2. Domestic water consumption Amount/year/person 
Waste 
3. Municipal solid waste generated Amount/Year/Person 
4. Municipal solid waste diverted from 
landfill % of Total amount collected 
Transportation 
5. Distance traveled in individual vehicles 
daily Distance per day 
Education 
6. Population with (at least a high school 
degree) 
% of population 25 years and over 
7. Population with (at least) a bachelor’s 
degree % of population 25 years and over 
Equitability 
8. Median gross rent as % of household 
income 
% 
9. Gini coefficient Number between zero (0) and one (1) 
Prosperity 
10. Median household income US Dollar per year 
11. Unemployment rate % of population 16 years and over 
Health & 
Safety 
12. Median air quality index (AQI) Number between zero (0) and 500 
13. Air quality days unhealthy for 
sensitive groups 
Number of days between zero (0) 
and 365 
14. Violent crime Per capita per year 
 
 South Korean government has been developing a domestic green building certification 
system since 1998, called the Korean Green Building Certification System (KGBCS), which was 
first implemented in 2002 and became the construction ordinance in 2005. Unlike in the LEED 
system in the US, which is developed by a non-government organization and applied by 




and implementation of the standard. The Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs 
(MLTM) and the Ministry of Environment (ME) jointly adopted the certification system for the 
purposes of “realizing sustainable development, and promoting the construction of natural 
resource-frugal, nature-friendly buildings” (Tae & Shin, 2009, p.1912). The evaluation 
categories include the noise level, structural durability, interior air quality, entertainment 
facilities, and fire safety among others. The KGBCS was originally applied to the multiple-
family housing and later was expanded to office buildings, mixed-use residential buildings (in 
2003), schools (in 2005), and retail markets and lodging facilities (in 2006). Both MLTE and ME 
enact regulations regarding the assessments and selection of committee members who are 
designated to evaluate and approve certification status for individual construction projects.  
 It is noteworthy that Songdo used both the Korean and international green building rating 
systems, unlike any other cities in South Korea. According to the POSCO E&C., the co-
developer of Sogndo, they used the double standards (Korean and international) to ensure the 
projects are built on the highest possible standards of sustainable construction. The authority of 
the standards bolsters Songdo to establish itself as an example of the sustainable and green city 
and to pave the way for other cities in South Korea to come through. Since the ratings are 
entirely based on a large volume of data generated by the buildings and the city, having the 
infrastructures prepared to constantly produce the data in accordance to the standards, such as in 
the smart city, becomes a vital necessity for many cities that aspire to go green.   
 Coming back to the discussion of environmental mode of governance in the smart city, 
one can argue that the proliferating use of the standards in urban environmental design is one of 
the key aspects of the new environmentalist mode of governance. First of all, the smart city’s 




governable and intervene-able’ (Shelton, 2017). City as well as the whole of environment is 
thought of as a transparent system that can be rated and manipulated by data. This cybernetic 
approach to the city informs the contemporary approach to the sustainability which parallels with 
a universal approach to the environment that assimilates the difference of different places. On 
this ground, a singular parameter such as the carbon emission becomes the depoliticized means 
of governing the environment across different geographical locations such as the national 
territory.  
 There is a long history of approaching the city with systematic means of experimental 
science and the smart city is the latest case of this perspective. Here, the city is imagined as a 
laboratory, a field of the “new urban science” (Shelton, 2017) where data-driven urban initiatives 
to quantitatively measure and modify the city from the micro-scale granularity is taking place. In 
such sterile and depoliticized environment, the green performativity becomes the singular 
criterion of success. The techniques of measuring and quantifying the city’s performativity 
(standards, codes, and algorithms) act as the stand-in for the bureaucratic regulations. Smart city 
comprises of multiple ‘zones’ where technologies are undoubtedly considered as central to 
forging connections and barriers to access. And because these standards and codes are 
supposedly value-neutral, the processes of implementing the standards seem as though they are 
apolitical (Barry, 2001). While the development and implementation of the standards for green 
performativity entails replacing the bureaucratic management with automated technology, 
scientific standards and protocols embedded throughout a number of receptacles in the city, the 
residual forms of governing entities are appointed to a seemingly reduced role of steering the 




 In such a highly technocratic approach favored by municipalities and corporations, the 
bottom line of their proposal always touches upon adopting new zoning rules, building codes, 
designing open spaces, and organizing the city with more ‘ecological consciousness’. This is 
precisely the changing strategy of the government that dissolves the matter of politics into the 
distributed techniques of standards, codes, and algorithms.  
 So far I have explored the shifting modes of governance in the smart city through the 
concept of ‘environmentality’, which constitutes the major urban condition in Songdo smart city. 
Green initiatives in Songdo articulated smart city as a green city, through deploying various 
ubiquitous computing technologies that reshaped the relationship between the city and the 
environment. The environment has been redefined as a governmental problem, in need of 
regulation and intervention and an instrument for the government.  
 With that being said, it is crucial to note that the environmental mode of governance in 
the smart city rely on another significant aspect of urban life. It involves a ‘more-than technical 
formation’ of the smart city, which is about the ethical relation between the individual subject 
and the city. A broader discursive work of the smart city’s governance integrates the individual 
in the technological zone through enacting codes of conduct for an ideal personhood. In the next 
section of this chapter, I will briefly discuss how this ethical dimension of the smart city’s 
extensive environmental mode of governance complements the technical formation of the smart 
city.  
Government of Environ-mentality   
It would be simplistic to claim that the environmental mode of governance is only achieved 
through putting in place the computational means to govern and to digitally animate the 




discursive work at play that allow these technical relations to be taken up and enacted by the 
individual citizens ‘voluntarily’, instead of thinking about the smart city as a fixed and totalizing 
system imposed them ‘from above’. As has been discussed previously, the city officials of 
Songdo have been keen to adopt the LEED rating systems, to acquire global recognition. By 
successfully gaining this recognition, Songdo gained tractions among professional individuals 
and families who sought to have a better quality of life in the high-tech and green city. For the 
most part, the well-curated greenness of Songdo is presented as a way of life that everyone is 
entitled to have and to pursue – a life that is well-secured in a clean, safe, and controlled 
environment. Ultimately, the ideal way of life is communicated through a city such as Songdo in 
various levels, in the ways that the city is thought of as an instrument for bettering itself and as a 
zone for deploying technologies to self-monitor and self-evaluate its performativity. Besides, by 
articulating the smart city as a green city, the environmental governance in Songdo has been 
morally justified as it supposedly procures humanitarian right to have a better quality of life. The 
imperative for greenness, in turn, demands individuals to bear responsibility to reshape their 
lives and their environment in accordance with the green standards.   
  That the city has become a useful field for rethinking the way in which the government 
operates environmentally has been explained above through the concept of environmentality. 
Following this thought, it is also worth considering what kind of ‘mentality’ is being forged in 
this new environment, which not only coerces the subject through regulations and legal means, 
but draws out moral virtue of the individual citizens to align themselves with the aim of the 
government. The argument advanced here slightly departs from how Gabrys (2016) had 
approached the ‘subjectness’ of the individual citizens, which is bypassed by the environmental 




performativity.35  Nevertheless, I believe it is crucial to delve into the ways in which the 
seemingly indisputable smart and green city initiatives gain their momentum, precisely by 
mobilizing the willingness and commitments from the ‘good’ citizens, who are morally charged 
and responsibilized to join the green initiative and to sustain the ‘quality of life’. For this reason, 
I emphasize the environ-mentality as a critical field of government as well as a component of the 
individual motives for action, which are socially constructed by desires for better life (and thus a 
better version of the self) and by fear of sickness and decay. Cities, often imagined in terms of 
disease, crowd, and noise, are now brought into the discourse of smart and green city, to be 
reshaped and redesigned in order for the aspects of urban living to be conditioned as a “network 
of living practices of well-being” (Rose & Osborne, 1999).  
 This particular shaping of environ-mentality constitutes an internal drive of the political 
machine such as the smart city. The ‘environmental mode of governance’ that distributes power 
in space informs the everyday conduct of the individuals, even the most mundane ones including 
the tasks of recycling the plastic bottles, monitoring the gas and electricity use, counting the 
daily footsteps, and economizing their carbon footprint. These individual operations, along with 
the computational activities that are already embedded in the environment, together make up the 
performative operations of the smart city. According to Gabrys (2016), in the scheme of the 
smart city, the matter of politics becomes delimited and confined to the matter of measurement, 
calculation, and management. By the same token, the practice of citizenship also gets reduced 
and confined to the matter of monitoring and managing data. In this way, the smart city “recasts 
who or what counts as a ‘citizen’,” by which the citizenship is “articulated environmentally 
 
35	Citizens contribute to the smart city both by consciously engaging with the data and by unconsciously 




through the distribution and feedback of monitoring and urban data practices, rather than through 
governable subjects or populations” (pp.200-201).  
 However, even now when the system is increasingly becoming more automated so as to 
self-operate without constant engagement of the citizens, individual citizens still are important 
nodes of smart city’s operation and the major objective of the government. Citizens are not 
merely primary points of gathering environmental data, but they are part of the operative 
rationale for the smart city, which requires problems that matter to the citizens and the ways of 
addressing the problems for the sake of their well-being. The discursive formation of the smart 
city thus articulates both the problem (sustainability) and the solutions (digital environment) in a 
way that supposedly benefits the citizens. Cities are important conduits through which ‘good’ 
citizen practices are envisioned and exercised, not necessarily based on the individuals’ rational 
decision-making but on the hopes of fulfilling their collective desire – desires for a better life, 
better environment, and a better self. This normative dimension of the city and citizenship is a 
crucial component of the environ-mentality, which extends from the environmental operation of 
power that touches upon the government of desire and mentality. This framework helps us 
comprehend how desires – for economic development, recognition, distinction, and well-being – 
which had historically been relatively oppressed in public, is now operating with the government 
as it mobilizes the willingness and aspirations of the individual citizens to achieve its goal. The 
‘good’ citizenry practice that previously was more or less grounded in one’s dedication to the 
nation-state and family is now shifting its emphasis into individual accomplishment and desire 







In this chapter, I traced a brief history of Songdo’s transition into a green city, with a special 
emphasis placed on the new mode of governance that involved the city, environment, and the 
individual citizens. I discussed the social and cultural implications of linking sustainable 
development and the smart city, which involved the shifting mode of government that distributes 
power in the environment.  
 During the first decade of the 21st century, smart city has been articulated as the green 
city by proposing to address the climate change through the pervasive use of ubiquitous 
computing technologies. In South Korea, environment was ‘discovered’ as the crucial problem 
for the government, which switched its economic strategy to the ‘green growth’, symbolically 
severing its previous industrial approaches to the ‘brown growth’. Songdo was one of the 
primary examples that demonstrated the changing goals and the strategy of the government 
through a new spatial-material arrangement of power. Sensors and cameras were widely 
distributed and embedded in the urban infrastructures, to digitally manage transportation, waste, 
and energy, while the standards and protocols were developed to make sure that the different sets 
of data were centrally governed and controlled. The protocols and standards became the proxy 
for the government, as they were made to inform the guidelines for activities and performativity 
of not just individual citizens, but the buildings, objects, and infrastructures. The technologies 
and techniques of smart city are the central mode of rule that translates human and nonhuman 
environmental activities into quantifiable data, to render them visible, manageable, and 
governable. Data are foregrounded as the dominant instrument of power that defines the sense of 




 With that being said, while the technical arrangement of the smart city constitutes a major 
example of environmentality, the new modes of governance that make available the conditions 
for the power to operate in less direct and visible ways, I also attended to the normative and 
subtle ways in which the power operates with the individual desires. Desires for well-being, 
progress, and comfort are the driving force of the environ-mentality, which extends its reach to 
the domain of government of the self (and others).    
 Within the arrangement of technology, space, and mentality through which the smart city 
operates, we are also witnessing how the cities in the 21st century have been called out as the 
social ‘enterprise’ that faces the challenges of globalization, climate change, and technological 
innovation. Cities are important conduits through which the global economy and the citizens are 
mediated, and the smart city is presented as a strategic zone for fostering the ‘creative economy’. 
Following from this chapter’s discussion on the economization of the urban environment through 
digital technologies, in the next chapter, I will explain how the economy of the smart city is 
predicated on the modeling of responsible and entrepreneurial subjects who hone their skills, 
knowledge, and capacities to become creative and innovative. The discourse of creative cities is 
a close cousin to the technical-spatial arrangement of the smart city, in that the technology is 
thought of as a salient instrument of the government that monitors and evaluates the 
performativity of the city and population and that the city is thought of as the exemplary zone of 
conduct that demonstrates the idea of citizens and their ideal way of life.    
 One caveat following the above argument is that the dichotomy between the civic duty 
for the collective good and the individual desire for well-being and comfort may not be so clear-
cut. Especially in South Korea, there is a long history of how the prosperity and security of the 




developmental state has reinforced and operated on the structure of mentality, which was 
predicated on the assimilation of the state as the patriarch of the family and the citizens as the 
dutiful children. In the next chapter, I will expand on this history of the South Korean 
developmental government and its administration of technology and culture, which is now 






















CHAPTER 5. K-SMART CITY AND CREATIVE ECONOMY:  
MYTHOLOGIES AND TECHNOLOGIES OF FUTURE-MAKING 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, smart city is symptomatic of significant shifts in the ways in 
which the government instrumentalizes digital technologies to extend its influence in the aspects 
of urban life that had not been previously thought of as the direct realm of government’s 
influence. The governance of and through a smart city is distinct from the institutionalized forms 
of ‘government’ in that it achieves a new level of effectiveness by distributing and embedding 
power in the environment and by formulating and enacting the ethos and norms of progress and 
development that work with the individual desire for their own well-being and survival. Smart 
city is also manifested as an open and transparent mode of governance that spreads out and 
invites “civic participation,” albeit within the limited parameters of the citizenship (Gabrys, 
2016).  In the previous chapters I also discussed how the idea of smart city, while often thought 
of as a singular and universal idea, is in fact, comprised of multiple and complex processes of 
problematizations that arise from specific genealogies. The genealogy of South Korean smart 
city I have offered so far provides several ‘signposts’ that serve as the temporal index and 
historical force of each of those problems: the problem of ‘mobilities’ and its relation to the 
South Korean history of modernization, industrialization, globalization, and digitalization 
(Chapter 2); the problem of ‘security and safety’, in relation to the history of militarism and 
defensive citizenship that is rearticulated in the digital regime of the smart city (Chapter 3); the 
problem of ‘environment’ and its relation to the new spatial ordering of the smart city and the 
new urban discourse in the 1990s that demanded a ‘quality of life’ for the citizens (Chapter 4).  
 In this chapter, I think through how the problem of ‘development’ and ‘futurity’ has 




rearticulated in the current regime of digital economy and creative cities. I will start with 
examining two features of Songdo which I have not addressed directly in prior chapters.  
 First, I will investigate how the ‘smartness’ of Songdo has been communicated via 
multiple forms of representation, including the K-pop music videos, dramas, festivals, and 
architectures. I examine how these texts construct and mediate Songdo and South Korea’s 
relationship with its future: how futurism is instrumentalized in the present thanks to the 
advancement and valorization of technology, while the future, as a constantly receding temporal 
horizon, normalizes certain ethics of work and a way of life that constantly has to update, 
improve, and move forward, without pause. In particular, I examine how Songdo’s identity as the 
“Tomorrow City,” which has been reproduced through popular cultural texts and some of its 
iconic buildings (i.e., Songdo Convensia, Central Park, Tri-bowl, Canal Walk), constitutes a 
significant part of Korea’s ‘sociotechnical imaginaries’ (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015; Sadowski & 
Bendor, 2018), which functions as the reference for the government’s desirable goal and how the 
imaginaries of the future is perceived to be inextricably bound with advancement in technology 
and innovation. 
 Second, I trace the historical trajectory of South Korean industrialization and 
urbanization that occasioned the government’s current approach to the city as a self-governing 
‘growth machine’ and ask how that approach constantly inducted a city like Songdo as a 
technological zone of progress and entrepreneurialism. Long before the ‘creativity’ and 
‘innovation’ became the watchwords of the first decade of the 21st century, the proponents of 
Songdo in the mid-1980s envisioned the city as a strategic node of global economy that would 
operate around the innovations in information technology and service industry sector. Since its 




position in the logistical network in Northeast Asian region, by providing a favorable business 
environment for the global investors and tech companies. Domestically, South Korean 
government has attempted to commoditize and export Songdo’s model through the ‘K-Smart 
City’ brand. I situate the techniques and practices around the K-Smart City at the intersection of 
the current preoccupation with innovation, global imperatives for creative economy, and South 
Korea’s techno-nationalist approach to developmentalism. In addressing these multiple historical 
and global contexts that conditioned Songdo’s transition into a zone of global entrepreneurial 
activities, I ask how Songdo has become a useful reference for the government and for the South 
Korean public to envision the future progress (and even survival) and technology-driven 
development.    
Kinesthetic of Futurity: K-Pop and Smart City  
By 2010, Songdo was receiving substantial attention by the Korean public through the 
government-sponsored promotions (e.g., festivals, conferences, TV shorts) as well as through a 
wide variety of cultural texts that featured Songdo as the city of future. For instance, Songdo 
appears in the background of numerous K-pop music videos – Psy’s Right Now (YG 
Entertainment, 2010), Gangnam-Style (YG Entertainment, 2012), BoA’s Hurricane Venus (SM 
Entertainment, 2010), F(x)’s Hot Summer (SM Entertainment, 2011), Exo-K’s MaMa (SM 
Entertainment, 2012), Big Bang’s Beautiful Hangover (YG Entertainment, 2010), Beast’s 
Fiction (Cube Entertainment, 2011), Rain’s Love Song (2010), to name just a few. In these 
videos, Songdo’s grey empty streets scattered with the city’s iconic landmarks (e.g., Tribowl 
Gallery, Songdo Convensia, Central Park, etc.) set the tone of dystopian ambience, which, 
harmonized with the meticulously choreographed performance of K-pop idol bands, creates a 




synchronized performances of the idol bands set apart K-pop from other music genres, Songdo’s 
cool tonality sets itself distant and distinct not only from any other cities in Korea but from 
anywhere else in the world. It was no small coincidence that one critic for the Korean Exposé 
was stunned by the “Chernobyl-like emptiness” in Songdo (James, 2016.10.14), at his first 
encounter with the “silent and post-apocalyptic” cityscape turned into a “human desert” of some 
sort.  
 While some of these critics were slighted by the inhumane emptiness of Songdo, location 
managers for the music videos and drama producers were taking advantage of the city’s 
tranquility for their logistical conveniences. Besides, no matter how inhumane and other-worldly 
its artificiality might have appeared at a first glance, still others projected their potential desirable 
future on to the vacant lots in Songdo, with variable scales of optimisms, hopes, and aspirations.  
The visual power of “digital flow and glow” is one aspect that characterizes the smartness 
and futurity that is exemplified in the above music videos that feature Songdo. According to 
Gillian Rose (2018), the ‘flow and glow’ is the smart city in its visual form, which is in a 
constant state of morphing and transitioning where everything is mutable and on the move. The 
meticulously choreographed K-Pop dancers juxtaposed against the backdrop of Songdo embody 
the speed, flow and mechanical discipline exemplified in the city. Gray and cool tonality of the 
scenes enhances the dazzling glamor of the things and the bodies that are in motion. Everything 
flows and nothing stays still. That is the (visual) norm of smartness.  
The iconic landmarks such as Tomorrow City Plaza, Tri-bowl Gallery, and Songdo 
Convensia, which became the regular props in the K-pop music videos and soap operas, are now 
the major tourist attractions in Songdo. Songdo’s Central Park surrounded by the high-rise 




City’s Central Park, a fascinating feeling of being ‘foreign’ in one’s own country. Pragmatically 
and conventionally speaking, these buildings contribute little to the primary function of the smart 
city – efficiency and rational management of urban mobility, energy, and security. Designed as a 
site for hosting conferences and art exhibitions, however, these buildings serve as the primary, 
iconic, and crucial way to represent Sondo visually, as “hip” and energizing as the music videos 
and to campaign Songdo’s smartness and futurity in various texts including the promotional 
brochures, exhibitions, and commercials. What then, might be the significance of these 
landmarks in terms of their non-functional quality? Can this futurist aesthetic of Songdo be 
indicative of the postmodern condition in which forms precede functions in a world that consists 
of a series of depth-less surfaces?36  
 In a way, the kinesthetic of futurity manifested in the digital flow and glow of Songdo 
and K-Pop videos became fused with the aesthetics of creative economy in Korean style. This 
distinct national style in fact has been described as one of the major features that buttress the 
recent expansion of K-pop in the global music industry. Part of the affective charge associated 
with the aesthetics is the speed and dynamism embodied in the K-Pop artists’ ably synchronized 
and choreographed movements, as well as the amount of self-disciplining involved in creating 
and perfecting the movement. The kinesthetic of the K-Pop stars moving across various urban 
settings in Songdo (such as several scenes from Psy’s Gangnam Style MV which were actually 
shot in Songdo), then, animates the sensation that viscerally, haptically, and emotionally moves 
the inner space of the viewers. As the growing influence of the “Korean Wave” across the globe 
well attests (Kim, 2013; Yoon & Jin, 2017), the dancing bodies of K-Pop stars now traverse 
 
36 In his critique of postmodern architectures, Charles Jencks refers to today’s iconic buildings as 
carriers of ‘enigmatic signifiers’, which are “desperate for new sensibilities,” separated from the 
obviousness of the local context (Jencks, 2005). As a result, these enigmatic signifiers are devoid of 





across the national territorial borders, fueling the momentum for a cultural flow that is even 
hailed as a counter-cultural force against the US dominated entertainment industry (Jin, 2018). 
 How specifically then, do the K-Pop and Songdo relate to each other? As explained 
above, the aesthetics of national style visually exemplified in the K-Pop MV lent its rhythmic 
force to the narratives that were used in “selling smartness” in Songdo. In turn, K-Pop MV also 
drew from the sociotechnical imaginaries of the urban futurism associated with Songdo and its 
identity as a ‘non-place’ (Auge, 1995), which are embedded in a distinctly Korean system of 
envisioning, producing, and managing the future. Therefore, K-Pop and Songdo depended on, 
and could not do without, one another. 
 Besides, there were other substantial ways in which this interdependence occurred –
Songdo and K-Pop share considerable similarities in terms of their production system, global 
aspirations, and their adaptability to shifting socio-economic context. First, in K-Pop music 
industry, there are big entertainment companies (such as the SM, YG, JYP) that operate their 
own ‘star manufacturing system’ (Shin, H. J., 2009) that entails a long period of (usually about 
five to six years) rigorous training and education for the aspiring star trainees who, mostly in 
their teens, acquire the skills for singing, dancing, acting, and so on. According to Shin 
Hyunjoon (2009), what is exported (with the K-Pop) is not only cultural goods produced in 
Korea but also an institution or system (star system in this case) and work ethic and discipline 
that are attributed as distinctly Korean (even Asian) style. Highly regimented process of 
discovering, educating, and exploiting the creative workers in the K-Pop industry is not 
dissimilar to the planning process of Songdo, which involved reclaiming the land from the 




city, the distinct currency of which is now widely consumed and desired by many Korean 
people.    
 Second, the techniques and practices of manufacturing and managing K-Pop stars and 
Songdo reflect Korea’s changing socio-economic condition in the late 1990s. The economic 
crisis of 1997 was a watershed moment that demanded a holistic restructuring of Korea’s 
industrial economic model to adjust to the new reality of global market economy and emerging 
media environment dominated by information technologies. K-Pop star training system, having 
evolved to adapt to the competitive global entertainment industry and new technological 
environment (e.g., social media channels like Youtube and Twitter), accomplished a remarkable 
growth throughout the first decade of the 21st century. During the same period, Songdo also 
emerged out of the social, technological, and economic condition of the 90s that pressured the 
Korean government to flexibilize its regulations and labor practices and ultimately to reinvent 
itself as an entrepreneurial actor to accommodate the global standard.      
 Third, both K-Pop and Songdo manifest their aspiration to go global. K-Pop has been 
characterized by its hybridity (if not an ‘inauthentic imitation’) that combined the American pop 
with Korean talent manufacturing system (Shin, 2009). In fact, much of the K-pop music in the 
2010s has been written by American and European musicians (Jin, 2018). Even with the dire 
chances of rising to the stardom, trainees are said to enter the star academy based on their pure 
passion of ‘making it’ in the end and the hopes of eventually turning their success in Korea 
toward Japanese, Chinese, and/or the US market. Likewise, Songdo has been keen to become a 
global city by emulating the Western architectural design with the labor force of Korean 




both K-Pop and Songdo comprise of hybridized components that emanate distant, yet somehow 
familiar ambience that can appeal to the universal audience.  
 Given the similarities between K-Pop and Songdo, in terms of their production, 
circulation, and audience, we can attempt a different approach to ‘reading’ Songdo and its 
relationship with future, not only through interpreting their textual representations but also 
triangulating those narrative forms with their undercurrent historical conditions and collective 
mentality of techno-centric developmentalism that served as the driving force toward the future 
visualized in those texts. What is significant about bringing these different sources together is 
that it allows us to see beyond the matter of how Songdo became the passive receptacle of the 
global imperatives to become smart, creative, and innovative and instead, see how the broader 
discursive work and a regime of governance informed, instructed, and shaped the mental 
disposition of the city (and citizens) to become willful and future-oriented economic actors. 
Songdo, articulated as the smart city, not only manifests the idea of future but operates the 
‘practice of future-making’ (Datta, 2018) through direct and indirect governing strategies 
including technological, economic, juridical, as well as ‘cultural’ means.  
 What then, constitutes the practice of future-making that is enacted and operated in and 
through Songdo? What promises were made in planning Songdo and what did realizing that 
promise mean for the people in Songdo and in Korea? In Carey and Quirk (2009)’s essay “The 
History of Future,” there are three ways that the future enunciates the present: exhortation, 
prophecy, and participation. First, future revitalizes optimism in the present, promising that 
things will be better and whatever problems of today will be somehow straightened out. Present 
is always inadequate, but the future will perfect its flaws. By a similar token, future recasts the 




‘progress’, ‘development’, and ‘national reconstruction’. These are the ways that the idea of the 
future can serve a political usage in the present, by evading the dissents and suffering in the 
present and/or by consoling the present with the offerings of the good old future for all.    
But more crucially, science and technology – especially wedded through the creative 
economy of cultural content production (e.g., television drama, music video, digital games), 
innovation and startup ecologies, urban design, public art and memorials – gain supremacy in the 
practices of envisioning and planning for the future, especially as that future acquires new 
expression in the development of information and computing technologies. Often portrayed as 
the revolutionary driver of progress in history, such as in Cisco’s current campaign to become 
“the Bridge to Possible,” technology is perceived to be the main bridge between the present and 
the future, through which the inhabitants of the present can participate in bringing the future 
closer to the present. Planning, as an inherently optimistic and future-oriented endeavor (Abrams 
& Weszkalnys, 2011), particularly relies on the technoscientific approach to participating in the 
future, utilizing the ever-evolving methods of extrapolation, prediction, and preemption.  
In Carey & Quirk (2009)’s terms, future manifests in all three dimensions – exhortative, 
prophetic, and techno-scientific – in Songdo. If the image of the future Songdo sketched in the 
K-Pop music videos were aesthetically pleasing and “moving” (affectively charged) yet too 
distant and out of reach (exhortative, and prophetic), there are more pragmatic (techno-scientific) 
ways in which the future is offered to the present. These different modalities of future – operated 
separately but synergistically with the others—were mobilized, made to move together by their 
relation to this urban space, as represented, material, and affective space.  
For instance, the “Incheon Global City Fair & Festival” held from August to October 




days of the festival combined a series of events and exhibitions featuring these multiple 
modalities of future: conferences on the green growth and urban future, a multimedia water 
fountain show, a robot science museum, collection of international cuisine, K-Pop concert 
(featuring the then top idol bands including the Girls Generation, ShiNee, and Four-Minute), and 
interactive screens displaying the prototypes of the ‘ubiquitous city’. The venue consisted of 
different sections including the Urban Planning Pavilion, Robot Science Pavilion, Green Growth 
Pavilion, and World Culture Street. Urban Planning Pavilion showcased the future city 
prototypes designed by major Korean construction companies such as Hyundai, Daewoo, and 
POSCO. While these events were meant to demonstrate and celebrate Korea’s cultural and 
technological excellence, they also communicated the ambitious vision for Korea’s future cities 
and economy that attainable through these technological achievements.  
At the first glance, the sociotechnical imaginaries reproduced in the venue do not seem so 
distinct from any other techno-optimistic visions promoted by the companies such as Samsung, 
LG, and Cisco. However, it is crucial to point out that the overarching theme of the Incheon 
Global City Fair & Festival reflected the idea of the head of the organizing committee, Chin 
Dae-je, one of the most well-known ‘IT gurus’ of South Korea. Chin maintained an envious 
career after graduating from Stanford, as a research scientist at the IBM’s Watson Lab in New 
York, as the youngest CEO of Samsung Electronics, and the Minister of Information and 
Communication in South Korea. Most notably, his career at Samsung is often hailed as the 
Korean popular “myth of semiconductor” [pandoch’e sinhwa] that scaled up the company to the 
leading position in the world’s semiconductor and electronics market. Chin is known as the 
heroic protagonist in the Korean nationalist myth of Samsung, where the ‘globally recognized 




without direct foreign aid or guidance. The story begins in 1985, when Chin starts his job at 
Samsung, then not very well known trade company, leaving behind his promising career at 
IBM’s Watson Lab. In his memoir published in 2006, Manage your Passion, Chin recollects this 
moment when he risked a promised career path in the US to dedicate his passion for his own 
country, by achieving the goal of developing the world’s best semiconductor memory chip and 
by defeating his competitors in Japan and in the US, who were way more advanced than Korea at 
the time. When Chin and his team successfully developed 4-Meg DRAM and 16-Meg DRAM in 
1992, Samsung became the biggest supplier of the semiconductor chip in the world’s market, 
accounting for the 40% of the entire sales.  
This often cited story is more than just an urban legend that accounts for the success of 
the top electronics company in Korea, although it is known as one of the most important stories 
in the history of innovation in Samsung and in Korea. It is recognized as a national myth that has 
been religiously circulated in the mainstream media as well as his own biography as a best-
selling book that inculcated moral imperatives to many Koreans that one’s hard work and 
passion for the country pays off in the end, with the reward of uplifting the national pride. The 
story also articulated technology as a mythological object, the only reliable source of growth and 
survival for the country deprived of natural resource. Technology figures as the salvation 
method. Especially during the time of crisis when everything seems to be moving so fast and up 
in the air and nothing is certain about the future. The relationship between mythology and 
technology amplified during the time of financial crisis (e.g., 1997 IMF crisis, 2008 global 
financial crisis) when the social and economic structures supporting the welfare programs 
destabilized and anxiety grew over the transitory sense of time. Technology was perceived to be 




make the future attainable. Technology, brought into this context, acquires a mythical power. 
Beyond its rational capacity to aid government in organizing, managing, and governing the city 
and its population, technology becomes a useful reference for the future that animates dreams, 
hopes, and optimisms and assuages the problems in the present.  
The discursive practice of future-making that bridges national mythology and technology 
unfolds in the scale of smart city in Songdo. Chin Dae-je’s strategic appointment as the head of 
Incheon Global City Fair & Festival explicitly reveals this intention to relive the glory of the past 
and to project that past glory toward the imagined future of Songdo. The myth serves as the 
source of optimism and anticipation for the future and legitimation of the transformations that 
take place in the present. Chin was chosen as the perfect person to bridge the past glory and the 
imagined technological future, a future of prosperity, pride, and success that was to materialize 
in the city of Songdo, embedded with ubiquitous computing technologies. With his current title 
as a corporate consultant, Chin also offered city officials in Songdo planning strategies to 
develop the ubiquitous city as a model to commoditize and export to the overseas market. So the 
technologized city of future, was not only to become the primary test site for the ubiquitous 
computing technologies, but a globally recognized and nationally produced technology that 
would revive the prosperity and pride that once marked Korea in a leading position in the world 
competition.  
Perhaps, this discursive and performative dimension of a technological future imagined 
through Songdo is what distinguishes Korea’s approach to the smart city from other smart cities 
(especially the ones in the Western developed countries). In postcolonial Indian context, Ayona 
Datta (2018) observes the conflation of the city and the state in many discussions about the smart 




future is to unfold, while the state is the paternal figure that governs that future. The relational 
dynamic between the state and the city manifests in a similar fashion in the present day context 
of Songdo, as well as many other smart city test sites that are emerging in Korea. Either through 
direct involvement or through financial support, the national government exerts great influence 
in making smart cities in South Korea, the trend which is at odds with the (neo-) liberalist 
approach to the development in the Western cities.   
In the next section, I continue to address the dialectic between the city and the state, 
technology, and mythology, and the past and the future, with a special focus on the formation of 
‘creative economy with Korean characteristics’. This formation, as I will contend, involves not 
only politico-economic restructuration of industrial economy but is entangled with a much 
broader range of aesthetics, techniques, and ethics that pertain to Korea’s tumultuous trajectory 
of modernization. I analyze the hybridization of Korean developmental state, history of 
governing culture and technology in Korea, and the principles of ‘creative economy’ and 
‘creative cities’ imported from the West, and examine how the current “K-Smart City” plan 
manifests distinct characteristics about the practices of future-making and the developmentalist 
politics of entrepreneurial and creative urbanism in Korea. How Songdo reflects this hybridized 
vision of the future and how it manifests the political rationales for converging arts, culture, and 
technology under the framework of creative economy in Korea are the key questions that will be 
addressed in the next section, which will be followed by the discussions about the moral 
consequences that shape the idea of ideal cities and citizenship befitting the future.    
K-Smart City and the Korean Style Creative Economy  
World class IT leaders have profound interest in our creative economy. I am 
going to establish online and seventeen offline creative economy innovation 
centers, which will become the pivot of our regional developments and the cradle 




achieve the miracle of creative economy […] Science, technology, ICT and the 
cultural contents, the vitamins of creative economy, are our strengths. We should 
apply these contents with the manufacture sector to build the newly converged 
industrial sectors such as ‘internet-of-everything (IoE)’, cloud computing, and big 
data. […] I will shift all the systems of regulation to encourage investment and to 
overcome economic hurdles in our nation.  
President Park, Geun-Hye, “Three-Year-Plan for the Economic Innovation in Korea” 
 
On February 25th, 2014, the president Park, Geun-Hye addressed the Korean public in her annual 
speech and laid out the “Three-Year-Plan for the Economic Innovation in Korea.” President Park 
(in office from 2013 to 2017) had publicized her national economic agenda of the Creative 
Economy [Changjo-gyeongje] upon her inauguration in 2013, distinguishing her plan with that 
of her predecessor President Lee, Myung-Bak and his “Green Growth” strategy. During her 
opening speech at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit Meeting in 2013, 
Park heavily politicized the K-pop’s sensational success in the global ‘creative’ industry, marked 
by Psy’s Gangnam Style’s global hit, which she lauded as the primary example of her vision for 
the creative economy (Ahn, 2013.10.07).  
 In establishing the creative economy as the national economic strategy, Park’s 
administration foremost emphasized the significance of increasing flexibility to the existing 
economic structure and deregulating policies that had largely served the interests of large-size 
corporations (chaebols) over the small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). Under Park’s 
administration, the new Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning [Mirae-changjo-gwahak-
bu] (Hereafter ‘Ministry of Future Planning’) was established to implement policies and funding 
schemes to encourage and support the new venture start-ups run by young and innovative 
entrepreneurs. The Ministry of Future Planning since has collaborated with the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy among others to 




area of ICT, smart devices, smart cars, smart energy grid, bio and medical science, and security 
and disaster prevention systems (National Information Society Agency 2014).37  
 In 2016, a special committee for the “K-Smart City” project was launched by the 
Ministry of Future Planning, which aimed to lead the R&D projects for the smart city, one of the 
nine national strategic focus area along with the artificial intelligence (AI), virtual and 
augmented reality (VR/AR), and self-driving cars. Smart city being one of the key strategic 
focuses of the creative economy, Songdo became a model for cities like Busan and Sejong that 
developed their own version of smart city testbed. While each city government carried out the 
experiments with digital sensors and big data-driven urban services, the Ministry of Future 
Planning oversaw the process of branding and commercializing the exportable K-Smart City, 
toward the emerging smart city market in the South and Southeast Asia (India and China in 
particular) and the Middle East. As a collaborative project of the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, and Transport (MOLIT) and the Ministry of Science and ICT and Future Planning 
(MSIP) since 2016, K-Smart City reconfirms the techno-nationalistic mythology in a supposedly 
border-free universe of digital infrastructure. The hope was that Korea could claim the “Smart 
City” as the national technological product (along with its system of production), which would 
benefit South Korea’s global reputation as a technologically advanced country and increase the 
sales of Korean made products overseas.  
 In parallel with the increasing emphasis placed on the technology-driven innovation as 
the main driver of economic growth, the field of culture was also undergoing a significant 
transition. ‘Culture technology (CT)’, a term coined by Won Kwang-yun, the dean of the 
 
37 The Ministry of Future Planning also collaborated with the Ministry of Education to develop a new 
curriculum to teach coding to elementary and middle school students to cultivate the capacity to 
“materialize creative idea through software,” prepared to become the “future workforce of the creative 




Graduate School of Culture Technology (GSCT) at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and 
Technology (KAIST), was often cited in government policy documents. According to the 
webpage of the GSCT, “culture technology (CT)” covers a “broad field of research on digital 
media and related technologies, interaction, design and theory, that are becoming more and more 
important in forming our surroundings and culture” (KAIST, 2006; cited from Shin, 2009). 
Korean government selected CT as one of the ‘five next generation promising technologies for 
economic growth’, along with IT (information technology), BT (bio-technology), NT (nano-
technology), and ET (environment technology).  
 Creative economy in Korea can be seen as an appropriation of the creative economy 
strategy imported from the US and the UK. It ‘rediscovered’ culture as economic utility, through 
Korea’s state- initiatives, to revitalize the techno-nationalist mythology by fostering an 
information-technology industry as the new national growth engine. In other words, ‘creative 
economy with Korean characteristics’ emerged out of the confluence of the national and global 
policy movement to economize culture and Korean government’s initiative to find the nation’s 
next revenue stream through ‘national informationalization’ [kukka chŏngbohwa]. To 
comprehend these distinct characteristics of Korean creative economy then, it is crucial to 
examine how the concept of creative economy has transferred from the US and UK to South 
Korea in the late 2000s, when policymakers sought to imitate and benchmark the Western 
policies (Kim, 2018).  
 In fact, there had been a longer history of ‘policy transfer’ that has shaped Korea’s 
information technology and R&D policy. For instance, in 2001, Alvin Toffler submitted a report 




stressed the importance of reforming Korea’s economic structure to adapt to the ever- 
accelerating global trend of what he called the ‘Third Wave Economy’:  
Third Wave economy is based, as we know, on innovative applications of 
knowledge – creative mind-power instead of brute muscle-power. In the Third 
Wave, innovative knowledge becomes the most important factor of production, 
capable of reducing reliance on all the others. Data, images, symbols, culture, ideas, 
and processes can drive down requirements of labor, capital, inventory, raw 
materials, and energy.  
Toffler Associates. (2001). “Beyond the Crisis: Korea in the 21st Century.” (p.8).  
 
 Toffler’s guidelines for the Third Wave economy suggested that Korea undertake a 
holistic reform of its business model, organized around a few giant companies (chaebols), and 
that it invest instead in the new economic sector of information technology as a vehicle for the 
nation’s future growth. Ideally, this reform was going to bring more flexibility and transparency 
to the market as well as to the government. Besides, for a natural resource-poor country like 
Korea, reaping the unlimited reservoir of human ‘mind power’ was seen as the only way to 
survive and thrive in the global economy – a point affirmed by President Kim Dae-jung in his 
address to the World Bank symposium in 1999: “In the 21st century… intangible elements such 
as knowledge, information and cultural creativity will be the source of a nation’s 
competitiveness.” This basic rationale was shared by Korean government ever since, albeit with 
a slightly different emphasis and rhetoric deployed by different administrations – ‘knowledge 
economy’ (1998-2007), ‘green growth’ (2008-2012), and ‘creative economy’ (2013-2017).  
 At the same time, there was a growing consensus at a national and global scale, regarding 
the role of culture in economic development. The tendency to co-opt culture increased especially 
since the international organizations such as World Bank and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) started calling for new directions in development work 




1970s onwards (Dutta, 2015). Together with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), these international organizations corresponded to such a shift 
and recognized the importance of culture as an economic resource and as an integral player in 
economic growth (Matarasso, 2001). For instance, a document titled “Recognizing culture: A 
series of briefing papers on culture and development” published in partnership with UNESCO 
and support from the World Bank notes: “cultural resources are replacing natural resources as the 
primary raw material of economic growth. Where timber, iron and oil ruled, knowledge, 
creativity and design are establishing themselves as the crucial sources of added value” 
(Matarasso, 2001, p. 4). Culture is seen as a source of aspiration, and by extension, the objective 
of development. It is through culture that people change the way they do things and how they see 
the world (Mulgan, 1997, cited from du Gay & Pryke, 2002).    
 Apropos these multiple national and international circumstances – such as the IMF 
financial crisis, the national initiatives to nurture the information technology industry, shifting 
emphasis on the mattering of culture in development programs – South Korean policymakers 
were gleaning from the case studies conducted largely in and about the US and the UK, most 
famously Richard Florida (2002) and his thesis of the “creative class” and “creative cities” and 
the UK’s Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s (DCMS) “creative industries” policy.38 One 
of the most pronounced of these efforts materialized in Seoul where the city served as the first 
template for the government’s new urban policy experiments. The “Design Seoul” project of 
mayor Oh Se-hoon (2006-2011) was among the series of the government’s attempts to ‘upgrade’ 
 
38 Initially introduced in Australia in the early 1990s, the concept of “creative industries” had fully found 
its definition under UK’s New Labour administration during the late 1990s (Ross, 2009). The hallmark of 
its thought was that the convergence of the arts, science and technology would generate innovative 
synergy, by producing highly profitable copyright materials such as video games and softwares, as well as 
by fostering related business in service, real estate business and manufacture sector including fashion, 




the city through culture, with a more practical guiding principle of ‘design’. It was through 
Seoul’s new design policy that the rhetoric of creativity-driven urban development first entered 
the public domain. For the cultural policy-makers, establishing Seoul as the design city was 
synonymous to turning it into a global city (Lee, H. 2015). This aspect was not only evident in 
the government’s strenuous effort to forge a relationship with the authorities from global entities 
such as UNESCO and WDC, but also in a series of city branding strategies that influenced the 
image of Seoul as a tourist-centered global city.  
 At the political front stage and through the back channels, numerous efforts were 
undertaken to foreground Seoul’s presence in the global network of urban cultural policies. 
Notably, in the year 2009, Seoul successfully joined United Nations Organization for Education, 
Science and Culture (UNESCO)’s new initiative called “Creative Cities Network.” By launching 
this program since 2004, UNESCO had presented itself as a broker of collaborative relationships 
among cities seeking leverage to promote themselves to other cities. While UNESCO already 
had a ‘World Heritage Cities’ program since 1996, through which it has sought to valorize and 
preserve the ‘legacy’ of humanity, the Creative Cities Network program shifted an emphasis 
away from ‘preservation’ of cultural heritage to ‘development’ of cultural assets.39 In promoting 
creative industries, Seoul metropolitan government drew lessons from London and Tony Blair’s 
‘Creative Britain’ project as an exemplary case that Seoul had to be modeled upon (see Lee & 
Hwang, 2012). After his resignation as the mayor, Oh went to reside as a fellow at the Graduate 
 
39 This can be seen as the critical difference between ‘cultural economy/industry/cities’ and ‘creative 
economy/industry/cities’ – whereas the former model relies on welfarist government’s subsidy on cultural 
sector, the latter emphasizes active entrepreneurialization of culture, by which culture has to be profitable 
on its own. Culture became a utility that creates wealth itself (Hewison, 2014) – a connotation that also 
relates to the newly assumed ‘active’ role of consumer, who is no longer supposed to be a passive 
anonymous audience but an independent, participatory agent who creates and contributes with his/her 




School of Social Science and Public Policy at King’s College London in 2014, to substantiate his 
theory of ‘culturenomics’. 
  The presidential agenda of ‘creative economy’ during Park administration (2013-2017) 
extended Seoul’s experiment with creative city policies, with the idea of converging the art and 
culture with the cutting-edge technologies, while a special emphasis was placed on generating 
added value to the Korean-made IT products and expanding the list of exportable product line 
such as the artificial intelligence (AI), virtual and augmented reality (VR/AR), and self-driving 
cars. Implementing this creative economy policy at the national level involved a significant 
‘translation’ process (Kim, E. S. 2018) of the practices and techniques that fit within the specific 
set of problems and institutional arrangement of the South Korean government. One particular 
problem that the government confronted at the time was the perceived lack of originality in 
software and cultural contents consumed by Korean users. In contrast to the rapid growth in 
hardware and ICT infrastructure, South Korean information technology was in need of 
significant improvement in its ‘cultural’ aspect. Creative economy policies therefore sought to 
promote Korean culture as original ‘contents’ that would improve Korean technology as a 
‘form’.  
 Another crucial aspect that deserves consideration for comprehending the distinct quality 
of creative economy in Korea is the enduring governing philosophy of ‘technological 
developmentalism’, the nationalist mythology that approached technology as the primary means 
of national security and economic growth. This sociotechnical imaginary was rearticulated in 
Korea’s creative economy and constituted the distinct quality of creative economy with Korean 
characteristics. Korea’s formation of technological developmentalism can be traced to the 1960s, 




Especially from 1960 to 1996, a profound amount of technological learning occurred, while the 
authoritarian government of Park Chung-Hee orchestrated the export-oriented industrialization 
(Kim Linsu, 1997) – with a success in semiconductor chips, shipbuilding and automobile 
industry. Even when the current preoccupation with ‘creativity’ is giving way to more 
technology-centered ‘innovation’ and the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’ techno-nationalist 
developmental framework rearticulates in the seemingly new growth directive of innovation.  
 To summarize, the global imperatives to co-opt culture as a utility of development, the 
Tofflerian information utopianism, techno-nationalist developmentalism, and the role of the 
national government that orchestrated the convergence of art, culture, and technology have been 
the recipe for the creative economy with Korean characteristics – and these are important 
considerations that have to be factored into any account of creative economy, not only in South 
Korean context, but many other developing countries such as China and India that are 
experimenting with the new strategies of synergizing the production of culture and technology in 
varying degrees. Seen from the above perspective, the current K-Smart City project can be seen 
as a governing strategy reflective of the general changes in the field of culture that is increasingly 
governmentally and technologically organized and constructed, of the enduring techno-
nationalist myths and practices of future making, and of the residual practices and approach to 
the export-oriented industrialization strategy that are rearticulated in the creative economy.  
 With that being said, it is crucial to mention that the broader social contexts reflected in 
the formation of the K-Smart City charted above have co-evolved with another important shift in 
the mode of governance that has occurred throughout the late 20th century to the present. In 
relation to the legal and economic transformation of creative economy, in the next section, I 




a prominent mode of urban governance and a form of governmentality, was diffused with the 
ideal norms of citizenship and the regime of self-governance. In addressing the everyday 
consequences of wedding culture and technology and of synergizing the multiple modalities of 
enunciating future in the present, I especially attend to the interdependency of ‘entrepreneurial 
urbanism’ (as an idea of the city) and the ‘entrepreneurial self’ (as an idea of personhood and 
conduct). Traversing the nexus between these two discursive fields, I contend, is the idea of 
movement perceived as a historical force, a physical as well as an ‘affective fact’. For instance, 
the movement idealized in various cultural forms – the kinesthetic imagery of K-Pop MV (e.g., 
Psy’s Gangnam Style, BoA’s Hurricane Venus, etc.), the transnational flow of Korean Wave, 
and the digital flow and glow of Songdo, becomes the embodied norm for the conduct and 
program of actions for the city and the citizens, as they map their way of being in space and 
shape their practices of carrying themselves into the future.     
Manage Your Passion: From Dutiful Nationals To the Creative Entrepreneurs   
The utilitarian assertion that culture and technology are supposed to serve the public’s interest is 
not a novel idea of creative economy. Nevertheless, the current conjuncture of creative economy 
rearticulates the idea of how the society is to better itself through culture and through 
technological advancement. And this idea percolates through everyday realm of life-world, as 
people are constantly on the move, making sense of the world, mobilizing their resources, 
improving their technical facility, “managing their passion” (as the Samsung’s hero of 
semiconductor myth Chin Dae-je’s autobiography title suggests), and effectively governing 
themselves as self-responsible entrepreneurs. What then, were the overarching thematic of the 
city and citizenship that constituted the ‘culture’ of production in creative economy, which have 




urban, national, and global scales? And more importantly, how were these norms generative of 
certain styles of conduct?   
 Before I think through the subjective and affective dimension of Songdo and its 
manifestation of entrepreneurial urbanism, I revisit David Harvey (1989)’s observation of the 
general transformation of urban governance from a managerial to entrepreneurial one. In 
previous sections, I have offered a contextualized narrative of this transition in South Korea. In 
this section, I closely navigate the shifting ‘psychogeography’ (Bruno, 2002) and the ‘affective 
landscape’ (Grossberg, 2018) that have been coeval with the economic and legal transformation 
associated with the entrepreneurial urbanization and creative economy. In a way, I attempt to 
capture the double connotation of motion and emotion, as the Latin etymology of kinesthesia 
tells us. It is through charting the inner space of emotion, and especially the affective charge of 
mobilizing one’s ‘passion’ that I will answer the above question regarding the ways in which the 
idea of entrepreneurial urbanism relied upon, and was synergized with the idea of entrepreneurial 
self.40  
 
40 Several critical cultural studies scholars discussed the emerging subjective condition of life and work 
parallel to the ‘rise of creative economy’ and the formation of ‘entrepreneurial self’ (McRobbie, 2002, 
2016; Ouellette, 2014). In the context of the UK, Angela McRobbie (2016) charts the broad societal 
transformation in which people are increasingly disembedded from the membership to the traditional 
social institutions as well as from the cushion of social welfare. As a result, people are pushed to embrace 
the re-invented notion of work that becomes a field to fulfill and actualize individual’s mark of self. 
Young generations are pressed to apply “their facilities with new media technology and the experience of 
‘club culture sociality’ with its attendant skills of networking and selling the self and have created form 
themselves new ways of earning a living in the cultural field” (p.521).  No longer depending on the public 
funding, creative workers instruct themselves to become a ‘microstructure’ or a ‘self-enterprise’, adopting 
the features of what Laurie Ouellette describes as ‘entrepreneurial selves’ (Ouellette, 2014). This notion 
refers to the kind of self-awareness increasingly upheld by creative workers who conceive themselves 
“less as a subject of rights and collective interests, but more as an ‘entrepreneur of self’, incited to manage 
his or her own conduct and maximize his or her own capacities as the condition of expanding freedoms” 
(p.91). In this model, labor is no longer limited to what happens in the office or the factory, since work is 
“reconceived as an investment in the self as a personal enterprise that involves education, training, social 





 As explained above, the K-Smart City consists of multiplicity of techniques, practices, 
and perspectives regarding technology, culture, and development that manifests in a unique 
social and historical context of South Korea. One crucial aspect of such manifestation involves 
restylization of the mode of urban governance that casts the city not only as an exportable and 
tourist-friendly cultural product but as an active entrepreneurial actor – of which Songdo is a 
prime example. As discussed in chapter 2, Songdo was designated as a Free Economic Zone 
(FEZ) in 2002 and ever since, became a deregulated zone that partially gave away the state 
sovereign power to other non-government proxies such as multinational corporations and 
international organizations. Leveraging its zoning strategy, Incheon Free Economic Zone (IFEZ) 
Authority has procured partnerships with IT corporations, real estate investors, and the US and 
European universities. Through these partnerships, IFEZ implemented the new geographic 
investment strategy, by opening branch campuses of the US and European universities (e.g., 
State University of New York, University of Utah, Ghent University, George Mason University), 
offering relocation services for incoming officials working for the international organizations 
(Song, 2014.09.22). IFEZ also retained the Techno Park (IBITP)41 model to support the growth 
of corporate research and development (R&D) centers and university labs in Songdo.42 Techno 
Park in Songdo now hosts the newly established Center for Creative Economy and Innovation 
(CCEI) in 2014. CCEI was originally the Ministry of Future Planning’s project, which 
established 19 branches spread out nationwide to serve as the regional incubating hub of startups 
 
41	Songdo Techno Park was originally established in 1998 as a corporate body of Incheon Development 
Committee. Since its relocation to Songdo in 2004, it changed its name to Incheon Techno Park and 
expanded its structure by combining Incheon Business Agency and Incheon Information Service. Incheon 
Techno Park’s official name is Incheon Business Information Techno Park (IBITP).  
42 The ‘Smart Valley’ within the Songdo district is located adjacent to Songdo Techno Park and its name 
is explicitly modeled after the Silicon Valley. Currently, the area is mostly used as an office and lab space 
for bio-tech and pharmaceutical research, for domestic and international companies including Samsung 
Biologics, Celtrion, Dong-a Pharmaceutical, Cisco (network infrastructure), Daewoo International (trade 




and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). CCEI’s mission was to provide consultancies 
to the small businesses to strategize and promote their ideas and to broker relationships with 
investors and larger corporations, such as Samsung, LG, SK, and Lotte.43 Following the Techno 
Park model, each city hosting CCEI established a corporate body, in order to manage its own 
venture finance operations, and designated its own regional focus: Songdo’s CCEI for smart 
logistics and smart city-related innovations and businesses, while other cities were focusing on 
green energy (Daejeon), urban life and food technology (Seoul), IoT and tourism (Jeju), film and 
visual technology (Busan), game and fin-tech (Seongnam), smart agriculture (Sejong) and so on 
(CCEI official website).  
 These examples illustrate how the shifting mode of urban governance is organizing the 
cities as ‘technological zones’ that integrate the entrepreneurial role of the city with its 
managerial function, in service of innovation and business. As Harvey (1989) observed in the US 
context, the managerial stance of urban governance typical of the 1960s confined the city’s role 
to the provision of the basic infrastructure and services. This stance started to shift into a more 
active and entrepreneurial form of urban governance in the 1970s and the 1980s, which put the 
cities in a position to support the enterprises and induce the local economic growth. The shift has 
been accompanied by the changing dynamics of socio-economic factors in a number of different 
levels: the transition from Fordist-Keynesian capitalist accumulation to neoliberal-flexible 
accumulation, the state government’s shrinking role in the local politics, and the formation of 
‘coalition politics’ among local administrative class which coalesced the city into a ‘growth 
machine’ (Logan & Molotch, 1987/2007). Besides, the growing prominence of global 
 
43	As of 2017, the management of the CCEI was transferred from the Ministry of Future Planning to the 





competition and the rolling back of welfarist state made the city to become a crucial node 
through which neoliberal hegemony materialize in territorial forms.  
 This entrepreneurial mode of urban governance swept across the world in the late 20th 
century, the process which has been theorized by many urban geographers who foregrounded the 
related theses: ‘city as a growth machine’ (Logan & Molotch, 1987/2007); urban 
entrepreneurialism’ (Harvey, 1989); ‘neoliberal urbanization’ (Keil, 2009); ‘mobile urbanism’ 
(McCann, 2011). Largely from a macro-economic perspective, these theories highlighted the role 
of cities in relation to the global network of capital accumulation that touch down and what the 
politico-economic consequences were for the cities to become the mobilizing ground of 
resources (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). In a similar vein, Sassen (2005)’s theory of ‘global city’ 
particularly stressed the role of the ICT in flexibilizing the financial exchanges across the 
territorial borders, which was integral to the process of consolidating power relations of global 
market economy in urban cores.44  
 The trope of globalization’s competitive and punishing reality gained prominence in 
South Korea in the mid-1990s and especially during the wake of financial crisis in 1997. As the 
sobering experience of the crisis legitimized the imperative to adapt to the ‘new’ reality of 
globalization, Songdo developed into a fully fledged enterpreneurial city, internalizing the 
neoliberal logic of capital accumulation, while at the same time, manifesting the legacy of the 
Korean developmental state (Shin, H. B., 2017). Like many other cities in Korea, Songdo 
proactively stylized itself as an entrepreneurial actor that confronted the new economic reality of 
 
44	The dynamic was more closely observed by Graham & Marvin (2001), who asserted that the 
networked infrastructures and technological mobilities have been the key assets of modern cities. From an 
infrastructural point of view, they view the current transitions that configure in urban forms as consisting 





globalization, by interacting with the global network of corporate actors and by proclaiming its 
role as the facilitator of local economic growth.  
 That said, this ‘internalization of neoliberal logic’ that occurred within the dialectic of 
global capitalist economy and the developmental state involved much more than implementing 
new economic policies and deregulating the business environment. At the fundamental and yet 
intimate personal level, there was a course of collective will formation that weaved the 
entrepreneurial urbanism into the everyday fabric of life-world, which in turn, inducted the 
individual citizens’ personal will to act upon oneself, through an entrepreneurial mode of self 
governance. With regard to the formation of the collective will in late 20th to early 21st century 
Korea, in a pessimistic tone, Kim Hong-Jung (2018) sees the undercurrent governmental 
rationality of ‘survivalism’, which turns the practices of future-making into the visceral matter of 
survival in the now.45 In this perspective, it can be said that the sociotechnical imaginaries of 
future city rendered in the form of entrepreneurial urbanism then, is derivative less of the actual 
hopes and optimistic anticipation of future attainable through technology than of the enduring 
pessimism, anxiety, and helplessness that could be remedied by technology. In other words, as 
the individualization of risk, neoliberal governmentality, overwhelming sense of vulnerability 
forced people to internalize the survivalist regime where the world is seen as a series of 
challenges and crisis, the disempowered human agency is seemingly uplifted and salvaged 
 
45 Kim Hong-Jung traces this historical formation of ‘survivalist governmenality’ during Park Chung-
Hee’s regime (1961-1979) and especially the broad range of sociopolitical circumstances that rendered 
‘precarity’ as a given condition of life in Korea’s Cold War period. As the trope of exigencies rendered 
the nation vulnerable to external threats (e.g., national security threat posed by communism, economic 
threat of poverty), Korean people internalized the view of the world as full of anomies, which extended to 
their view of life-world also consisting of a series of challenges and crises (Kim, 2018). This historically 
constructed regime of survivalist mentality is not only experienced and performed, but viscerally 
animated through the “inner, psychic, and even spiritual dimension of human actors” (p. 8) and Korean  




through their passionate devotion in technology, creativity and innovation. Even if technology 
does not resolve the crisis, at least it is believed to prolong their survival in this world.  
 From the cultural point of view of looking at the specific performances and practices that 
urban dwellers are entangled, we can investigate how the discordance between the 
‘transcendental structure of problem’ and the ‘will of the governed’ is mediated by the formation 
of an ethos (or ‘spirit’ in Weberian term) – a collective mentality of survivalism and a form of 
governmentality that shapes the ideal values and moral competency demanded of the subjects 
who seek their liberation (if not redemption). After all, it is not greed but fear that motivates 
these subjects. In the imaginaries of the future devoid of hope, the anxiety creeps in. In the world 
viewed as uncertainties and challenges, with little sense of life security guaranteed by the state, 
the individual becomes the responsible entrepreneur solely accountable for one’s life.  
 In South Korea, this new survivalist regime of entrepreneurialism is grafted onto the 
enduring techno-nationalist developmentalism, which put in motion highly regimented and 
disciplined program of action for the individuals who are composed of personal ‘specs’ – 
denoting the qualifications, skills, experience, knowledge and other attributes that they must 
possess to perform certain job duties. In the world where precarity is understood as a new 
normalcy of life and the risk is individualized, technology presides the power to give assurance. 
As many Koreans internalize and enact the ‘praxis of survivalism’ and reinvent themselves as a 
technological zone defined by their level of ‘specs’. Among today’s Korean youth, the phrase 
“improving/accumulating one’s specs” is in common parlance, denoting the practices of 
validating one’s worth through technically assessable means: scoring high in English proficiency 
exams (e.g., TOEIC, TOEFL), documenting extracurricular activities (e.g., volunteering at social 




and acquiring the ‘state-registered certifications’ (e.g., spreadsheet and information management 
ability test, Word Processor application ability test, etc.).46 Even many retirees are forced to 
reeducate themselves at technical colleges before entering the already tough job market for the 
second time. In the absence of social welfare programs that are supposed to provide a minimum 
safety net for the precarious and aged life, technology is their substitute insurance and retirement 
plan.47  
 It is through the specifying programs of governing oneself and the others that the 
governance of entrepreneurial city accomplishes its final goal, which is to automate its governing 
function in the realm of urban life that had not been previously thought of as the direct realm of 
government’s influence. This point ties back to my discussion in previous chapters, about how 
the governance of smart city is distinct from the institutionalized forms of ‘government’ in that it 
achieves a new level of effectiveness by distributing and embedding power in the environment 
and by formulating and enacting the ethos and norms of progress and development that work 
with the individual desire for their own well-being and survival. What is remarkable about 
Songdo and smart city’s seemingly voluntary, civic, participatory mode with which individuals 
are supposed to govern oneself is that, the terms with which they must navigate through the 
present uncertainties and precarities are beyond their means to exact an influence. The only way 
 
46	The state-registered technology qualification test [Kukka kisul chagyŏkshihŏm] is a national 
certification system administered since 1975, which consists of both written test and performance test 
designed to evaluate the individual’s level of knowledge and dexterity with specific technology or 
techniques. As of 2017, there are as many as 525 categories of test depending on the applicant’s chosen 
area of technical expertise (e.g., computer application, information management, makeup skills, cooking 
skills, excavation machine operation, etc.). The number of issued certification steadily increased 
every year and in 2017, the total of 676,046 certifications were newly registered to the system, out of 
2,451,067 individual tests administered (Human Resources Development Services of Korea, 2018).  
47 Such perception of science and technology as the driver of national economic growth especially gained 
prominence during Park Chung-Hee regime (1961-1979). See Han & Downey (2014) for the history of 
the relationship between the changing economic strategies of South Korean government and changing 





to address the gap between the uncertainties of the present and the potential resolution in the 
future is through mobilizing one’s ‘passion’, enduring all sorts of physical and mental suffering 
of the “Passion Pay” [Yŏlchŏng p’ei] – another common term among Korean youth that indicates 
very little or no payment earned by doing ‘voluntary’ internships and temporary jobs.  
 The regime of survivalist entrepreneur rearticulated in Korean developmental mentality 
becomes a useful field for envisioning and governing Songdo as an entrepreneurial city. The new 
ethos of work that orders population along the series of ‘specs’ seemingly disrupts the previous 
norms civic virtue that were defined by their devotion to family and the nation. Still, there exists 
an enduring plane of mentality and desperation for development and survival that drives and 
animates the new practices of the self, which is ‘willfully’ embraced by various groups of people 
in all walks of life across the class distinction and generational gaps: students, teachers, parents, 
retirees, as well as the aspiring creative workers within the innovation ecology in Songdo. For 
instance, many Korean parents are vying to send their kids to Songdo or relocate the whole 
family to Songdo, hoping to provide a higher quality of education to their children from English-
speaking schools such as the Chadwick International School (a kindergarten to twelfth grade-
level private school, which has a main branch in Palos Verdes, California), and other satellite 
campuses of US and European universities. Regardless of their level of income or other means, 
many parents internalize the ethos of survivalist entrepreneur and developmental mentality in 
programming their children’s educational path, in order for them to be better-equipped to 
navigate the precarious future in Korea and in the world. For them, Songdo is perceived as a 
facilitating ground to assemble the necessary ‘specs’ and to gain mobility, and as an imagined 
plane to project their dreams and passions of bequeathing a better quality of life and future to 




 In this way, a city like Songdo becomes less of a field where the effect of ideologies is 
materialized and legitimated than an assemblage of techniques and affects that inspire certain 
ways of mapping one’s existence in the world. Songdo maps the ways in which one is supposed 
to behave and compose oneself in order to navigate the road between his/her aspirations for the 
future and desperations of surviving in the present. It is through this roadmap that the individuals 
learn to articulate oneself in relation to the various societal shifts associated with creative 
economy, including the competitive reality of the global, ‘flexibilizing’ labor conditions, the 
production model that synergizes culture and technology, and compelling culture of work that 
individualizes risk, so as to constantly remind themselves of the skills and ways of conduct that 
they can practice on their own.  
 Thus, the governmental rationality of developmentalism articulated in the survivalist 
regime of entrepreneurial self operates through the shifting mode of governing the city that 
implicates and draws resources from the will to fabricate one’s self and one’s passion toward the 
fear and fascination with the future. As Osborne & Rose (1999) point out, “the fabrication of the 
self is not a once-and-for-all matter, accomplished in family or school, nor does it rely on 
exterior transcendental sources.” Instead, “it is continuously maintained in the very act of 
participation in the networks of existence” (p.750). City is a useful milieu for these processes of 
self-fabrication, insofar as it is within the city that the forms of conduct are shaped and stabilized 
in how the self relates to itself and to others.  
Conclusion 
This chapter charted how the smart city serves as one of the ways in which the government 
grapples with South Korea’s future in creative economy. Through Songdo, the idea of future was 




embodied in the dynamic and skillful movements of K-Pop musicians as well as the celebratory 
rendition of techno-nationalist mythology in the festive venues. Songdo was one of the key 
motifs for South Korea’s sociotechnical imaginaries, in which culture and technology were 
perceived as the primary means of future-making in the creative economy. What is distinct about 
the rhetoric of future in Songdo is that while it shares with other smart cities the relentless 
optimisms and aspirations to become global, secure, and sustainable, the very aspiration of the 
city is entrenched in the perpetual desperation in the present and the history of techno-nationalist 
developmentalism, which are deeply implicated in the idea of nationhood. While discussing the 
smart cities in India, Ayona Datta (2018) points out how the state and the city are often conflated 
in the mythologizing rhetoric of technology, which she describes as one of the characteristics of 
postcolonial cities. The curious relationship between urban future, nationhood, and technology 
plays out in the future-making practices in Songdo, particularly through the discursive and 
material endeavor to plan and promote the “K-Smart City,” which attempts to emulate K-Pop’s 
growing influence in the global music industry.   
 There are both emergent and residual ways in which the city such as Songdo is enrolled 
in the practice of future-making. On the one hand, the imperative of creative economy has been 
increasingly pervading the cities in Korea, producing a new demand for the cities to become 
entrepreneurial actors and for the citizens to improve their capacities and to manage their lives in 
certain ways. Yet, there still persists an ‘old’ way of doing ‘new’ things, which partly has to do 
with the bureaucratic inertia of the government that, yet to devise a new response, applies the 
same methods of state-led development regime in dealing with the new problems of the creative 
economy. More crucially, the persisting plane of ‘developmental mentality’ articulated in the 




fabricate one’s will and behavior, in order to navigate the precarious terrain of the present, which 



























Throughout this dissertation, I analyzed the multiple articulation of smart city in the scale of 
Songdo, South Korea. In each chapter, I mapped the specific diagrams that comprised different 
aspects of the smart city, which collectively manifested in Songdo. Overall, this dissertation 
illustrated how the intersecting urban diagrams and their specific genealogies regarding the 
problems of mobility, security, environment, and futurity simultaneously gave emergence to the 
current formation of Songdo. One of the primary goals of this research was to establish the 
ground for a genealogical and cultural approach to the smart city, which involved mapping the 
relationality between the institutional, technological, cultural, historical, and affective landscapes 
of Songdo and articulating the broad context within which public discussions about 
globalization, surveillance, sustainable development, and creative economy weaved through the 
everyday life world of the smart city. 
 The results from this research can be briefly summarized in the [Table 2] below. As a 
manifestation of multiple diagrams of Songdo, the table can be read both vertically and 
horizontally. Any column and row can be a starting point to read the map of Songdo and can 
even be utilized as a guideline for the future smart city research. The first row of [Table 2] 
suggests the general framework for viewing the history of the smart city as a multiple 
sociotechnical emergence out of the dialectics between continuity and ruptures. Charting the 
long history of the smart city throughout this dissertation, in Chapter 1 in particular, involved not 
only drawing upon the immediately related concepts and inventions of the smart city but 
exploring the relations between the dispersed genealogies that pertain to South Korea’s urban 
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communication and transportation history (e.g., highways, microwaves, airports, television, and 
the electronic media), history of militarized modernization and the subjective formation of 
‘dutiful nationals’, and the development history of South Korea and the technology’s privileged 
position in society. If my attempts were successful, this dissertation can serve as an antidote to 
the smart city research that narrowly focus on the ‘newness’ and the ‘effect’ of the smart city and 
instead, foreground the expanded cultural and historical continuity of the smart city. 
 The second row enlists the keywords that were used to analyze how Songdo has been 
articulated as a global city. Taking a cue from the smart city’s primary emphasis on mobility 
management and the long history of ‘governmobility’ (perceived as a problem of the government 
and a mode of rule) in South Korea, Chapter 2 of this dissertation especially focused on how the 
government of mobility was exercised through the interdependency of communication and 
transportation infrastructure (e.g., highway-microwave network, airport-Internet) and discussed 
how the smart city’s mobility management system functionally merges communication and 
transportation. From the mobility perspective, articulating Songdo as a global city involved 
synthesizing the new transportation infrastructure for the global mobility (through the airport), 
the new model of global communication (through the Internet), institutional arrangement for the 
global financial mobility (through the Free Economic Zone), and the cultural sensibilities for 
openness and global aspirations. One of the takeaways for the future smart city and mobility 
research is to keenly attend to the variegated aspects of mobility, which is not only about 
speeding up or setting something free. The chapter suggests the inherently dialectical relations 
between freedom and rule in mobility governance, which regulates and distributes freedom of 




 The third row presents a different, if not a paradoxical, dimension of the same mobility 
regime read through the second row. Chapter 3 was especially concerned with what techniques 
of security and safety were utilized in problematizing risk in Songdo (and smart city understood 
as a risk management machine) and how these techniques are symptomatic of South Korea’s 
long history of militarism, public discussions of national security, and understanding of oneself 
as the frontier of personal defense responsibilities. This reading of smart city will be especially 
useful for future smart city research that narrowly view the surveillance issues from a 
deterministic perspective. This chapter triggers questions about how the risk, as a socially 
constructed concept, has been differently problematized and how, as a result, the idea of self and 
its responsibilities have reflected the historically contingent notion of risks (e.g., variously 
imagined in a scale of the national threat, street crimes, environmental hazard, etc.).  
 The fourth row presents another view of the smart city both as a media saturated 
environment and as a means for environmental sustainability. Chapter 4 of this dissertation 
especially charted how the environment became an emerging object of the government since the 
late 20th century and how the smart city is situated within the nexus between the discursive 
formation of the sustainable development and the growing demand for a better quality of life 
from the South Korean citizens. This chapter utilized the concept of ‘environmentality’ to 
discuss how the techniques and technologies of environmental mode of urban governance, such 
as the distributed digital sensors and protocols for managing environmental data, have relegated 
the governmental accountability to the non-governmental realm of the environment and 
automated governance. This significant shift in the mode of urban governance is the topic that 
deserves further exploration in the future smart city research along with the issue of citizen 




 Lastly, Chapter 5 charts how the problem of ‘development’ and ‘futurity’ articulated in 
the regime of smart city in Songdo has been kinesthetically, visually, and governmentally 
communicated through the smart city’s norm of mobility and progress. This chapter explores the 
inter-textual flows of these norms that traverse the K-pop music videos, festivals, architectures, 
and the nationalist mythologies of techno-futurism, which bear upon the mutual construction of 
Songdo and South Korea’s relationship with its future, which in turn, normalize the constant 
mobility and progress in the present. The chapter also demonstrates how this futurity is 
conditioned by multiple modalities of temporalities and spatialities – the historical trajectory of 
South Korean industrialization and urbanization, the techno-nationalist approach to development, 
the global imperatives for creativity, innovation, and entrepreneurialism, and the affective charge 
associated with the kinesthetic and visual norm of smartness – which are co-articulated in the 
initiatives to commoditize and export South Korean cultural technology, the ‘K-Smart City’. 
This chapter concludes that the smart city, as a form of governmentality, forges a particular 
disposition for life and future, which gains momentum from the city and the citizens’ passion for 
self-improvement, prosperity, and a better life as well as from their desperation for survival and 
relevance in the present.   
 What have we learned through this research? How does my research contribute to the 
field of communication and media and other scholarly writings on the smart city? This 
dissertation charted a new direction in communication and media studies field by including 
urban history and environment as a topic of research. Moving away from the field’s tendency to 
focus either on audiovisual media texts or political economy, this dissertation’s approach to the 
topic suggested that a renewed framework is necessary to confront the evolving forms of power 




landscape and to capture the multiple and overlapping scales of mediality that traverse within 
and beyond the textual and institutional dimension of media.  
As I have discussed above, my dissertation will serve as an antidote to the extremes of 
urban scientific approach to the smart city that focus on the immediate effects of technology. As 
a corrective to the deterministic and totalizing narratives about the smart city, this dissertation 
took a localized and cultural approach to the smart city, within a specific context of Songdo, 
South Korea. I emphasized the multifaceted, contingent, and situated nature of the smart city, 
which exists in relation to the specific histories, public memories, and governmental rationalities. 
I hope the future research will also factor in the complex web of relationships that produce and 
occur within the smart city that I presented in this dissertation – for it is based on such historical 
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